A Regionally Integrated Pacific:  The Challenge of the  Cotonou Agreement to  Pacific Regionalism by Thomas, Steven Barry
  
 
A Regionally Integrated Pacific: 
The Challenge of the Cotonou Agreement to 
Pacific Regionalism  
 
 
By Steven B. Thomas 
 
 
National Centre for Research on Europe 
University of Canterbury 
 
 
2004 
 
A Regionally Integrated Pacific: 
The Challenge of the 
Cotonou Agreement to 
Pacific Regionalism 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree 
of 
Master of Arts in European Studies 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Steven B. Thomas 
 
 
 
 
National Centre for Research on Europe 
University of Canterbury 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
 ii
 
 iii
 iv
Acknowledgements 
 
A friend of mine once said that every piece of education is useful in some way, at some 
time.  At the time, I was sceptical how true this piece of advice was, but standing at the end 
of this project, I agree that writing this thesis has been a rewarding exercise.  Nevertheless, 
I think I have gained a new appreciation for the words written by the preacher in the book 
of Ecclesiastes, when he wrote that “there is no end to books, and too much study will 
wear you out” (Ecclesiastes 12:12).  However, the preacher also wrote, “wisdom will 
protect you…knowledge with good sense will lead you to life” (Ecclesiastes 7:12).  Study 
and research therefore has its rightful place in helping us to lead better lives; but family, 
friends and those who support and encourage us are an even more essential element in the 
process of becoming – and staying – wise.  It is fitting then that I now acknowledge and 
thank those who are dear to me, and who have helped me to complete this thesis. 
 
First of all, I must acknowledge my mother and father, Barry and Deborah, and my sister, 
Julie.  Many thanks go out to them for supporting me, feeding me and propping me up 
when I felt down; even if they could not quite understand why their son was writing a 
thesis, or what it was really all about.  Thank you, too, to my grandparents, Dave and Joan, 
for being a sounding board when I needed to bounce ideas (and frustrations) around, from 
time to time.  I hope I can repay all of you many times over in the future. 
 
Next I must mention all of the great friends I have made during my time at Canterbury 
University, both here and who have left to follow new dreams.  Among the latter I must 
count my best mates, Nick Bonner, Chris Holmes, and Hayden Johnson, who have been 
involved from afar.  To all the friends I have made at Canterbury University Christian 
Union, especially, Mike and Paul Bright, Abi Harper, Tim Weir, Phillipa Renouf, Esther 
Rohs, Roshan Allpress, Nathan van Rij and Jim Bier, you are all like a second family to 
me.  I must especially thank Andrew Brehaut, too, for holding my cover while I was often 
away “spying.” 
 
Along with these people, I must also include my two church families; at Ilam Baptist and 
St. Christopher’s churches.  Thank you for providing a place to challenge and grow me 
spiritually; and for reminding me of the eternal perspective to what I was doing.  Special 
 v
thanks to Colin Wood too, for all those times you were willing to listen over coffee, and 
help me see ahead.  To James Woodlock, Lyndon McIntosh, Charlotte Mann, and all the 
members of the Tuesday night Young Adults Cell Group, thank you for being interested 
(or at least pretending to be interested) when all I could talk about was my thesis or the 
European Union.  Your resident “Euro-geek” could not have got through the last fifteen 
months without your fellowship and friendship. 
 
Last, but not least, I have to give great thanks to my academic colleagues.  First of all I 
give thanks to my Supervisor and Head of Department at the National Centre for Research 
on Europe, Professor Martin Holland.  Martin fired my interest in the European Union a 
few years ago now, and I also have him to thank for introducing me to the kernel of this 
project.  I have always found Martin’s perceptive, professional and enthusiastic approach 
to research an inspiration.  Martin must also be thanked for the generous support, and 
productive working environment he has been able to provide at the NCRE, due to the 
excellent financial support that is available to research students. 
 
I cannot forget either my immediate colleagues.  To Doctor Malakai Koloamatangi, thank 
you for providing me with an island perspective on Pacific politics, through our various 
conversations, and for helping me to attend the Pacific Islands Forum in 2003.  To my 
office mates, Tim Ridley, Lucy Cassels, Tamsin Royson and that great NCRE character, 
‘Dr.’ Peter Mayell, I could not have asked for better workmates.  It has been fun kicking 
around ideas with you, and comforting to know that there really are other people around 
who are interested in the same field of research as me.  Thanks too to the various other 
NCRE staff and visiting academics who have helped guide and shape my research as it has 
unfolded, and to answer all those fiddly technical questions about writing theses. 
 
With this, I leave you to enjoy the fruits of my research, while I proceed to that next thing 
which is waiting in store for me. 
 
Steven B. Thomas 
National Centre for Research on Europe 
University of Canterbury 
30 June 2004 
 vi
Contents 
Page 
Abstract xi 
List of Terms and Abbreviations xii 
List of Figures, Tables and Maps xvi 
 
INTRODUCTION EU Development Policy and a Template of 
 Regional Order  
I. Introduction 1 
II. Regional Integration: A Principle of EU Development Policy 3 
III. The Focus: Pacific Regionalism 5 
IV. A Brief Note on Methodology 7 
V. The Way Ahead 9 
 
Part I:  Evaluating Regionalism in the Developing World: 
Theory and Concepts 
 
CHAPTER 1) The Development of Development Cooperation: 
 From European Associationism to Cotonou 
I. Introduction 12 
II. Associationism 13 
III. Heritage: The Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions 16 
IV. The Need for Reform 19 
V. Beyond Lomé IV: The 1996 Green Paper and on to Cotonou 22 
VI. The Cotonou Agreement: New Wine in Old Wineskins 25 
VII. Salient Implications for the Pacific 30 
VIII. Development Policy: An Example of the Capabilities 
 -Expectations Gap 31 
IX. Conclusions 32 
 
 
 
 vii
CHAPTER 2) Theoretical Approaches to Regional Integration 
 and Development 
I. Introduction 34 
II. The Study of Regionalism 36 
1. Defining Regionalism 36 
2. Political Approaches to Regional Integration: Theories of 
European Integration 38 
3. Economic Approaches to Regional Integration 44 
III. Regional Integration and Development 46 
1. Economic Integration and Neofunctionalism as Normative 
Theories of Integration in the Developing World 46 
2. A Political Economy Approach 52 
3. The Political Economy Approach Described and Appraised 59 
IV. Conclusions 61 
 
Part II: 
The Challenges and Prospects for the post-Cotonou Agreement Process in 
the Pacific: 
Does the Pacific Possess the Capacity to Act as a Region? 
 
CHAPTER 3) “Pacific Dreams” Defining ‘the Pacific’ 
I. Introduction 64 
II. The EU Definition of “the Pacific” 65 
III. “Inside”: Precontact Threads of Identity 69 
1. “Islands in the Sea” or a “Sea of Islands”? 69 
2. The Lapita Phenomenon and Patterns of Exchange from 
Precontact Times 71 
IV. “Outside”: Redrawing the Map 76 
1. Cultural Mapping 76 
2. European ‘Naming’ of the Region 76 
3. Contemporary Implications of European Contact for 
 Islander Identity 80 
V. “Inside-Out”: Islander Identity in a Globalised World 82 
 viii
1. Regional Identity: A Response to Western Influence 82 
2. Invented Tradition in the Contemporary Pacific 82 
3. Who is the Pacific For? Reform and Continuing Western 
Rendering of Islanders 83 
VI. Conclusions 85 
 
CHAPTER 4) Is an Island an ‘Island’?  Approaches to “Capacity Building” 
I. Introduction 87 
II. The Elusive Concept of “Capacity Building” 88 
1. What is “Capacity Building”? 88 
2. Measuring Capacity Building 90 
III. Pacific Capacity for Regional Integration 91 
1. Regional Trade Capacity Building: Trade Facilitation 
Programmes 91 
2. Information and Communications Technology 96 
IV. Conclusions 100 
 
CHAPTER 5) The Nature and State of Pacific Regional Cooperation: 
 The Political Economy of Contemporary Pacific Regionalism 
I. Introduction 102 
II. An EU Appraisal of Pacific Regional Cooperation 104 
1. The Pacific Regional Strategy Paper 104 
III. The Evolution of Pacific Regional Cooperation 107 
1. Initial Post-War Regional Cooperation: the SPC 108 
2. Independence and a Stronger Island Voice 110 
3. Is the “Pacific Way” a Unique Form of International  
 Interaction? 115 
IV. Cleavages, Patterns and Programmes 117 
1. Culture Area Regionalism: Cleavages Based on Ethnicity 
 and Geography 117 
2. Contrasting Cases of Regionalism: National Interests and 
Polarisation of Costs and Benefits of Regional Cooperation 122 
V. Regional Cooperation in the Age of Reform 131 
1. Donor Regional Reform Agenda Produces 
 ix
 a Stronger Compliance Regime 131 
2. Good Governance and Security: 
 Stronger Regional Discipline 132 
3. The 2004 Eminent Persons’ Review and Challenges 
 to the Pacific Way 134 
VI. The Political Economy Framework Applied: 
 An Assessment of the Nature and State of Pacific Regionalism 138 
VII. Conclusions 141 
 
CHAPTER 6) The Challenges to the post-Cotonou Agreement Process in 
 the Pacific: The Potential for Island Economic Integration 
 and EPAs 
I. Introduction 143 
II. The Controversy Surrounding Regional Economic Partnership 
Agreements 145 
1. The Commission’s Rationale for Regional Partnerships 145 
2. Economic Partnership Agreements Explained 147 
III. The Political Economy of EPAs: WTO Compatibility 153 
1. How to Make EPAs WTO Compatible: Issues and Prospects 154 
2. Provisions for Flexibility 157 
IV. The Political Economy of the Pacific 159 
1. Current Economic Trends and Conditions in the Pacific 160 
2. Rent 165 
3. Quasi-Rents 168 
4. Issues in Economic Debates over RTAs – Application to 
  the Pacific 170 
5. Application to Pacific Trade Agreements 171 
V. An EPA or an Alternative Trade Agreement for the Region? 174 
1. The EU-PACP Trading Relationship 174 
2. Optimal Configuration for a Pacific EPA: A Multi- 
 Agreement Approach 175 
VI. Conclusions 178 
 
 x
CONCLUSIONS A Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement 
  – “Off the Shelf or Tailor Made”? 
  Is the Pacific a Region? 
I. Introduction 181 
II. Rationale of Regional Relations with the Pacific Revisited 182 
III. Evaluation: The Extent of Regionalism in the Pacific 184 
IV. Prospects for a Pacific EPA 186 
V. Prospects for an EU Template of Regionalism in the Pacific 188 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 Bibliography  191 
 Frequently Consulted World Wide Websites 223 
 
APPENDICES  
 Appendix One: The Contemporary Pacific Region 225 
 Appendix Two: The EU: Member States and Administrative Regions 226 
 Appendix Three: The Six Regions of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
  States  227 
 Appendix Four: Key Indicators for Pacific Island Countries 228 
 Appendix Five: Timetable of Trade Negotiations for EU-ACP Wide 
  Economic Partnership Agreements and Pacific Island 
  Countries Trade Agreements 229 
 Appendix Six: Inter and Intra-regional Affiliations of Pacific Island 
  Territories 231 
 Appendix Seven: Cultural Sub-regions of the Pacific Illustrating 
  Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 233 
 Appendix Eight: Ratification Status for Countries Covered by PICTA 
  and PACER 234 
 Appendix Nine: Tables Illustrating the Profile of the EU-Pacific Trade 
  Relationship (Import and Export Patterns and  
  Products) 235 
 
 xi
Abstract 
 
 
The European Union (EU) has comparative advantage in regional integration.  Moreover, 
regionalism is a growing phenomenon, as both the growing number of regional trade 
agreements and literature on “new regionalism” indicate.  In this context, the EU has 
incorporated regional integration into European development policy as a strategy to help 
integrate the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states into the global economy, with 
the negotiation of region-to-region reciprocal free trade agreements, called Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA).  This thesis examines the extent to which the Pacific may 
constitute a region, for the purposes of the Cotonou Agreement, along cultural, political 
and economic dimensions of regional cooperation.  This is in order to measure the 
potential for regional integration in the Pacific, as well as to test the applicability of the 
EU’s regional template of development in this context. 
 
A theoretical framework is developed, based on the political economy of regional 
cooperation among developing states, in order to apply a series of propositions to the test 
the integrative potential of the Pacific region.  The key finding is that regionalism in the 
Pacific is easily politicised.  Anthropological evidence and economic analysis also confirm 
the informal nature of regional cooperation in the Pacific works against global imperatives 
for deeper regional integration, as Pacific islanders have generally not subscribed to a 
common identity, and the welfare benefits from regional free trade are shown to be 
minimal.  Consequently, the Pacific accepts the EPA platform in order to maintain the 
development partnership with the EU, rather than because regional free trade is the most 
desired vehicle for development in the region.  A trade agreement will therefore be 
concluded with the Pacific ACP states, but its form and timing remain the key issues for 
clarification. 
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 1
Introduction: 
European Union Development Policy and a 
Template of Regional Order 
 
 
I. PRELIMINARIES: THE EU CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
For the European Union (EU), the early years of the twenty-first century are ones of 
challenge and immense change.  The Constitutional Convention concluded its work in 
July 2003, out of which a consensus has emerged to give legal character to the European 
Communities and to clarify many of the inter-institutional complexities of the EU.  
However, because continuing problems with Europe’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), the EU’s international identity is still less developed.  May 2004 saw the 
acceptance into the EU of ten new member states from Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean.  Finally, the EU will continue to be subject to broader changes in the 
conduct of global trade relations, as the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) includes a focus on meeting the needs of developing countries.1  Although these 
are problems that the EU will have to work through, because the Community is grappling 
with reform of regional governance, rather than disintegrating, shows the EU has matured 
as a form of regional integration. 
 
With the rise of the EU, regional integration is a topic itself that has attracted wide 
attention, in the literature of international relations and international political economy.  
Scholars have investigated the appearance and consolidation of economic integration 
schemes in various regions of the world, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur in South America, or the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN).2  Of 250 RTAs notified to the GATT and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) throughout their combined history; 130 of these were registered 
after January 1995.3  What is interesting about these integration schemes are how they 
                                                          
1 James Mackie, (2003), Challenges for 2003: The Changing Framework of EU External Relations and its 
Implications for the ACP, (ECDPM InfoBrief 6), European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at: http://www.ecdpm.org/, 22 August 2003. 
2 Ben Rosamond, (2000), Theories of European Integration, St. Martin's Press, New York, p. 179. 
3 World Trade Organisation, (2004), Regional Trade Agreements: The Mandate, World Trade Organisation, 
Geneva, accessed at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, 20 May 2004. 
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challenge state sovereignty, and whether the regional trade agreements that exist among 
them are stepping stones or stumbling blocks towards global free trade, under the WTO. 
 
Another equally relevant challenge to how Europe engages with the rest of the world is 
the relationship the EU has with the developing world, through European development 
policy.4  For over forty years, long before the pillared structure of the Maastricht Treaty 
instituted external action as a separate Community competency, the EU actively shaped 
the fortunes of several African and later the Caribbean and Pacific states with special 
preferential trade arrangements granted under the Yaoundé and subsequently the Lomé 
Conventions.  More recently, the Lomé partners were subjected to the wider “objectives 
and priorities of the Community’s development policy” (Article 4, Treaty on European 
Union, 1992) that address issues beyond trade.  This translates into observance of the 
three essential provisions for development, contained in Article 130u of the Treaty on 
European Union.  Paraphrased, these are: 
 
• The sustainable economic and social development of developing countries; 
• The smooth and gradual integration of those countries into the world economy; 
and 
• An ambition to eradicate world poverty. 
 
These objectives became a mantra for EU development cooperation, as the internal 
integration process pressured the EU to adopt a consistent approach to external relations.  
The TEU development provisions later influenced the direction of the ACP partnership in 
the late 1990s, when development policy underwent a fundamental overhaul to produce a 
renegotiated partnership agreement between the EU and the ACP: the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement signed in June 2000.  Like its predecessors, the provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement have the same potential to alter the complexion of development 
among the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP). 
 
 
                                                          
4 Christopher Hill, (1993), 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International 
Role', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 314. 
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II. REGIONAL INTEGRATION: 
A PRINCIPLE OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between these two broad themes; the revival 
of regionalism and the reform of EU development policy.  The significance of the 
Cotonou Agreement, besides reaffirming and bolstering the political, cultural and social 
dimensions of the partnership, introduces regional integration as a “key instrument” to 
incorporate the ACP states into the world economy, in terms of trade and private 
investment.5  Regionalism is mentioned 83 times in the 100 articles of Cotonou, 
illustrating its importance as a principle of EU development policy.6  The emphasis on 
regionalism is driven largely by the EU’s comparative advantage in integration, the 
consequence of Europe’s success so far in bringing about peace and prosperity through 
regionalism.  By encouraging existing regional integration schemes and collective 
impulses within the ACP, the EU intends to help deliver sustainable economic 
development and to use regionalism as a platform upon which to build a mature trading 
relationship with the developing world.  The Cotonou Agreement also lays the 
foundations for reciprocal free trade agreements to be concluded between the EU and the 
ACP, called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), to coincide with the end of the 
WTO waiver on EU-ACP trade preferences at the end of 2007. 
 
The EPAs are not intended to be mere FTAs, but will in time incorporate trade-related 
areas and trade support measures.  EPAs, are envisaged to work along regional 
dimensions.  The EPAs will subdivide the ACP into six regions; Central Africa, East 
Africa and the Indian Ocean, the South African Development Community, Western 
Africa, the Caribbean, and lastly the Pacific (Appendix Three).  Instead of separate FTAs 
with each ACP state, each ACP region shall negotiate an EPA with the EU.  EPAs will 
bring a novelty into the international trading system because instead of North-North, 
North-South or South-South agreements, regional EPAs will be South-South-North 
agreements.  According to the Commission, in this way the EPAs will help achieve the 
three core objectives of EU development policy.  Region-to-region partnership 
agreements will offer advantages in efficiency for the EU, as it is simpler for Brussels to 
                                                          
5 Commission of the European Communities, (2000), The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, The Courier, 
Special Issue, September 2000, European Community, Brussels, p. 6. 
6 Sanoussi Bilal, (2002), The Future of ACP–EU Trade Relations: An Overview of the Forthcoming 
Negotiations, February, Economic Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, accessed at 
http://www.ecdpm.org, 18 March 2004, p. 33. 
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deal with a collective group of countries than to have to negotiate up to 79 bilateral 
agreements with the ACP states. 
 
As well as this agenda, there is another pressing imperative; the reform of the trade aspect 
of the ACP partnership so that it is compliant with World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
rules on international trade.  This is because it has become impossible to justify 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) in goods under Article XXIV provisions of the 
GATT/WTO arrangements for trade between the developed and the developing world.  
Article XXIV states “substantially all trade” must be liberalised between members of 
developing and developed country trade agreements so that countries outside of a 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) are not privileged over others.  Otherwise, the EU’s 
new trade development partnership will be in clear violation of the Most-Favoured Nation 
principle.  If non-reciprocal trade preferences are replaced with region-to-region FTAs, 
the new trade regime will be compatible with WTO rules.  RTAs among developing 
countries are permitted however as a preliminary deferential measure to allow time for 
developing states to liberalise amongst one another, as a stepping stone towards their full 
integration into the multilateral trade system.  This approach allows the ACP states time 
to reduce tariff and trade barriers, so long as they begin liberalisation amongst themselves 
first. 
 
One simple but remarkable observation that can be made about the trade dimension of the 
Cotonou Agreement is that it contains within it a particular variety of EU world order, 
where the EU has become an exporter of regional integration as a solution to 
underdevelopment.  The post-Cotonou Agreement process (PCP) situates each ACP state 
in a particular region.  Another observation is whether the EU model of development, 
through trade and regional integration, is based on the assumption that a model which was 
successful in Western Europe is transferable to a developing world context.  Another 
observation is that the EU appears to have premised its development policy on a model of 
development through trade and regional integration that was successful in Western 
Europe.  The question remains, however, to what extent this will work for developing 
countries. 
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III. THE FOCUS – PACIFIC REGIONALISM 
The Pacific region cover a vast space, including 13 time zones, 25,000 islands and has a 
combined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over 20,000,000 square kilometres.7  
Hence, the intention of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which the Pacific may be 
able to adopt the EPA model of regional integration.  In other words, can the Pacific be 
considered an area capable of conducting regional economic integration, and therefore a 
degree of political integration as well?  It is hypothesised that economic integration 
accentuates the political ramifications of cooperation in a context of development. 
 
The Pacific is an interesting case to examine within the ACP group, firstly because in 
relation to the rest of the ACP, the Pacific ACP states have previously had an immature 
relationship with the EU.8  The original eight PACP states became members of the 
partnership as a result of how the Community dealt with the incorporation of the 
developing states of the British Commonwealth into its development architecture, when 
Britain joined the EC.  As such, they have mattered less to Europe than the African 
members of the ACP.  The Cotonou Agreement has warmed the Pacific partnership, by 
welcoming in six new Pacific states, but they have had little or no prior dealings with 
Europe, as they were not European colonies.  However, the trade volume between Europe 
and the Pacific is low.9  While not having a colonial legacy is advantageous for the EU’s 
perception in the Pacific, it does mean there are fewer links upon which to build a more 
region-to-region partnership. 
 
Secondly, it is questionable whether Pacific islanders possess a common commitment to a 
regional identity, in a similar way to how Europe has developed a regional interest and 
consciousness.  Throughout Pacific history, a long list of foreigners has defined the 
identity of Pacific islanders.  The EU definition of the Pacific groups a cross-section of 
Pacific states together.  To what extent, then, is there a common Pacific identity or 
                                                          
7 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy 
Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, European Community, Brussels; 
Robert C. Kiste, (1994), 'Precolonial Times', in K. Howe, Robert C. Kiste, and Brij V. Lal (eds.), Tides of 
History, The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, p. 3. 
8 Roman Grynberg, (2000), Asymmetric Reciprocity in the Post-Lomé Framework, Implications for Trade 
Relations in the Pacific, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed at:  http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/biblio_pacific.php, 14 July 2003. 
9 The Commission EPA impact report for the Pacific noted in 1998 that the Pacific only imported five per 
cent of EU imports and formed 19 per cent of EU imports Netherlands Economic Institute (NEI), (1998), 
Introducing Reciprocity into the Trade Relation between the EU and Pacific ACP Countries, Study 
undertaken by the Commission of the European Communities, Amsterdam. 
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definition of the Pacific among Pacific islanders?  It is reasonable to hypothesise that how 
islanders define their identity will influence whether islanders can establish and cooperate 
on common regional interests.  Thirdly, the Cotonou Agreement attempts to build upon 
local regional integration initiatives.  Hence, it is necessary to investigate the prospects 
for political-institutional cooperation.  What attempts have been made at regional 
integration in the Pacific and how have they been characterised?  Are there any local 
engines of political and economic integration in the Pacific, or is it merely the role of 
exogenous forces in the Pacific that has kept regionalism on the agenda?  Lastly, in 
relation to the model of free trade contained in the Cotonou Agreement, questions arise in 
relation to the economic viability of constructing a Pacific FTA.  For instance, intra-
regional trade in the Pacific is only two per cent of total trade in the region.10  Although 
the PICs are committed to establishing their own FTA, under the Pacific Island Countries 
Trade Agreement (PICTA), ratified in April 2003 (Appendix Eight), the implications of 
the EPA negotiations for the pace and scope of liberalisation need to be investigated. 
 
Before proceeding further, some general concepts concerned with gauging the potential 
for regional cooperation in the Pacific need further definition.  The first is integration.  
Integration theory has suffered from a ‘dependent variable problem’.  This means what is 
it that is to be explained when we contemplate the processes of region-building.  What 
does it mean to say that the Pacific is integrated, or is in the process of integrating?  Is 
integration an outcome or a process?11  This might mean establishing whether integration 
is an economic or a political phenomenon.  Wallace’s definition of integration is the 
creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among 
previously autonomous units.12  Wallace also highlights the difference between formal 
and informal integration, which underlines the importance of the relationship between 
political and economic integration.  The former consists of outcomes (institutions, 
policies, legislation), as a consequence of deliberate political sanction, while the latter has 
consequences without formal authoritative intervention.  Hence, the real issue at stake is 
one of political economy.  For example, how do changes to capital mobility, trade 
production or tariffs influence the agenda of political actors, or vice-versa.  This means 
                                                          
10 Roman Grynberg, and Onguglo Bonapas, (2002), A Development Agenda for the Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the EU and the Pacific ACP (PACP) A Concept Paper, EU-Least Developed Countries 
Network, accessed at http://www.eu-ldc.org/downloads/PACP.doc, April 2003. 
11 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, pp. 11-14. 
12 Wallace, William (ed.), (1990), The Dynamics of European Integration, Pinter, London, p. 9. 
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that the definition of integration is fluid, depending on whether there is an ultimate end, 
which, as will be revealed, is perhaps difficult to define in the Pacific. 
 
The concept of ‘development’ is another general concept used often in this thesis.  It is 
not the purpose of this thesis to debate the definition of development.  The definition used 
here refers to the kind of transformation which produces a modern industrial-consumer 
society, implying change across social, economic, political and cultural dimensions of 
society.13  Thus, development, for the purposes of the post-Cotonou Agreement process, 
is concerned with the set of transformative practices that will achieve the TEU 
development objectives.  These promise to reshape the nature of the state in each of the 
ACP countries, with the goal of improving the opportunities and choices for interaction, 
exchange and production among the various actors in civil society.14
 
 
IV. A BRIEF NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used to investigate the answers to these questions is not unique, but 
intends to take some older approaches and apply them to a highly contemporary and 
topical case, where they have not been used before.  In short the questions outlined above 
represent a nomothetic, macro-historical approach to studying the phenomenon of 
regional integration in the Pacific that intends to test and develop the body of literature on 
the political economy of regional integration in a context of underdevelopment. 
 
The literature on political economy, which, broadly defined, is the study of the interaction 
between the state and economic interests, was popular in the late 1960s and 1970s for 
interpreting the limitations of economic integration schemes among developing countries, 
which had tried to emulate the model of European integration embodied in the common 
market.  When integration efforts in general stalled in the late 1970s and for most of the 
1980s, this literature fell out of interest.  However, with the revival of regionalism in the 
1990s, it is argued here that this literature can make a valuable contribution to 
understanding the EU model of South-South-North integration, contained in the EPAs.  
This is because EPAs encourage economic integration between developing countries, 
                                                          
13 Björn Hettne, (1995), Development Theory and the Three Worlds, Second Edition, Longman Scientific 
and Technical, New York, pp. 15-16. 
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which may be considered similar to the first attempts by developing countries to engage 
in regional integration.  Thus, the insights of the political economy literature in this area 
can be analysed in order to develop propositions which can be applied to the case of 
Pacific regionalism, in order to evaluate the potential for political and economic 
integration in the region.  Hence, a political economy approach to regional integration 
will form the theoretical core of this study. 
 
This research will also utilise secondary literature from anthropological studies of the 
Pacific region to capture the dynamics of Pacific identity.  To address the questions on 
economic cooperation, elements of the political economy framework will be developed 
further by employing insights from theories of economic integration to analyse the issues 
surrounding construction of an FTA in the Pacific.  In order to include a fresh, current 
perspective on EU-Pacific relations, and the latest trends in Pacific regionalism, it has 
been necessary to consult and incorporate an extensive range of primary sources, in the 
form of press statements, news sources, official documentation, and briefing papers from 
non-governmental organisations, the European Commission and the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat.  Lastly, to gain an accurate sense of the tone and current salient issues 
in Pacific regional politics, a visit was made to the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in 
Auckland, New Zealand, in August 2003, where unstructured interviews and participant 
observation was carried out to provide data from an elite perspective. 
 
However, studying the Pacific can be frustrating because of the dearth of accurate data 
which is available on the profile or economic performance of PICs.  This is partly a 
reflection of the limited resources PICs have to collect and manage such data, but also the 
low value which many island leaders place on the collection of national statistics.  The 
National Centre for Development Studies at Australia National University, Canberra, 
initiated a Pacific data bank in the 1970s to regularly report indicators in the Centre’s 
Pacific Economic Bulletin.  When responsibility was shifted to the Pacific Community 
Secretariat in Noumea, the work collapsed in 1994 because the SPC did not possess 
sufficient statistical and economic expertise to carry out such specialised work to assist 
Pacific island statistical offices to produce comprehensive data.  Hughes in particular 
noted that data for Pacific economic and social indicators was either not available or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 Cf. Gilbert Rist, (2002), The History of Development: from Western Origins to Global Faith, Zed Books, 
New York, pp. 8-18. 
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varied by more than 25 per cent among sources.15  This indicates an area in which 
capacity needs to be improved, to enhance the quality of information across the region.  
However, it also means that often the assessments or assumptions made might be limited 
in certain cases because of a lack of data upon which to make precise conclusions.  
Nevertheless, enough data is available upon which to make reasonable generalisations.16
 
 
V. THE WAY AHEAD 
In relation to the topics and questions outlined above, the chapters of this thesis will deal 
with the answers to them two parts.  The first section examines the ideas and concepts 
behind regional integration and development, to establish how regionalism may be 
assessed in the Pacific.  Chapter One sets the EU context for region-to-region trade 
relations with the ACP, examining the sources of the regional template in EU 
development policy, and charts the rationale behind its adoption.  Chapter Two proceeds 
to review the literature on regionalism, and to construct a political economy framework of 
analysis to apply to regional cooperation in the developing world.  Chapter Three begins 
to apply the concepts developed by moving the focus specifically to the Pacific.  Its 
intention is to investigate how the Pacific has been defined as a region by islanders and 
foreigners, to establish how deep the linkages of commonality extend in the region.  
Chapter Four explores the ways in which the technical capacity for regional cooperation 
and trade might be measured, to both highlight problems which need to be addressed and 
how to determine if progress to improve regional integration has been made.  Chapter 
Five investigates the nature and state of regional cooperation in the Pacific, applying the 
political economy framework developed in Chapter Two.  Chapter Six teases out the 
prospects for free trade in the Pacific, and the prospects for the application of the EPA 
framework.  The conclusions sketch out some observations for the future of the regional 
                                                          
15 More specifically, Hughes notes that the longest and most consistent data series on key Pacific indicators 
are those compiled by the World Bank’s Development Data Group in Washington from national statistical 
offices in the Pacific.  The statistics included in Appendix Four, for example, are based on these data sets.  
The Asia Development Bank and the CIA Factbook also give an array of incomplete and varying figures, 
but they show the same general trends.  Hughes suggests that inaccuracies are because data is often 
tampered with for political purposes by island elites.  Helen Hughes, (2003), Aid Has Failed the Pacific, 
Issue Analysis, No. 33, 7 May 2003, Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, pp. 3-4.  Cf. Chand, Satish, 
(2003), 'Economic Trends in the Pacific Island Countries', The Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 1, 
pp. 1-2. 
16 Robert Scollay, (2001), Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific 
Islands' Proposed Free Trade Agreement, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study 
Series, No. 10, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), New York and Geneva. 
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integration under the post-Cotonou Agreement Process (PCP) in the Pacific, as the EPA 
negotiations play themselves out.  While this might be one of the first words on the nature 
of the prospects for the EPA framework in the context of Pacific regionalism, it will by no 
means be the last.  What is hoped is that it will represent a unique juxtaposition of 
research on the nature of Pacific island regional cooperation and the EU model of 
integration and development envisaged for the Pacific ACP states. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One: 
 
Evaluating Regionalism in the Developing World: 
Theory and Concepts 
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Chapter One 
 
The Development of Development Policy: 
From European Associationism to Cotonou 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The principal focus of this thesis is to attempt a preliminary evaluation of the 
reinvigoration of regionalism in European Union (EU) development policy, under the 
Cotonou Agreement, with respect to the regional processes at work in the Pacific.  
Although regionalism is only one element of EU development policy reform, it is also 
hoped to critically view these reforms in a developing world context through a framework 
of political economy.  These concepts and arguments will be developed in later chapters.  
The aim of this initial chapter, however, is to explain how the EU has come to adopt a 
differentiated regional free trade approach to ACP relations under the Cotonou Agreement.  
Furthermore, it will be shown that the context in which EU development policy has 
developed engenders questions of political economy, since the relationship that the EU has 
with the developing world has grown out of historico-political considerations, and not 
necessarily from a logical strategy.  Thus, this foray into the past, while not intending to 
produce any new perspective on the history of EU-developing world relations, will help to 
illustrate how regional cooperation in the developing world is subject to both political and 
economic variables, as well as to explain various institutions and issues driving EU-ACP 
relations.  It will also develop the argument that the EU manages its global affairs with a 
regional template of world order.  In essence, the EU context in which to locate the post-
Cotonou process (PCP) will be defined, as well as to introduce some of the problems of 
building regional free trade areas (FTA) in the developing world, which in turn highlights 
some of the tensions faced by the EU as a global actor. 
 
Four key phases of European development policy evolution can be identified, among 
which the most significant innovations will be discussed.  These include firstly the early 
formative period of association; secondly, the peak of Third World power during the time 
of self-determination and the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which marked 
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the establishment of the first Lomé Convention; thirdly, the challenge of neoliberalism, and 
finally, the period most relevant to this study, the Lomé reform process and the revised 
partnership framework that has been introduced under the Cotonou Agreement.  Finally, it 
will be suggested that development policy is an important tool that the EU uses to manage 
its aspirations to be a global actor, but, like the Common Foreign and Security Policy, also 
demonstrates traits of Hill’s (Hill, 1993) Capabilities-Expectations Gap (CEG).  In this 
manner, the rationale and broader processes at work in EU development policy will be 
established in order to lay the foundations for a discussion into whether there is congruence 
or a conjunction between the EU’s ambitions to treat the Pacific as a region and the actual 
potential for cooperation along the EU model. 
 
 
II. ASSOCIATIONISM 
The original organising principle of Community development policy was grounded in the 
concept of “associationism.”  Associationism was influenced primarily by the European 
colonial legacy with Africa, and especially the French agenda for continuity in its relations 
with its overseas territories, concomitantly with its pursuit of the twin goals of peace and 
prosperity in Europe.  Associationism was based on the notion of complementarity 
between the metropolitan areas and the colonies, and the corollary of mutual benefits 
between them.  The French incorporated it as a guiding principle in relations with their 
territories after the Second World War in the Pacific and, most importantly, Africa.  
Essentially, it was neo-colonialism, but presented in a form which referred to autonomy, 
equal rights and obligations and mutual efforts to pool resources and to develop each 
other’s civilisation.1  Associationism established a separate political identity for overseas 
territories, but where they still remained a part of the state processes of the former colonial 
power.  The historical evolution of the partnership is illustrated in Table 1.1. 
 
Consequently, it was the strong relationship that France and Belgium had with the 
countries and territories still under their jurisdiction that led the European Community 
(EC) to adopt an associationist development policy with the Third World.  The status of 
these territories in relation to the Community was a political issue that had to be resolved 
during the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome in the late 1950s.  Since closer economic  
                                                          
1 Enzo R.Grilli, (1993), The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge University 
Press, London, pp. 1-6; Majorie Lister, (1997), The European Union and the South, Routledge, London & 
New York. 
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Table 1.1:  Evolution of EU-ACP Cooperation 
Year Event No. of countries 
  AASM/ACP EC/EU 
1957 Creation of the European Economic Community (EEC).  Rome 
Treaty provides for association of countries with special 
relations with the EC. 
— 6 
1964 Yaoundé I Convention between EC and Associated African 
States and Madagascar 
18 6 
1969 Yaoundé II (EC-AASM) 18 6 
1975 Lomé I Convention, between EC and the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific states (ACP). 
Non-reciprocal trade preferences and export stabilisation 
measures introduced. 
46 9 
1980 Lomé II Convention (EC-ACP) 58 9 
1985 Lomé III Convention (EC-ACP) 
Social development goals introduced. 
65 9 
1990 Lomé IV Convention (EC-ACP) 
Political Conditionality elements strengthened. 
68 12 
1995 Lomé IV bis – after mid-term review of Lomé IV, between the 
European Union and ACP, after ratification of Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993. 
70 15 
1996 Green Paper on future of EU-ACP partnership published.  
Dialogue and negotiations commence and continue for a 
successor agreement to Lomé, 1996-1999. 
70 15 
2000 Cotonou Agreement signed on 6 June 2000 in Benin (EU-
ACP. 
Preferences to be phased out, except for LDCs.  Regional, 
differentiated approach to trade with ACP introduced. 
NB.  Six more Pacific Island countries join the ACP (Niue, 
Cook Islands, Nauru, Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands). 
78 15 
2002 September, 
ACP-wide negotiations on format of regional negotiations on 
Economic Partnership Agreements begin with EU. 
78 15 
2003 April, Cotonou Agreement ratified. 
October, ACP-wide negotiations close. 
First regional EPA negotiations commence with West and 
Central Africa. 
79 15 
2004 February and April, regional EPA negotiations begin with 
Southern Africa and the Caribbean, respectively. 
79 15 
Source: Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; & Commission of the European Communities, 2000. 
 
integration incorporated the economies of territories which were not part of Europe, this 
was one of the early implications of integration affected how Europe dealt with the world.  
France, supported by Belgium, would not compromise on association, as its price for 
joining the Community and completing the Treaty of Rome, so that its free access to 
imports from its former colonies would not be hindered.2  In effect though, the French 
                                                          
2 Martin Holland, (2002), The European Union and the Third World, Palgrave, New York, p. 25. 
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approach was myopic, as associationism limited the scope of relations that the Community 
could have originally had with the developing world to those who had special status in 
relation to the member states.  In this case, however, squabbles over the form of external 
development policy were subordinated to the overall opportunity to build the common 
market.3
 
Consequently, Articles 131-136 in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome renewed the kind of 
commercial and financial relationship that France had enjoyed with its colonies: 
 
“The purpose of the association shall be to promote the economic and social development of 
the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the 
Community as a whole…association shall serve primarily to further the interests and 
prosperity of the inhabitants…in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural 
development to which they aspire.” 
 
From these clauses, three essential principles and practices can be derived that instituted a 
distinctive Community approach to development.  These were the characterisation of 
cooperation as a partnership between the Community and the developing world, along with 
principles for a range of trade and aid instruments.  These specific mechanisms of 
association have endured.  Financial aid was provided for through the European 
Development Fund (EDF), supported directly by member state contributions, and lasting 
for periods of five years.4  Most importantly, the associates were granted privileged access 
to EC markets, ahead of other developing countries and regions, but the preferences 
appeared to be discriminatory under the GATT. 
 
The only exception under GATT to the goal of equality in global trade relations was 
Article XXIV, which specified that customs unions or FTAs were acceptable if they did 
                                                          
3 Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries, op cit., pp. 7-8; Commission of the 
European Communities, (1996), Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP 
Countries, Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, 20 November, European Community, Brussels, 
p.9. 
4 Currently incorporating the EDF into the EU budget is under review for the fourth time in its history.  The 
Commission argues that ‘budgetisation’ will make EU aid more publicly accountable, allow more flexible 
responses to realities on the ground, as well as bringing oversight of a considerable proportion of the aid 
budget to the European Parliament.  However, there are risks that member states’ contributions may be on the 
basis of the lowest common denominator, if budgetisation incurs extra costs to them.  Britain, Spain and 
Ireland were most opposed to this proposal in October 2003 for this reason.  Eurostep, (2003), 'European 
Commission Supports Budgetisation of the EDF', Proactive File, No. 328, 26 September; Commission of the 
European Communities, (2003), 'Incorporating the EDF into the EU Budget', Rapid Press Release, accessed 
at: http://www.europa.eu.int/, 16 October 2003. 
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not discriminate against outside members.  The logic was that regional arrangements might 
provide a ‘second-best route’ to multilateral trade liberalisation without discrimination.  
Therefore, the EC was in dispute with other GATT members about its preferential trade 
arrangements.  In response, the EC argued that Article XXIV did not apply because of the 
development dimension to the relationship, since the provision was never meant to apply to 
North-South trade agreements.5  Associationism was always intended to be a partnership 
between the developed and the developing world.  It was not constructed deliberately to 
discriminate against non-ACP states, even if it had this effect.  The dispute was never 
settled at this stage, and as a result Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) of the 
developing world by Europe became a compounding problem. 
 
 
III. HERITAGE:  THE YAOUNDÉ & LOMÉ CONVENTIONS 
The Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions introduced several key instruments of the European 
model of development cooperation and incrementally modified the associationist 
framework in response to new internal and external challenges to the political economy of 
development policy.  No sooner had associationism been introduced, the African 
decolonisation movement gained momentum.  This required the negotiation of a new 
Convention of Association in 1964, christened the Yaoundé Convention.  Yaoundé 
reflected the change in legal status from territories to independent nation-states among the 
majority of the associates.  Joint institutions were established in the European Council and 
the European Parliament to coordinate and administer development cooperation, as well as 
a Court of Arbitration.  The latter was relevant, as Yaoundé was a negotiated, if 
asymmetric, set of bilateral preferential trade agreements between the former associates 
and the Community.  The unified approach, and the 581 million ECU financial package 
under the second EDF, made Yaoundé attractive to the associates, and the Convention was 
renewed for a further five years in 1969.6
 
However, by the time that Yaoundé II was approaching the end of its life, the entry of the 
UK into the Common Market, along with its Commonwealth, and the increasingly 
assertive voice of the Third World within the United Nations for the NIEO imposed upon 
                                                          
5 Theodore H. Cohn, (2000), Global Political Economy, Theory and Practice, Longman, New York, p. 244-
250; Stefan Szepesi, (2003), Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and 
Trade Negotiations with the European Union, Masters Thesis, Maastricht University. 
6 Christopher Piening, (1997), Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, Lynnne Rienner, 
Boulder, Colorado, p. 184. 
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the Community a more pressing requirement to support the developing world and respect 
their autonomy.  The occurrence of the oil crisis in 1973, also gave the developing world 
more negotiating leverage over Europe, which was willing to accommodate concessions in 
order to preserve access to raw materials in Africa.7  Thus, this set of circumstances gave 
birth to the first Lomé Convention, named after the Togolese capital in which it was signed 
in 1975.  Lomé was a more mature, comprehensive agreement than Yaoundé, as it 
provided a single robust framework for organising the Community’s trade and aid with the 
associates.  What is more, the Lomé Convention served this function for 25 years. 
 
The Lomé Convention also created the equally enduring political entity whose future is 
perhaps now called into doubt by the regional focus of the post-Cotonou reform process; 
the African Caribbean and Pacific states, or the ACP.  The creation of the ACP was 
necessitated by the inclusion of the Caribbean and Pacific members of the Commonwealth.  
This meant that the francophone obsession with Africa was diluted as the driving force 
behind the development agenda, so that the Convention became a more equitable 
partnership, similar to how the British Commonwealth operated.8  Surprisingly, the new 
ACP group was able to forge a strong consensus and spoke through a single spokesperson 
during the negotiations with the Commission.  One of the advantages then of the ACP is 
that it provides a forum for collective diplomacy, where many leaders of the developing 
world can collaborate and discuss common issues.  However, the ACP has never 
developed the inclination to act as a collective in other multilateral negotiations.  Instead, 
its members have chosen to act through other sub regional organisations.  The Economic 
Community of West African states (ECOWAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 
or indeed the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are all examples of regional groupings whose 
members are part of the ACP.  This may be because the ACP states see most value in the 
preferences of the partnership, rather than its potential to be a vehicle for an equal voice in 
multilateral affairs. 
 
Lomé incorporated significant aspects of the NIEO agenda, to address the concerns raised 
under Yaoundé that the associates remained some of the poorest countries in the world.  
Firstly, trade concessions were bolstered by swapping the requirement for reciprocal trade 
preferences to a nonreciprocal relationship.  Secondly, steps were taken to protect the 
revenue the developing world earned from primary exports from the ravages of price 
                                                          
7 Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries, op cit., p. 26. 
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fluctuations, by introducing compensation payments under the system known as STABEX, 
the System for the Stabilisation of Export Earnings.  For products which competed with 
sensitive Community agricultural products, such as sugar, rum, beef and veal, specific 
commodity ‘protocols’ were negotiated to allow certain quantities of imports into the EC at 
guaranteed prices.  When the EC’s separate Generalised System of Privileges (GSP) under 
GATT is included too, the Community had a comprehensive set of trade preferences with 
the entire developing world by 1976. 
 
Generally, then, Lomé consolidated a system of unconditional aid, and an extensive system 
of non-reciprocal trade, which gave the developing regions of the world in the EC’s orbit a 
significant advantage in access to EC markets.  The rhetoric of the Preamble to Lomé I 
went so far as to proclaim a new era in development cooperation through the establishment 
of: 
 
“a new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the 
aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic 
order.”9
 
In reflection of these sentiments, the ACP states had full, unconditional responsibility over 
their internal political arrangements and development strategies.  Lomé also bolstered the 
Yaoundé framework with remodelled institutions: the ACP-EC Council of Ministers; the 
Committee of Ambassadors; and the Joint Consultative Assembly.  Each body brought 
together combinations of European and ACP members of state.  The innovations contained 
in Lomé I made steps to institute a progressive programme that in theory could rectify 
some of the problems relating to dependent development that had become apparent under 
Yaoundé.  However, in practice the rhetoric of partnership did not match the actual 
conduct of relations, since Europe set the development agenda.10  More to the point, once 
instituted, a global preferential trade model of aid and development has conditioned the 
ACP to be dependent on the Community, and has proved difficult to undo.  For this reason, 
trade preferences have become one of the complicating factors in the application of the 
regional free trade model proposed by the post-Cotonou process. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
8 Holland, The European Union and the Third World, op cit., pp. 32-33. 
9 Cited in Charlotte Bretherton,. and John. Vogler, (1999), The European Union as a Global Actor, 
Routledge, London, p. 115. 
10 John Ravenhill, , (1993), 'When Weakness Is Strength: The Lomé IV Negotiations', in William Zartmann 
(ed.), Europe and Africa: The New Phase, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado & London. 
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IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM 
The high hopes for partnership and autonomous development of the ACP through trade 
preferences under Lomé were not realised.  By the 1990s, the Lomé regime was coming 
under serious doubt against the neoliberal agenda for trade liberalisation, and was suffering 
criticism for its economic inadequacy.  While other reforms and aspects of the reform to 
the ACP-EU partnership are important, such as those relating to political conditionality and 
management of economic aid, the most relevant area of reform to this study is how the EU 
and the ACP chose to address the problems of economic partnership, and the implications 
for regional cooperation which lie therein.  Despite tariff-free access for as much as 99 per 
cent of export products and the agricultural commodity protocols, the share of ACP trade 
in EU imports declined from 7 per cent in 1975, to 4.3 per cent in 1980 and by 1998 to an 
astonishingly disappointing figure of 3 per cent, continuing the pattern from Yaoundé (cf. 
Tables 1.4).11  Part of the problem was that the non-ACP countries in Asia and Latin 
America out-performed the ACP states.  Between 1976 and 1992, ACP exports grew at an 
annual rate of 2.28 per cent, whereas Latin America grew at 5.97 per cent and Asia’s 
growth was roughly five times the ACP’s at 11.7 per cent (cf. Table 1.2).12  Trade patterns 
also shifted away from Africa and the ACP, as the CEECs formed a proportion of trade 
with Western Europe in the region of three to four times the figure of the ACP states.13  
Although it is true that the volume of trade between Europe and the ACP grew as much as 
six fold under the preferential regime, from the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the early 
1990s, over much the same period, the actual value of the preferences was also reduced by 
the general post-war trend to lower tariffs. 
 
In reality, the ACP became less of a priority to the Community during the 1980s, as 
internal economic integration gathered speed, and enlargement and the end of the Cold 
War occurred, which made the Mediterranean and the Central and East European 
Countries (CEEC) of greater relevance to the dreams of European policy-makers, and the  
 
                                                          
11 Szepesi, Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and Trade 
Negotiations with the European Union, op cit., p. 6; European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
(2001), Cotonou Info Kit, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, accessed at: 
http://www.ecdpm.org, 24 February 2003. 
12 Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, op cit., p. 123. 
13 Martin Holland, (2003), 'The Challenge of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement', Asia-Pacific Journal of 
EU Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 65. 
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Figure 1.1: EU Trade with Developing Countries, 1995-2000 
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2002. 
 
 
Table 1.2: EU - Developing Country Trade - 1976-1994 (ECUs billion) 
Imports into the EU 1976 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 
ACP 10.5 19.4 26.8 21.9 18.0 18.6
Asia 6.7 16 26 50.9 66.4 84.3
Latin America 8.3 13.7 25.8 25.7 24.8 27.6
Mediteranean 9.6 16.4 32.3 29.8 30.3 30.8
All LDCs 70.7 114.3 128.9 143.8 145.6 160.7
All non EC 157.7 269.9 399.7 461.5 487.6 540
              
Exports from EU 1976 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 
ACP 9.6 15.7 17.4 16.6 17.0 14.9
Asia 7.5 13.1 29.4 41 47.1 70.5
Latin America 7.7 12 13.5 15.6 20.4 29.6
Mediterranean 12.3 19.8 29.8 28.5 28.6 33.1
All LDCs 550.9 83.4 121.7 134.2 153.1 184.4
All non EC 141.3 221.1 380.8 415.3 436.1 539
World 292.9 475.1 811.8 1076.6 1137.8   
              
Share of Imports from outside EU (%) 1976 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 
ACP 6.7 7.2 6.7 4.7 3.7 2.8
Asia 4.2 5.9 6.5 11 13.6 13.1
Latin America 5.3 5.1 6.5 5.6 5.1 5.4
Mediteranean 6.1 6.1 8.1 6.5 6.2 6.1
All LDCs 44.8 42.4 34.7 31.2 29.9 34.2
All non EC 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: EUROSTAT - ODI - March 1996 & Commission of the European Communities, 2000, 
 Cotonou Agreement. 
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Table 1.3: ACP Trade with the World (excl. S. Africa) 
(Million ECU/euro and per cent share) 
  1980 1990 2001     1980 1990 2001 
Imports 21,637 40,410 96,896   Exports 22,397 36,450 84,982 
world share (%) 2.1 2.0 1.8   world share (%) 2.3 1.9 1.7 
Trade Balance 760 -3,960 -11,914      
 
Table 1.4: EU Trade with ACP (excl.S.Afri.)  (Million ECU/Euro and %) 
Rank IMPORTS 1980 1990 2001   Rank EXPORTS 1980 1990 2001 
7 21,720 20,986 31,495   8 17,985 17,406 27,515 
Share of EU 
Total (%) 
7.9 4.8 3.1   Share of EU 
Total (%) 
8.9 4.4 2.8 
Trade Balance -3,735 -3,580 -3,980      
Source: Eurostat, 2003. 
 
demands on the European budget.14  The global free trade agenda of the GATT Uruguay 
Round to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers to free trade also undermined the 
foundations of privileging certain developing countries before others, culminating in the 
case of the WTO ruling in 1997 that ACP banana exports to the EU violated international 
trade laws. 
 
Furthermore, it became increasingly difficult for the EU to justify the geographical 
inconsistency of the ACP.15  The needs of the ACP states are far from heterogeneous, 
considering the disparity between the Caribbean and the African LDCs, not to mention the 
particular development issues facing small island developing states (SIDS) in the Pacific.  
There appears to be no logical reason for why ten of the world’s LDCs were omitted from 
the Convention, why Brazil and India, two of the most significant developing states, are 
excluded, or why all of Asia is excluded from the ACP; besides the politico-historical 
considerations discussed.  It may be argued then that the ACP is anachronistic.  
Furthermore, aid dependence and weak institutions in the LDC ACP states have made 
dialogue difficult.  Despite these criticisms, the ACP Secretariat has consistently argued 
that the global partnership and institutional framework is an adequate way to manage EU-
developing world relations, since if the ACP was split up there is the possibility that the 
                                                          
14 Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, op cit., p. 118. 
15 Holland, 'The Challenge of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement', op cit., pp. 65-66. 
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ACP states will no longer have the same bargaining power against the EU.  However, as 
the partnership “diminished in substance,” to the point it “tended to be restricted to the 
institutional side of cooperation and the joint administration of aid resources”, arguments 
for ACP unity appeared less axiomatic.16  Therefore, the rationale for reform of the ACP’s 
preferences emerged from internal pressures of European integration and the external 
geopolitical and multilateral challenges which questioned the assumptions of an 
associationist partnership, and indicated that a qualitatively better successor was needed to 
Lomé. 
 
 
V. BEYOND LOMÉ IV: THE 1996 GREEN PAPER AND ON TO COTONOU 
The pressing issue was to decide on a formula that measured up with, in the words of 
Development Commissioner, Professor Pinheiro, the “new challenges and new 
preoccupations” of the global environment, which framed the parameters for the reform of 
European development cooperation, while also satisfying the desirable aspects of the 
partnership arrangement which the ACP wished to preserve, or more fundamentally, would 
not exist without.17  For the first time in 25 years the EU was prepared to alter the terms on 
which its partnership with the ACP was based. 
 
Hence, new reasoning and new language entered the EU-ACP dialogue.  Reciprocity, 
differentiation and regionalism were several catch words that set the tone for the reform 
process, and figured prominently in the Commission’s Green Paper on relations between 
the European Union and the ACP, in 1996.  The Green Paper was a think piece to help 
guide positions to be adopted in the negotiations to consider what might succeed Lomé IV, 
scheduled for 1998.  The Green Paper made the case for a radical reform agenda.  What is 
more, many of the essential proposals which are necessary to understand the post-Cotonou 
Agreement process may be found in it.  These may be presented under the inter-related 
dimensions of politics and good governance, trade liberalisation, and regionalism. 
 
                                                          
16 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and 
the ACP Countries, Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, op cit., p. 12. 
17 ACP General Secretariat, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation and Management and European Centre for 
Development Policy (ECDPM), (1997), Conclusions of the Workshop on ACP Perspectives on Future ACP-
EU Cooperation, ACP/28/040/97, 16 June 1997, ACP Secretariat, Maastricht, accessed at: 
http://www.acpsec.org/gb/lome/future/confutgb.htm, 13 October 2003 
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The Commission stressed that “a stronger political relationship between the EU and the 
ACP countries (was) needed to breathe new life into the partnership”.18  In particular, 
reform was intended to tackle how respect of human rights and security concerns in terms 
of conflict prevention, and the associated issues of regional peace and stability, and 
migration, could be addressed.  Following this logic, maintaining the special status of the 
ACP was the most preferred option, because of the longevity of the relationship, and the 
aspect of predictability, which was valuable to LDCs least equipped to deal with a rapidly 
changing global environment.  The qualification, however, from the Commission was that 
it could not succeed without mutual political commitment from both parties to reform 
institutions and the effectiveness of aid programmes to meet these objectives.  The 
language used evidences the Commission has adopted a belief that there is a causal link 
between underdevelopment and the absence of political stability and good governance.19  
Consequently, an implication was that aid would have to be targeted selectively to 
facilitate such reform.  Human rights, democratisation and good governance were 
emphasised as essential issues to the development agenda.  In effect the Green Paper 
proposed that “contract” replace “contractual” in the description of the partnership.  More 
revolutionary were the implications for the geographical configuration of the ACP, 
required for the political dialogue to implement the new agenda.  The Green Paper 
presented standard bilateral and multilateral options, but also introduced the new 
possibility of relations between the EU and sub regional groups. 
 
Under this heading, the Green Paper discussed the concept of differentiation, which meant 
that in order to improve the effectiveness of the political and economic relationship, the 
EU was prepared to treat particular ACP states or regions in a manner consistent with their 
development status, or more specifically, their capability to comply with the more stringent 
political and economic impositions of the reform agenda.  The fundamental question 
relating to the proposal for regional differentiation was whether the ACP was an 
appropriate partner for the EU, or was too anachronistic.  Four possible options were 
tabled, that blended the old associationist logic with the new rationale for sub regional 
cooperation.  In many ways the regional reform agenda appeared to reproduce the logic of 
regional integration that had been experienced in European integration.  These were, 
firstly, the status quo, or a global agreement, but with differentiated provisions depending 
                                                          
18 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and 
the ACP Countries, Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, op cit., p. vi. 
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on the development status of the recipient country.  Secondly, was the option of a global 
agreement, but supplemented by tailored bilateral agreements.  Thirdly, and more 
radically, was the possibility of splitting Lomé up into regional conventions to take 
advantage of headway achieved there in regional cooperation, to assist regional initiatives 
to improve the competitiveness of ACP production, and to strengthen regional institutions 
for enhanced political dialogue.  Lastly, related to this, was the Green Paper’s suggestion 
that the LLDCs be treated separately, thus introducing a ‘multi-speed’ approach to 
development cooperation, so that the EU could move ahead with abolishing trade barriers 
with those developing countries in the ACP which were able, in order to satisfy WTO 
compatibility requirements. 
 
Similar considerations had to be addressed under the reformulation of the trade 
relationship, which was one of the pressing areas where change was unavoidable.  
Although regionalism was preferred by the EU, the Green Paper was still concerned to 
observe the spirit of Lomé, by avoiding breaking up the ACP group as an entity, to prevent 
the poorest ACP countries from being marginalised any further, and to preserve the special 
ACP-EU link.  Again, a menu of options was produced.  Provision of non-reciprocal 
preferences was considered, with additional political cooperation features added to 
augment the status quo.  Secondly, the Commission proposed to remove trade relations 
entirely from the negotiations, where the Community’s GSP would be applied bilaterally 
or multilaterally.  In opposition to this was the unlikely option to require the ACP to extend 
reciprocity in time to EU exports, exactly in compliance with WTO expectations.  Lastly, 
and most prominently, were options for differentiation, which expanded on the principles 
of reciprocity, and graduation.  Basically, the EU would seek region-to-region FTAs, or as 
under the options for altered geographical coverage of the ACP, include different options 
of trade relations depending on the level of development within each ACP state.20
 
Therefore, the proposals contained in the Green Paper reflected how the EU was 
influenced by the norms of the multilateral framework in the 1990s, to liberalise, promote 
the role of the private sector and to adopt a strategic approach to the use of aid and trade as 
mechanisms for development, as well as placing more emphasis on democratisation 
                                                                                                                                                                                
19 cf. Ole Elgström, (2000), 'Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of Norms', 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 187. 
20 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and 
the ACP Countries, Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, op cit., pp. 65-67. 
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processes and good governance.21  Furthermore, as the status quo was next to impossible 
to maintain beyond 2008, the logic contained in the presentation of the proposals made it 
certain that the ACP would have to accept a model of reciprocal trade liberalisation, of 
either a global or regional nature.22
 
 
VI. THE COTONOU AGREEMENT: NEW WINE IN OLD WINESKINS 
The Cotonou Agreement has become the flagship of European development policy, but 
was also a product of compromise.  The actual provisions and form of cooperation adopted 
were not as radical as the Green Paper, despite the enthusiasm of the Commission for 
liberal economic reform over social development, as the negotiating process among the 
member-states and between the EU and the ACP moderated the Commission’s initial 
proposals for reform.  The EU member-states were divided on the pace of trade 
liberalisation, as they wished to afford the ACP states a measure of protection and 
preparatory time, as well as on how much preference might be granted to the ACP under 
the Commodity Protocols, in the context of review of these measures in the WTO.23  
Furthermore, the asymmetric nature of EU-ACP negotiation meant that the member-state 
preferences for “partnership, forseeability and contractuality” expressed in the European 
Council formed the final Commission negotiating mandate. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement itself consists of five key pillars: a reinforced political dimension, 
involvement of civil society and the private sector in the partnership dialogue; poverty 
reduction as a key objective; an innovative economic and trade cooperation framework; 
and rationalised aid and financing instruments.24  The agreement in fact maintained many 
of the features of the Lomé Conventions, as well as introducing new innovations which 
were touched on in the Green Paper.  Cotonou maintains the contractual nature of the 
partnership agreement with the ACP, but over a much longer timeframe: 20 years.  In this 
respect, the integrity of the EU-ACP framework has been preserved, but this is probably 
due substantially to the salience of the patron-client relationship and moral norms of the 
EU member-states, regarding the implications of free trade for social development and aid 
strategies, than the influence of the ACP over the agenda.  Although many of the ACP’s 
                                                          
21 Elgström, 'Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of Norms', op cit., p. 176 
22 Kenneth Karl, (2002), 'Economic Partnership Agreements - Hopes, Fears and Challenges', The Courier, 
No. 195, November-December, p. 21. 
23 Holland, The European Union and the Third World, op cit., pp. 186-88. 
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concerns about the continuation of the partnership were addressed in the internal EU 
negotiations, the compromise between morals and trade liberalisation bequeathed mixed 
objectives to Cotonou. 
 
Hence, the general objectives in Article 1 of Cotonou did not deviate from the rhetoric of 
Lomé IV, and the TEU, to promote the economic, cultural and social development of the 
ACP, and to integrate the ACP states into the global economy (cf. Figure 1.2).  Building 
capacity for social development and democratisation, as well as encouraging “regional and 
subregional” processes were explicitly mentioned to facilitate these objectives.  Among the 
other important highlights of reform, were those contained in Article 2, which outlined 
four fundamental principles to govern EU-ACP relations.  Equality was preserved at the 
forefront, as was the principle that the ACP states are responsible for implementing 
development strategies in line with the objectives of the agreement. 
 
As a remedy for underdevelopment as explained in the Green Paper, the political 
dimension was incorporated virtually intact, and consolidated the terms of Lomé IV.  
Human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law henceforth constituted “essential 
elements,” of the agreement, but defined good governance in lesser terms as a 
“fundamental element.”  The political dialogue and conditionality aspects of Cotonou were 
controversial, but only so far as they raised the possibility that the EU might be able to 
interfere in the affairs of ACP states, in spite of the principle of equality and ACP 
ownership of development strategies.  At worse, failure to observe essential or fundamental 
elements could lead to suspension from the agreement.  Beneath the apparent consensus 
was fundamental divergence over the weight carried by ‘political dialogue.’  It was a 
prerequisite for development to the EU, whereas, to the ACP, politics was subordinate to 
development. 
 
Although, many of the old “desirable” features of Lomé were retained, differentiation, 
regionalisation, and reciprocity were affirmed by the Cotonou Agreement under several 
new innovations.  Firstly, Cotonou adopted regionalism, under the model of group-to-
group relations with the ACP sub groups, as sketched by the Green Paper, as the future 
organising principle for EU-ACP relations.  The rationale is that regional integration is the 
most effective strategy for integration of the ACP states into the global economy, since  
                                                                                                                                                                                
24 Commission of the European Communities, (2000), The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, The Courier, 
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Figure 1.2: The Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
Main Objectives and Principles 
Central Objective: 
The Central Objective of the Partnership Agreement is to reduce and eradicate poverty while 
contributing to sustainable development and to the gradual integration of ACP countries into the 
world economy. 
Fundamental Principles: 
• Equality of partners and ownership of development strategies.  In principle, it is up to ACP 
states, in all sovereignty, to determine how their societies and economies should develop 
• Participation.  Apart from central government as the main partner, partnership is open to 
other actors in civil society, the private sector and local government. 
• Dialogue and mutual obligations.  Other obligations beside trade and aid are a part of the 
Partnership, including respect for human rights and observation of good governance 
criteria. 
• Differentiation and regionalisation.  Cooperation agreements will vary according to the 
partner’s level of development, its needs, its performance and its long-term development 
strategy.  Special treatment will be given to countries that are classified as least-developed, 
or vulnerable; ie. Landlocked or island states. 
Source: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2001, Infokit, No. 2. 
 
integration schemes can enhance efficiency through economies of scale and competition, 
and provide an attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); in addition to 
consolidation of peace and security.25  Furthermore, a cooperation strategy based on 
regions will in theory allow the EU to better tailor development strategies to the specific 
needs of each region.  This is not to mention the EU has preferred to deal with regions in 
global relations where possible.  The regional model has been applied to both general 
development strategies, as well as the provisions for economic and trade cooperation. 
 
In Articles 28-30 of Cotonou, the EU describes its general cooperation strategy will be to 
build on the local regional cooperation initiatives of the ACP sub regions, to accelerate 
cross-regional linkages and trade capacity.  In Articles 34-37, the provisions on the new 
trade arrangements, the model of reciprocal free trade between the various subgroups of 
the ACP and the EU has been enshrined as the solution to the deficiencies of the Lomé 
preferences: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Special Issue, September 2000, European Community, Brussels, p. 7. 
25 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Assisting Countries to Benefit from Trade, COM(2002) 513 final, 18 September, European 
Community, Brussels, pp. 13-14. 
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“Economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional initiatives of the ACP states, 
bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP 
countries into the world economy (Article 34).” 
 
“…the parties agree to conclude new World Trade Organisation compatible trading 
arrangements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing 
cooperation in all areas relevant to trade (Article 36).” 
 
Henceforth, the EU considers the region as the primary political unit with which to 
negotiate free trade agreements, as well as in the other areas of cooperation and aid 
disbursement and management.  Article 37 goes on to outline in specific detail a timeframe 
for the negotiation of new trading arrangements, described as “Economic Partnership 
Agreements” (EPA), which are intended to enter force no later than January 2008.  The 
EPAs are the specific template for regional economic integration within the ACP regions.  
Consequently, it is this framework for cooperation which will be tested against the Pacific 
case and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.  Here it is sufficient to 
say that the EPAs are intended to be FTA-plus WTO compatible regional free trade 
agreements, which means the trade agreements negotiated with the EU will not only seek 
to abolish trade barriers internally and with the EU, but will also have a clear development 
dimension, given the continuation of economic aid, as earlier described.26  Therefore, 
Article 37 explicitly takes into account the observation of WTO rules by both parties 
(Figure 1.3), but EPAs are more generally meant to deepen the regional integration 
processes within the ACP, as the EU argues that regional integration is the best 
cooperation strategy for achieving the Maastricht objectives, of integration into the global 
economy and to eradicate poverty.27
 
Within this process, though, the principle of differentiation has been observed.  The 
transition is intended to be as flexible as possible, so negotiations will only begin with 
ACP countries which consider themselves ready.  Moreover, Cotonou seeks to differentiate 
between the LDCs, landlocked and island states, and the rest of the developing states in 
application of the liberalisation agenda, since these states will continue to have free access  
 
                                                          
26 Szepesi, Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and Trade 
Negotiations with the European Union, op cit., p. 7; European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
Cotonou Info Kit, No. 14, op cit. 
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Figure 1.3: Aims of post-Cotonou Agreement Negotiations, Article 37.7-8 
7. Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements shall aim notably at establishing the 
timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties, in accordance with 
the relevant WTO rules. 
• On the Community side trade liberalisation shall build on the acquis and shall aim at improving 
current market access for the ACP through inter alia, a review of the rules of origin. 
• Negotiations shall take account of the level of development and the socio-economic impact of 
trade measures on ACP countries, and their capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to the 
liberalisation process. 
• Negotiations will therefore be as flexible as possible in establishing the duration of a sufficient 
transitional period, the final product coverage, taking into account sensitive sectors, and the 
degree of asymmetry in terms of timetable for tariff dismantlement, while remaining in 
conformity with WTO rules then prevailing. 
 
8. The parties shall closely cooperate and collaborate in the WTO with a view to defending the 
arrangements reached, in particular with regard to the degree of flexibility available. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 26. 
 
to “essentially” all products from 2005, in evidence of the compromise to member states’ 
opinions, and the diversity of the ACP group (Articles 85-89).  Consequently, although the 
regional focus was supposed to supersede preferential bilateral agreements, Cotonou has 
managed to maintain a paradoxical double-standard, where on the one hand the LDCs are 
protected from liberalisation, but at the same time regional free trade agreements are 
expected to be concluded with the constituent regions of the ACP.  Although the EPA 
framework, regionalism and differentiation are supposed to better meet the different 
development needs of the 79 states in the ACP, it may be argued then that the 
inconsistencies between regional free trade and sustainable development of the ACP may 
contribute to the disintegration of the ACP as an umbrella for EU-ACP relations, as the 
region-to-region negotiations are concluded.  To generalise, regionalism, reciprocity and 
differentiation together are perhaps paradoxical elements of the Cotonou Agreement. 
 
Nevertheless, negotiations commenced with the entire ACP in September 2002, to develop 
legally binding guidelines for the negotiation of regional EPAs, over the course of one 
year.  This was achieved on schedule, but only because of pressure from the EU to stick to 
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the transition timetable, irrespective of the ACP’s wish to continue ‘phase one’ 
negotiations throughout 2004 to resolve sixteen outstanding WTO-compatibility issues.  
Instead, a Joint Declaration was delivered that merely offers “guidance” for regional 
negotiations, which delivers much less assurance to the ACP than a legally binding 
agreement that the EU will treat the ACP regions uniformly when conducting regional 
trade negotiations.  The end result was that in October 2003, the EU was able to launch its 
first regional negotiations with West and Central Africa, with CEMAC and ECOWAS, 
respectively, as planned.28
 
 
VII. SALIENT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PACIFIC 
A few points may also be raised now about the problematic nature of the regional strategy 
in the Pacific, in anticipation of subsequent chapters.  The first is the question of how the 
region is defined.  For the EU, the Pacific is synonymous with the Pacific Islands Forum 
states.  However, this excludes many sub regional identities and linkages, as well as strong 
external ties with Australia, New Zealand and the United States.  A second problematique 
relates to the unresolved tension between Article XXIV and the EU.  Article XXIV is 
meant to ensure that regional integration agreements do not become protectionist, by 
stipulating that tariffs and trade restrictions must be eliminated on “substantially all” trade 
among member states within a “reasonable” period of time.29  However, the definition of 
these terms remains unresolved in the WTO, despite attempts during the Uruguay Round to 
clarify them.  The jurisprudential tradition on the issue is that when 90 per cent of the total 
bilateral trade is liberalised, an RTA may be considered an FTA.  The EU has adopted this 
definition to ensure compatibility in the future, but as these issues are addressed at WTO 
Ministerials as the Doha Development agenda is addressed during the transition phase to 
the EPAs, the PACP states may find themselves exposed to compliance with tighter 
definitions of a regional FTA if changes occur in the multilateral legal environment.30
 
This problem is exacerbated by the immature and unbalanced trade relationship between 
the EU and the PACP, compared to Africa and the Caribbean.  For this reason, the 
technical feasibility of a regional FTA with the PACP is doubtful.  The development levels 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, European Community, Brussels, p. 6. 
28 Eurostep, (2003), Proactive File, 328-330, October, various issues. 
29 Cohn, Global Political Economy, Theory and Practice, op cit., pp. 247-48. 
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within the group are quite disparate, since five are LDCs, and consequently have little 
incentive to liberalise, since the EU has promised flexibility over engaging in EPAs, and 
the LDCs have the assurance of access to EU markets with the implementation of the 
“Everything But Arms” initiative (EBA) parallel to Cotonou, under the GSP.  More to the 
point, only Fiji, Papua New Guinea and possibly Tonga have the potential to develop trade 
concessions to comply with the 90 per cent guideline, and might be able to benefit from 
such a contractual arrangement.31  These issues remain to be fully explored, but it is clear 
that the template the EU chooses to adopt in its dealings with the developing world will 
have consequences, besides the constant pressure from the European integration process 
for external relations to be ‘coherent, consistent and complementary,’ and more recently to 
be multilaterally ‘compliant.’  This discussion raises one final issue with which to close 
this analysis of the evolution of EU development policy; how development policy fits into 
the EU’s broader aspirations to “assert its identity on the international scene” (Article B[2], 
TEU). 
 
 
VIII. DEVELOPMENT POLICY: 
AN EXAMPLE OF THE ‘CAPABILITIES-EXPECTATIONS GAP’ 
As can be discerned from the previous discussion, development policy has been a method 
that the EU has used to manage its relations with a significant proportion of the countries 
in the world, well before Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy was formalised 
under Pillar II of the TEU.  However, the Maastricht pillars have split development policy 
up between the commercial activity of the Community in Pillar I and foreign policy in 
Pillar II.  This segregation appears to be absurd, where North-South relations should be 
firmly part of foreign policy, but due to nature of the TEU, the EU’s external presence has 
been diluted.  More importantly, the TEU gives overall direction to all aspects of external 
policy, to ensure the consistency of its external activities (Article C[3]), and in particular 
Article 130u places upon the EU the obligation to act pursue policies complementary to the 
member states’ development policies.  This may in fact diminish the value of the EU’s role 
if it is running a development policy that duplicates member state activity.  However, 
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history demonstrates that despite its uncomfortable position in the EU architecture, the 
partnership framework has helped the developing world take advantage of the EU’s power 
as a global trader and as an advocate of political stability and democracy.32
 
Nevertheless, the uniform approach of Lomé and Cotonou to the developing world has 
produced an asymmetric relationship between Europe and the partner states.  What is 
more, history shows that the arrangements of the partnership agreement have been 
governed by piecemeal reform, as the geographic scope of the ACP expanded.  
Furthermore, when the implications of the application of both regionalism and 
differentiation are considered, the Cotonou Agreement might well be classed as a further 
example of Hill’s (Hill, 1993) Capabilities-Expectations Gap.  Hill’s essential point was 
that expansion of the EU’s capabilities as an external actor has been talked up to a point 
that it is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations.33  Transition periods and flexibility 
aside, with the new focus on regionalism the EU may be making a broad assumption that it 
can classify regions arbitrarily within the ACP, and furthermore that it is possible to 
achieve the stipulated degree of functional and thematic benefits of scale economies 
through regional integration in a context of underdevelopment.  Therefore, it is argued that 
the EPA template is a further example of the CEG, as a discernable gap appears to exist 
between the expectations of the post-Cotonou process, and the ability of the ACP regions 
to meet those obligations, which will likely result in the extent of reform to the partnership 
falling short of the vision in Cotonou. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Therefore, among the reforms to the political, aid and trade dimensions to the EU-ACP 
partnership, it is the regional focus which is clearly controversial.  Regional cooperation 
strategies and EPAs will be extremely problematic to implement.  Consequently, this is 
why the regional aspects of the Cotonou reforms represent a novel aspect of EU 
development policy to investigate.  While in the past the EU conducted its relations with 
the ACP mainly out of moral concern for the former colonies and the historical rationale of 
associationism, the transnational norms governing the relationship have now sufficiently 
diverged such that a new set of principles is determining how the EU should deal with the 
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developing world.  The Cotonou Agreement reflects the first definitive attempt to break 
with the legacies of associationism, but as its agenda deals with encouraging development 
through free trade it appears to have an ambiguous focus when the details are assessed.  
Cotonou did not utterly break the Lomé mould, but is innovative enough to signal a 
paradigm shift, and as such may be considered as “new wine in old wineskins.”  These 
tensions, as well as the “pillarisation” of development under Maastricht, contribute to a 
‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ regarding the negotiation of regional EPAs.  Moreover, 
the journey from Yaoundé to Lomé to Cotonou, as well as the patchwork of cooperation 
and association agreements outside the ACP, shows a clear preference by Europe to deal 
with the world through regional templates.  The experience of the EU-ACP partnership 
should also illustrate that the appropriate lens for viewing cooperation in the developing 
world is one that takes account of both politics and economics.  The following chapter will 
aim to develop this approach more in relation to analysing regional integration schemes in 
the developing world, since this model has replaced the associationist conventions as the 
primary EU mechanism for integrating developing states, such as the Pacific ACP states, 
into the global economy. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Theoretical Approaches to  
Regional Integration and Development 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among other points, the previous chapter established two arguments.  The first was that 
EU development cooperation, including the Cotonou Agreement, has been coloured by 
associationist political considerations.  The second was that a differentiated regional 
template has been adopted by the EU to manage its partnership with the ACP states, 
consistent with the EU’s tendency to conclude agreements with regions.  Moreover, the 
EU’s plans to negotiate regional EPAs are consistent with a recent phenomenon in global 
trade relations and the study of world politics to conclude regional trade agreements 
(RTA).1  Thus, the literature on regionalism is the logical theoretical context in which to 
situate the proposed EPAs, since regionalism is a discourse which is broad enough to 
incorporate both the political and economic agendas which are driving the future of EU-
ACP cooperation.  At the heart of this matter are questions of how regional 
institutionalisation may affect the interests and preferences of actors; how regional forms 
might condition identity; and, directly relevant to the post-Cotonou Agreement Process 
(PCP), whether regionalism accelerates or retards free trade and multilateral exchange 
between states.  Whether regionalism is a threat or a building block to multilateralism is 
another outstanding issue, in relation to WTO-compatibility.  As hinted at previously, 
though, the application of a WTO-compatible regional free trade scheme to the Pacific, or 
a developing world context in general, is problematic.  It will be argued that this is 
because regional integration, as a mechanism for integrating the developing world into the 
global economy, as expressed under EU development policy, is located in a ‘Eurocentric’ 
perspective of development, and does not account for the peculiarities of regional 
cooperation in the developing world.  Hence, the chapter will discuss theorisation about 
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regionalism and regional integration, and aims to sketch out a framework to at once 
situate the discussion of developing world regionalism in the calculus of political 
economy, and correct the fallacy that European theories of integration have the same 
normative potential to make accurate predictions about regional integration in the 
developing world.2  This was demonstrated after the failure of EC-style integration in 
Latin America and mixed results in the Caribbean, yet, with the renewed enthusiasm for 
regionalism, Western European assumptions about regional cooperation have crept back 
into the development rhetoric with little appreciation for the lessons of the past.  Hence, 
this investigation is primarily intended to illustrate the factors which influence 
cooperation at the regional level and to provide the theoretical, or propositional ‘tools’ to 
measure and predict the integrative potential of the South Pacific, in relation to the model 
of economic integration that the Cotonou Agreement envisages for the region.  Implicit in 
this, is the argument that a political economy approach recognises the challenges and 
prospects for EU development policy in the South Pacific. 
 
In order to develop these tools, elements of this chapter will be devoted to the definition 
of key concepts.  The review of integration theory will also begin with theories of 
European integration, as it is the EU model of regionalism which has informed and 
continues to colour much of the debate about regional cooperation.  It will be argued that 
these theories describe the European case best.  Nevertheless, this has not prevented 
various attempts to deploy them as general theories of regional integration.  Subsequently, 
a political economy framework will be developed, based on the conceptual approach 
employed by W. Andrew Axline (1979; 1984) on the politics of regional integration 
among underdeveloped states in the Caribbean, and also the Pacific.  This will be 
expanded upon with the insights of Walter Mattli (1999a), whose general investigation 
into the outcome of regional integration schemes emphasises the rational motivations of 
demand and supply behind regionalism, aspects of which may be instructive for the 
developing world.  This will iterate the importance of domestic factors in regional 
cooperation in the developing world.  Furthermore, the review should also reveal the 
similarities between the ‘new’ direction of EU development policy and some of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Of 200 agreements that have been notified to the WTO, half of these have been reported within the last 
seven years Stefan Szepesi, (2003), Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries and Trade Negotiations with the European Union, Masters Thesis, Maastricht University, p. 1. 
2 W. Andrew Axline, (1979), Caribbean Integration, The Politics of Regionalism, Frances Pinter, London, 
p. 33. 
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traditional issues surrounding regionalism and FTAs, and provide justification for the 
deployment of older approaches in the literature to regional cooperation. 
 
 
II. THE STUDY OF REGIONALISM 
1. Defining Regionalism 
(i) ‘New Regionalism’ and ‘Old Regionalism’ 
Instances of regional cooperation can be traced as far back as the early nineteenth century, 
to early customs unions among the German states, prior to unification.3  Likewise, the 
study of regionalism spans an equally extensive range of disciplines, and has reasserted 
itself as a concept with the proliferation of regional entities and cooperation schemes, 
since the end of the 1980s.  The EU remains the textbook case of mature regionalism 
because of the extent to which it has become politically integrated, but integration 
processes have also become revitalised in the Americas, including Mercosur (the 
Southern Common Market) and NAFTA; in Asia, with APEC and ASEAN, and also in 
Africa where a number of sub continental arrangements exist, such as the South African 
Development Community (SADC) or very recently, the emergence of the African Union, 
in imitation of the style of the EU.4  The term ‘new regionalism’ has been coined in order 
to incorporate the diversity of examples and theoretical dynamics of the subject.  The 
context of new regionalism is in the changing nature of the international order caused by 
the end of the Cold War, and the rise of structures and processes that are transnational in 
nature, or seek mutual security in regional blocs from fears over the stability of the WTO 
multilateral trade order and the Bretton Woods development infrastructure. 
 
Similarly, ‘old regionalism,’ or the analysis of regional integration which occurred 
between the 1950s and 1970s, before the lull in European integration caused the field to 
stagnate,5 was conditioned by its geopolitical context.  Two such issues that were of 
                                                          
3 Walter Mattli, (1999a), The Logic of Regional Integration, Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 1. 
4 Robert Gilpin, and Jean M. Gilpin, (2001), Global Political Economy : Understanding the International 
Economic Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 341-43; Michael Schulz, , Frederik Soderbaum 
and Joakim Ojendal, (eds.), (2001), Regionalisation in a Globalising World, Zed Books, London & New 
York, pp. 1-4; Eurostep, (2003), Proactive File, 328-330, October. 
5 See, for example, Haas, Ernst B., (1975), The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Institute of 
international Studies, Berkeley as a marker of the theoretical turn from the study of integration in its own 
right in the social sciences to new a picture of diffuse global order where states were not the only actors, 
such as complex interdependence Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, (1989), Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Scotts, Foresman, Glenville. 
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immediate concern after the Second World War were security, with respect to how 
cooperation could prevent interstate conflict, while the second was with how regionalism 
could advance the cause of economic development.6  Thus, literature that is concerned 
with regionalism exists among theories such as neorealism, functionalism, 
neofunctionalism, market and trade integration, and development theory, to name a few.  
This review will concentrate on those aspects of regionalism which are most relevant to 
understanding regional cooperation in the developing world. 
 
(ii) Regionalism and Regionalisation 
Before proceeding further though, it is necessary to define more specifically some 
operational terms.  Mention has been made so far of old regionalism and new 
regionalism.  However, the distinction should also be made between ‘regionalism’ and 
‘regionalisation,’ as these have become quite distinct expressions under new regionalism.  
Regionalism may be defined as a “state-led or states-led project designed to reorganise a 
particular regional space along defined economic and political lines,” as suggested by 
Gamble and Payne (1996).  This definition stresses the realist dimension of regionalism, 
or the concrete strategic programmes of states as well as interstate cooperation and 
institution building that facilitate the kind of security and welfare goals typical of old 
regionalism.7  Schulz (2001) argues that this can be a false dichotomy in the context of 
new regionalism, but regionalism, as a more state-centred approach, is probably more 
relevant to the study of integration processes in the developing world.  This is because 
regionalisation describes the trans-national methods of exchange, or regional processes 
which lead to closer cooperation and integration.  It is thus less concerned with the 
interests of national governments, as it is with cross border flows in the private sector, the 
market, people or ideas which build regional identity.  As will be shown, national 
interests are the primary force behind regionalism in the developing world, and most 
certainly in the case of the Pacific, rather than the unchallenged advance of 
regionalisation, as the new regionalism suggests.  Both regionalism and regionalisation 
must however include some sort of geographical limit on what constitutes a region, 
                                                          
6 Cf. W. Andrew Axline, (1994), The Political Economy of Regional Integration, Pinter Publishers, London, 
pp. 8-9; Shaun Breslin, , Christopher W. Hughes, Nicola Phillips and Ben Rosamond (eds.), (2002), New 
Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy Theories and Cases, Routledge, London and New York, p. 2; 
Amitav Acharya, (2002), 'Regionalism and the Emerging World Order, Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity', in 
Shaun Breslin, Christopher W.  Hughes, Nicola Phillips, and Ben Rosamond (eds.), New Regionalisms in 
the Global Political Economy Theories and Cases, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 21-22. 
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otherwise the concept becomes unmanageable.  As the terrain of regionalism can be 
rather rough, it appears best to deploy an overarching term when referring to both 
phenomena as a whole.  Consequently, in order to incorporate the variance in political 
intensity of the various competing conceptualisations of regionalism, the term ‘regional 
cooperation’ will be employed. 
 
It is now necessary to direct attention towards the actual varieties of regionalism 
mentioned among the different theoretical approaches.  As demonstrated, modern 
regionalism and integration theories arose in response to the sustainability of the nation-
state as a vehicle for effective and peaceful government in Europe and subsequently 
movements towards regional cooperation in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, 
which sought to emulate the success of European integration.  As a result, European 
efforts at regional integration have dominated the theoretical landscape, and cooperation in 
the developing world has mainly been analysed from this perspective, partly out of a lack of 
empirically based generalisations upon which to generate a proper theoretical perspective on 
regional cooperation among developing countries.8  It is one hypothesis of this thesis that the 
post-Cotonou process is informed by similar assumptions that theories of European 
integration can be equally applicable in the various ACP regions as in Europe, particularly 
with respect to the integrative and welfare potential of economic integration.  Therefore, 
several of the most influential theories of European integration will be surveyed in both 
politics and economics, and then evaluated against the substantial body of literature on 
regional integration and development. 
 
2. Political Approaches to Regional Integration:  Theories of European 
Integration 
(i) Theories of Functionalism 
The Treaty of Rome provided the first substantial blueprint for emulation by many 
regional ventures in the Third World.  Early initiatives such as CARICOM, ECOWAS or 
the Andean Group adopted models of economic integration, which encompasses various 
degrees of market integration as defined by Balassa (1961), proceeding from  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Note Andrew Gamble, and Anthony Payne, (1996), Regionalism and World Order, MacMillan Press, 
London, pp. 1-6; Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal, Regionalisation in a Globalising World. 
8 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Integration, op cit., pp. 182-83. 
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Figure 2.1: Stages of Regional Economic Integration 
 Free Trade 
Area 
Customs Union Common 
Market 
Economic 
Union 
Political 
Union 
Removing all 
tariffs among 
members 
× × × × × 
Common 
external tariff 
 
 × × × × 
Free 
movement of 
factors (labour 
and capital) 
  × × × 
Harmonisation 
of Economic 
policies 
   × × 
Political 
Unification     × 
Source: Cohn, 2000, p. 36; Gilpin and Gilpin, 2001, p. 343. 
 
FTA to customs union, common markets and economic unions (Figure 2.1).  As such 
these schemes also emphasised cooperation in shared functions among states.  David 
Mitrany (1943) first developed the key proposition that new peaceful forms of authority 
could be established through cooperation in non-political areas.  This premise rested on 
the assumption that such cooperation over ‘functions’ was feasible due to advances in 
communications and transportation, and economic integration.9  Although not a theorist 
of regionalism, Mitrany sparked the interest of researchers like Karl Deutsch (1957) 
whose transactionalism was primarily concerned with how peace could be established 
through post-national community building.  The applicability of transactionalism to 
regionalism lies in Deutsch’s assertion that the states system could be stabilised through 
building a sense of community across a region, as a function of communication, or 
transaction.  Transactionalism is therefore in vogue once again, under new regionalism, 
because it emphasises mutual responsiveness and common linkages which build regional 
communities.  However, the theory is difficult to measure empirically, especially the 
assumption that interaction leads to positive cognitive change.  Thus, transactionalism is a 
good general theory, and anticipates later work on regionalisation, but it failed to catch 
attention as much as “neofunctionalism,” which laid out a set of testable propositions to 
apply to understanding regional integration in the developing world. 
                                                          
9 Gilpin and Gilpin, Global Political Economy : Understanding the International Economic Order, op cit., p. 
350. 
 40
 
Neofunctionalism, developed firstly by Ernst Haas (1964; 1958; 1968) and subsequently, 
Leon Lindberg (1963) and Philippe Schmitter (1970; 1971), evolved out of Mitrany’s 
focus on cooperation in technical and functional areas, the key concepts of ‘low politics’ 
(cooperation in non-controversial welfare activities) and ‘high politics’ (cooperation in 
security matters) and the transferability of cooperation between them.  However, where 
functionalism was normative, neofunctionalism was a probabilistic theory.  As the early 
European initiatives in economic integration, such as the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), were the only ‘low’ political areas through which functionalism 
could be tested, the EC became the laboratory in which to test the relationship between 
technical cooperation and political integration.  Haas’ work therefore went further than 
Mitrany’s to analyse how the process of integration actually occurred, within a broader 
trend in the 1960s to examine political behaviour. 
 
Consequently, Haas’ neofunctionalism was based on several premises expressed in a way 
which was unique from previous theorising on post-national community building.  One 
was that political agency among rational actors was essential to the integration process.  
The second considered politics as a group activity, and that, thirdly, these self-interested 
groups may transfer their loyalties to the transnational level in pluralistic societies, thus 
envisaging a supranational polity driven by technocratic cooperation.  Thus, the 
framework of neofunctionalism, built extensively on the empirical evidence of the ECSC, 
the EEC and Euratom described the process of integration as ‘automatic.’  When a set of 
countries decide to work for integration in a common area of interest, which only existed 
at the time in economics, to accomplish the task more effectively, they appoint it to a 
supranational bureaucracy, which in turn encourages integration in other cognate areas as 
the benefits of cooperation are realised.  This was encapsulated by the term “spillover.”  
Lindberg defined spillover as “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific 
goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
actions.”10  Lindberg also contributed the rationale that for political integration to occur, 
region-level institutions would need to be present, that there be congruence between 
participant states’ interests in projects which were “expansive,” in that they generated 
tensions which would lead to the incorporation of more actors.  Neofunctionalism 
                                                          
10 Leon N.Lindberg, (1966) [1963], 'The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration', Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, p. 10. 
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therefore hinges on the belief that economic and technological forces are driving the 
world toward greater political integration.11  Hence, the theory is completely linear in its 
assumption that once the process of economic and technical integration has been 
launched, spillovers from one functional area to another will inevitably push political 
elites from below to move from less intense to more intense political integration, and 
ultimately unification, since the process is assumed to be beneficial and desirable. 
 
However, Haas and the neofunctionalists had to accept that the automaticity of spillover 
in low political areas required a measure of political direction.  Consequently, at its 
ultimate evolution, neofunctionalism attempted to explain spillover as part of a dynamic 
strategy to achieve functionalist ends, as described by Schmitter.12  Here loyalty to central 
organisations and structures was essential for the process to work; however, the predictive 
capacity of the Haas-Lindberg model of integration suffered severe damage in the 1960s, 
with the resurgence of nationalism in European politics.  DeGaulle’s passion for 
statehood and the national interest within the Community stalled institutional integration 
in 1965, until the famous Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, and blocked British 
accession to the Community between 1963 and 1973.  Stanley Hoffman (1966) was the 
first to reassert a state-centric case for regional cooperation.  Hoffmann critiqued the 
neofunctionalists by stating how states’ interests defined the particular context for 
integration.  Diversity of interests would be at odds with the integrative forces at work in 
economics, especially when supranationalism might threaten sovereignty, as had 
apparently occurred in Europe.  Hansen (1969) also summarised several essential 
problems with the construction of neofunctionalism with his argument that 
neofunctionalism did not explain the external influences on integration for member states, 
or the interrelation between low and high politics that might cause instances of 
spillover.13  Economic gains could arise from intergovernmental cooperation as much as 
through supranational governance. 
 
Haas himself eventually admitted that neofunctionalism was limited by its roots in the 
analysis of social change and decision-making in pluralistic societies, and because it 
                                                          
11 Gilpin and Gilpin, Global Political Economy : Understanding the International Economic Order, op cit., 
p. 352. 
12 Phillipe C. Schmitter, , (1970 & 1971), 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', in Leon N. Lindberg, 
and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration Theory and Research, pp. 232-264, Harvard 
University Press, Massachusetts. 
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suffered from an acute dependent variable problem, since the level of integration or final 
destination of integration was always ill-defined, especially in the case of Western 
Europe.  Therefore, while neofunctionalists had aimed to develop a sophisticated theory 
and methodology of examining the processes of nation-building and comparative regional 
analysis, they had tended to exaggerate the expansive effect of increments within the 
economic sphere and the gradual politicisation dynamics of spillover, as well as the 
enduring importance of national interests and the interdependence between the 
international environment and the integrating region.  In essence, the theory was good for 
explaining the processes at work in the initial stages of European integration, as well as 
the revival of integration in Europe in the mid-1980s,14 but does not deeply describe why 
regionalism should expand along functional lines, or to give a theoretical account of the 
welfare benefits of regional integration.  Yet, neofunctionalism is still highly relevant to 
theorising regional integration in a developing world context because of the synergies it 
possesses with theories of economic integration. 
 
(ii) Statist Theories 
As a result of the ‘anguish’ of neofunctional pretheorising, intergovernmentalism has 
become the significant other of the theoretical discourse relevant to the study of 
regionalism.15  As already mentioned, intergovernmentalism establishes the central role 
of national governments and heads of state, as the key units of analysis, which carefully 
circumscribe how much sovereignty may be sacrificed to achieve common goals.  Thus, 
classic neorealist intergovernmentalism argues that regional cooperation will occur when 
it is in the mutual interest, relative to each state’s position to its survival in an anarchic 
world order.16  Bargaining among states tends to converge toward the lowest common 
denominator.  The realist focus on power relations is helpful then for elucidating 
important features of regionalism, which neofunctionalism cannot explain.  Andrew 
Moravscik (1998; 1991; 1993) offers the most ambitious attempt to develop a general 
theory of integration based on intergovernmentalism, known as liberal 
intergovernmentalism.  Moravscik posits a two-stage approach to integration, by focusing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 See Ben Rosamond, (2000), Theories of European Integration, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 74-80. 
14 For example Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, (1989), '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World 
Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 95-128 who looked at the role of international developments that developed the 
European Commission as a policy entrepreneur. 
15 Ernst B Haas, (1970 & 1971), 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorising', in Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart A. Scheingold (eds), Regional Integration Theory and 
Research, pp. 3-44, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts. 
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on how grand interstate bargains are negotiated, which is similar to multi-level 
institutional analysis in international relations.  In the first stage, national preferences are 
determined by opportunities and constraints imposed by economic interdependence, or in 
other words national preferences determine the ‘demand’ for integration.  The second 
stage is at the interstate level, where interests are bargained through intergovernmental 
negotiations at the European level; the supply side of integration. 
 
Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to explain integration primarily with respect 
to interstate bargaining.  An advantage of Moravscik’s work is that it is grounded strongly 
in observed empirical observation of European politics; particularly into how 
institutionalisation might affect the interests of rational actors.  One interesting, but 
paradoxical argument of liberal intergovernemntalism is that integrative bargains, 
presented to national constituencies as a ‘take it, or leave it’ dichotomy, may actually 
strengthen the state.  By the same token, though, a theory which explains integration with 
respect to convergence of preferences is hard to validate, and ignores prior and 
subsequent events, as well as the implication that convergence of member states’ interests 
could result in rejection of integration.  The demand side of liberal intergovernmentalism 
also sounds much like neofunctionalism, in the sense that domestic and transnational 
society expresses preferences which governments pursue through international bargains 
and supranational institutions.17  To generalise, then, perhaps one of the most useful 
insights of liberal intergovernmentalism is how it illustrates how states may use 
intergovernmental fora and institutions to advance domestic agendas, and maximise their 
gains. 
 
To summarise, the review of the principle political approaches to integration reveals 
several salient issues for regional cooperation in the developing world.  The first point 
relates back to the wider issue between the importance in regional integration of states’ 
interests versus supranationalism.  Some intriguing questions in relation to integration in 
the developing world is how domestic imperatives may encourage states into integrative 
agreements, and to what extent this is to recapture a measure of sovereignty in relation to 
endogenous and exogenous pressures.  Furthermore, the purposefulness and level of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, op cit., pp. 130-134. 
17 Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration, Europe and Beyond, op cit., pp. 6-7; Mattli, Walter, (1999b), 
'Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, March, pp. 
28-31. 
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autonomy of regional institutions as agenda-setters is an important independent variable 
in determining the depth of political cooperation. 
 
3.  Economic Approaches to Regional Integration 
(i) Traditional Customs Union Theory 
A substantial contribution to theorising regionalism has been made by the theory of 
economic integration, because integration of this kind is more readily achievable in this 
way among states with similar interests and backgrounds than at a universal level.18  
Economists who study regional integration are concerned less with institutions or 
governance than with the market relationships among goods and factors of production to 
assess the welfare benefits of integration.  Jacob Viner’s (Viner, 1950) work on the static 
effects on production and consumption which result from inter-country substitution in 
goods assessing the welfare consequences of regional trade agreements was stimulated by 
the acceleration of economic integration in Western Europe.  Previously to Viner’s 
analysis, it had been assumed that regional agreements would produce traditional 
Ricardian gains from free trade, including specialisation, improved terms of trade, 
competition and greater efficiency.  Viner pointed out though that for a customs union, or 
indeed an FTA, the consequences are ambiguous for generating welfare increases within 
the region, and may result in negative effects as well from trade diversion.  Trade 
diversion is the result of the establishment of a common external tariff (CET), where trade 
from countries external to the region is diverted to suppliers within the region.19  
Alternatively, it may represent the welfare change caused by substituting low-cost 
imports from the rest of the world with higher-cost imports from regional producers.  A 
regional integration agreement affects welfare negatively because of the loss of tariff 
revenue.  Trade creation is analogous to Ricardo’s concept of comparative advantage, but 
on a regional scale, where welfare benefits arise because high-cost domestic production is 
replaced by lower-cost production in the partner country, and inefficient industry is 
rationalised across the region.  As markets are opened through reduction of tariffs and 
trade barriers within the region, each country specialises production, to serve the markets 
of partner countries. 
 
                                                          
18 Hiroshi Kitamura, (1966), 'Economic Theory and the Economic Integration of Underdeveloped Regions', 
in Miguel S. Wionczek (ed.), Latin American Economic Integration, Praeger, New York, p. 46. 
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Thus, according to classical CU theory, trade diversion must be less than trade creation 
for countries in an RIA to make welfare gains.  A positive welfare effect from forming an 
FTA is likely when partner countries already have extensive trade with each other, and 
the region’s external tariff, or common tariff, is low to attract imports from third 
countries.  There also need to be responsive demand and supply elasticities within the 
partner countries’ markets to respond in price changes, as well as efficient regional 
transportation to keep the cost of goods low.  However, Viner’s analysis assumes that 
there will be perfect competition, fixed prices and constant returns to scale.  Furthermore, 
the principle of relative factor endowments in the Heckschler-Ohlin trade model predicts 
that regional integration may disadvantage the owners of scarce production factors, as a 
result of specialisation as industry is redistributed across the region, and if labour and 
capital are not mobile enough to cope with the cost of adjustment.  There is also the 
matter of terms of trade in relation to world markets, as FTAs may not necessarily 
influence world commodity prices even if more efficient production of goods is a result of 
regional cooperation.20
 
More fundamental to the framework and issues relating to regional integration in the 
Pacific which will be developed later is that traditional theory does not address itself to 
the major issues of interest to development; namely how economic integration will deal 
with the dynamic structural conditions of production and technology, specialisation and 
foreign investment.  This is because the theory also fails to deal with the distribution of 
costs and benefits of integration across a region, and the role of actors in determining 
integration outcomes.21  The dynamic effects flowing from the creation of a larger 
economic area are surely the most desirable long-term reasons for following a model of 
economic integration. 
 
This literature has extensively coloured the arguments for economic integration as a 
strategy of regionalism.  Although the classical frameworks have been statist, regional 
cooperation at any of these levels does introduce functional pressures for deepening 
integration, and the transference of authority and perhaps legitimacy to the regional level.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 Gilpin and Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, op cit., 
pp. 346-48. 
20 Szepesi, Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and Trade 
Negotiations with the European Union, op cit., pp. 15-17. 
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Consequently, in this way it can be seen how regionalism is the appropriate theoretical 
context in which to analyse the implications of the FTA negotiations which lie at the heart 
of the post-Cotonou process, as it raises questions about the relationship between the state 
and the market, between informal and formal integration and therefore politics and 
economics. 
 
 
III. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
1. Economic Integration and Neofunctionalism as Normative Theories of 
Integration in the Developing World 
Of the theories reviewed, customs union theory and neofunctionalism comprise the 
‘revised standard version’ of regional cooperation in the developing world because they 
have been most rigorously applied.22  In fact, the sub discipline of comparative 
regionalism has grown out of the application of neofunctionalism to cases beyond Europe.  
An implication of this is to avoid the temptation to model or compare regional integration 
schemes to the EU, which can be difficult, given the high degree of specialisation in EU 
studies and because the EU is the most enduring example of mature regional cooperation.  
However, this can create the fallacy that a degree of EU-style institutional and economic 
integration is the mark of successful regionalism.23  What is important is to incorporate 
the concepts of dependency, inequality and national costs and benefits, as well as 
exogenous influences on a region, as thinking about development and integration has 
moved the theorisation of regional cooperation away from economic growth and 
mimicking the EC/EU, to an understanding of regionalism within the broader processes of 
the global political economy. 
 
(i) Economic Integration 
The orthodox theory of economic integration outlined evolved with the developed 
countries of Europe in mind, expressly for the purpose of throwing light on the problems 
of integration in Western Europe.24  This poses the question of to what extent the 
characteristics of less developed countries favour trade creation in regional integration; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Constantine V. Vaitsos, (1978), 'Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation', World Development, Vol. 6, 
pp. 719-769, p. 751. 
22 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Integration, op cit., p. 179. 
23 Breslin, New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy Theories and Cases, op cit., pp. 11-12; 
Axline, Caribbean Integration, The Politics of Regionalism, op cit., p. 33. 
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and whether trade creation is the significant criterion for evaluating customs unions and 
FTAs in developing countries.  Economic integration fits well with the concept of 
neofunctional spillover, since neofunctionalism is similarly concerned with a recasted 
relationship between politics and economics.  Balassa (1961) captured the essence of this 
in her definition of economic integration, which used the term to refer to 
intergovernmental dialogue and formal cooperation between states as a progressive 
movement from a free trade area, to customs union, common market, monetary union, 
and finally political union, where the region would in essence be a super-state (Figure 
2.2).  However, as has been pointed out in the literature which has developed on regional 
integration in developing economies, similarly to the evolution of literature on political 
integration, the process is not automatic.  Economic integration is a highly politically 
charged environment in which national governments must cede autonomy over important 
domestic matters to achieve benefits from higher stages of integration.  This is not to 
mention that the countries in a given region cannot be assumed to be at an equal stage of 
development, and that traditional neo-classical customs union theory assumes the 
conditions of a modern industrialised economy are present. 
 
A further issue for the suitability of integration schemes in the developing world based on 
traditional theories of economic integration is that FTAs are more likely to increase 
welfare if trade creation is in goods which are competitive and do not possess 
complementary markets producing similar goods.  The picture which should be emerging 
illustrates that developing countries fail to fulfil the economic conditions to reap the 
benefits of scale economies in economic integration.  Firstly, there is a distinct lack of 
competitive intra-regional trade or intra-firm trade that would facilitate integration, as 
well as the fact that these countries also compete with one another over a range of 
inelastic commodities to supply exports to foreign markets.  Lastly, tariff policy is 
primarily aimed at generating revenue, rather than as a tool of commercial policy.  For 
these reasons, among small states in a South-South RIA, the more developed countries’ 
relative deprivation improves against the rest of the world, but the less developed 
countries’ status worsens.  The conclusion which has to be drawn is that the benefits of 
economic integration are unlikely to be reproduced in the developing world.  At best 
integration is a non-issue; at worst it is positively harmful.25
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Peter Robson, (1998), The Economics of International Integration, Routledge, New York, p. 270. 
25 ibid., p. 270. 
 48
 
Realising the limitations from traditional theory, the experience of regional cooperation in 
developing countries progressed from promoting trade as an engine for growth through a 
customs union, such as Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) or the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), to a means of industrialisation for economic 
development.  Regionalism was considered as a tool to lessen the structural dependency 
of the developing world, thus coining the term dependencistas, or ‘dependency theory.’  
The new strategy, advocated by the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA), 
and its director, Raul Prebisch, recognised that the main gain from integration is trade 
diversion, where the policies of import substituted industrialisation (ISI) can be 
employed.26  ISI involved producing goods domestically that otherwise would have been 
imported.  However, the theory did not work in practice because the domestic market for 
high cost industrial goods was not large enough in developing countries. 
 
At the regional level, ISI offers a way of boosting national production by expanding it to 
the region, as firms supply other countries’ markets, but sacrifices the security of national 
protectionism.  In other words, an economic integration scheme may be exploited for its 
negative effects as a way to reduce dependency of a region on trade with the rest of the 
world.  Successful import substitution at the regional level, taken together with the 
regional use of resources, allows for a more efficient combination of factors of production 
through increased capital imports from foreign exchange savings and production for a 
regional market.  The long-run goal is to hopefully increase trade with the rest of the 
world, off-setting the initial effects of trade diversion.27  However, ISI as a strategy only 
proved beneficial if the partner states possessed the magnitude in scale economies to 
industrialise and produce efficient exports for the world market, as well as providing the 
regional facility to attract and distribute foreign investment.  Nevertheless, the principle 
of ISI matured into a variety of regional cooperation amongst developing states known as 
“collective self-reliance,” as joint policies and political positions were adopted against the 
developed world.28  Hence, collective self-reliance was a theoretically sophisticated 
approach to integration in the developing world, as it was grounded in a political 
                                                          
26 ibid., p. 271. 
27 Axline, W. Andrew, (1977), 'Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: the Politics of 
Regionalism in the Third World', International Organisation, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 84-86. 
28 As described in Chapter One, collective self-reliance was a driving rationale of the ACP when it was 
originally formed in the 1970s. 
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economy approach to regional cooperation that went beyond assessing the perceived or 
actual gains or losses from integration. 
 
A final important consideration of the effects of integration and development, in terms of 
political dynamics, is related to how the costs and benefits of a collective self-reliance 
strategy may be distributed.  It is axiomatic that for all integration schemes the gains and 
losses are not distributed evenly.  Among underdeveloped states the disparities tend to be 
greater, with generally the more developed countries reaping the benefits, and the less 
developed countries becoming net losers.  This is because the benefits of economic 
integration are felt most strongly in industrialised areas, which in an underdeveloped 
context means that growth will be concentrated in the most economically advanced areas, 
thus leading to polarisation.  It follows that as growth occurs around certain poles, the 
economic activity attracts factors, exacerbating the existing inequalities within the region.  
This implies that regional economic integration must account for this tendency with 
measures that respond to polarisation, to redistribute the gains from integration, besides 
using the gains themselves as an incentive for forming an FTA. 
 
(ii) Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism came to be applied as a normative theory for development through 
regional cooperation since it was relatively successful in describing the early instances of 
European integration.  Economic cooperation in functional areas was non-controversial, 
because the participating states were all developed industrial economies, and setbacks in 
integration were explained by exogenous variables (such as de Gaulle).  However, as the 
general discussion of the theory of functional and technical integration illustrates, there 
are basic economic and political differences between advanced industrial economies and 
the economies of underdeveloped states, which means that the conditions of economic 
integration are different.  The fundamental difference is that the ultimate goal of 
European integration was peace, security and prosperity.  Pursuing functional integration 
raised the stakes of cooperation, if it failed.  However, as noted the principal goal of 
integration for underdeveloped countries is the development of the region itself, and to 
address the various structural problems that impede their growth.29  Neofunctionalism 
was applied as a normative theory to the developing world because ‘success’ was 
                                                          
29 Axline, Caribbean Integration, The Politics of Regionalism, op cit., pp. 7-8. 
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interpreted to mean a higher level of integration, or movement from ‘technical’ to 
‘political’ spheres of cooperation, and because it claimed that integration could take place 
within delimited territorial regions.  The neofunctionalists also broadened the focus to 
make predictions about emerging regionalisation trends outside of Europe, since its 
strength as a general theory could be bolstered if neofunctionalism could be validated 
against other cases of integration.  
 
Haas and Schmitter produced several studies of integration beyond Europe.  Haas became 
concerned with identifying the ‘background conditions’ that could be conducive to 
integration.30  These included pluralistic social structures, substantial economic and 
industrial development and common ideological patterns among the participating actors.  
While this seems a logical strategy to assess the integrative potential of a region, the logic 
is flawed if it is considered that different regions may have different background 
conditions.  Therefore, the predictive power of spillover appeared to be limited as a 
general theory of integration.  To improve upon this state of affairs, Haas and Schmitter 
investigated the conditions under which automatic politicisation of background conditions 
might occur.  Joseph Nye (1971 and Keohane & Nye 1989) argued that this focus on 
study of functional spillover was misplaced and possibly Euro-centric.  Nye 
acknowledged the importance of background conditions but subdivided them into two 
categories, the structural and the perceptual.  Structural conditions incorporated the 
learning of the neofunctionalists about the politico-institutional capacity to integrate, but 
beyond this Nye described the importance of the perception of the equity of distribution 
of the benefits; the perception of each actor’s view of their strategic position; and the 
potential for deep integration in relation to how high the price of integration was.  Nye 
also raised the issue of specific historical factors which needed to be taken into account.  
In sum, Nye severely questioned the applicability of neofunctionalism as a general theory 
of integration.  What became apparent when neofunctionalism was applied to Third 
World cases was that political unification through cooperation in economic activities 
remained the focus of analysis.  The objective of integration and the dependent variable 
became confused.  As argued, the means of achieving integration in Europe is the goal of 
regional cooperation in the developing world.  Neofunctionalism was unable to explain  
 
                                                          
30 Ernst B. Haas, , (1961), 'International Integration: the European and the Universal Process', International 
Organisation, Vol. 15. 
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Figure 2.2: Varieties of Regional Integration 
Balassa, Gilpin; 
Cohn, et al: 
Political Economy 
Classifications 
Description Nye (1968) 
Political Science 
Classification 
Overall Intensity of 
Integration 
Free Trade Area Removing all tariffs 
among members 
Token Integration Limited 
Customs Union Common external 
tariff 
Security Community Moderate 
Common Market Free movement of 
factors (labour and 
capital) 
Limited Functional 
Cooperation 
Significant 
Economic Union Harmonisation of 
Economic policies 
Economic Integration Extensive 
Political Union Political Unification Political Unification Extreme 
 
the process of political integration among developing countries because it was based on a 
premised relationship between politics and economics which is fundamentally different to 
the socio-economic conditions of underdevelopment.31  The mistake was that it was 
assumed economic development was presumed to be synonymous with economic growth, 
which went hand in hand with the model of European integration along the model of a 
customs union and increasing economies of scale through industrialisation.  All the steps 
of integration will be highly controversial.  The rationale of neofunctionalism and the 
case for economic integration leading to an upgrading of common interests within a 
region alone provides little insight into regionalism in the developing world. 
 
If integration is considered as a means to promote development, as the EU argues, then it 
should be emphasised that traditional neofunctional cooperation based on economic 
integration is likely to have a negative effect on development, with respect to incentives 
and welfare gains from cooperation that was the experience of Western Europe.  Free 
trade liberalisation may in fact be harmful to development of a region if it exacerbates 
intra-regional disparities through polarisation and with the associated costs of 
harmonisation and the commitment to pursuing regional programmes and sectoral 
development.  A further pertinent concern is the issue of vulnerability of developing 
                                                          
31 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Integration, op cit., pp. 182-84. 
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states in the global economy, particularly small island states.32  This is not to discredit a 
free trade strategy in itself, but to note the caveat that measures must be taken to counter 
the disintegrative effects of functional economic integration.  In other words, 
redistribution of the benefits and national positions must be factored into an analysis of 
regionalism in the developing world.  This brings about the issue of what is a more 
theoretically appropriate perspective to frame regionalism in a context of 
underdevelopment. 
 
2.  A Political Economy Approach 
As the previous sections have illustrated, integration in the developing world has 
progressed from simple FTAs, to customs unions, to ISI schemes, to finally more mature 
forms of collective self-reliance, since the norms of economic and political integration – 
the expansionist logic of neofunctional spillover and the incentive of tangible rewards – 
are simply not present in developing countries.  The essential point to conclude from the 
previous analysis though is that the relationship between integration and development is 
that development is the object of cooperation, not the means by which cooperation is 
achieved.  Therefore, in the developing world, the foundation for regional integration must be 
considered as originating from the premise of ‘collective self-reliance,’ in which integration 
of national economies is no longer the sole focus of cooperation.  Joint political actions define 
the activities of developing regions to make welfare gains, as much as economic activity. 
 
Using these findings as a base, a political economy approach sees regional cooperation as 
part of a quest for a broadly based national development within the twin constraints of the 
domestic political system and the international economy, and thereby demands an 
emphasis on the holistic and historical processes of regional cooperation and 
development.33.  The previous chapter also revealed that EU development policy in fact 
represents the convergence of a number of disciplines from politics and economics, as it 
relates to how the state and the market interact.  Cotonou also shows that development policy 
is increasingly concerned with political and civil society aspects of aid and assistance.  A 
political economy approach reflects how historical and intellectual trends, as well as 
developments in world politics, have made the boundaries between disciplines such as 
                                                          
32 Uentabo Fakaofo Neemia, (1986), Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in 
Pacific Regional Cooperation, Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, p. 10-
11. 
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politics and economics more permeable in the context of the study of regionalism.  It is 
argued that such an approach is useful for understanding the regional cooperation 
provisions of the post-Cotonou process because the EU, by the most basic definition, is 
advocating a South-South-North model of economic integration, which raises the same 
familiar questions which have been dealt with by the discourse on development and 
integration.  Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to outlining the 
elements of a political economy approach for assessing regional cooperation in the 
developing world. 
 
One of the most useful accounts on which to build such a framework are the analyses and 
concepts developed by W. Andrew Axline.  It is an argument of this thesis that Axline’s 
framework, although less contemporary to the work on new regionalism is still essentially 
applicable to assess the integrative potential of a developing region.  Axline (1971) 
originally investigated customs unions and FTAs as a ‘petrie dish’ in which to conduct 
scientific study of foreign policy among national units, as they offered a bounded arena in 
which to analyse foreign policy behaviour.  Over a series of publications, Axline refined 
and extended this framework, which led to examination of the politics of collective self-
reliance schemes based on economic cooperation through examining the costs and 
benefits of cooperation to modify the basic precepts of the European model of integration 
(Axline, 1977).  The framework was applied principally to regional economic integration 
in the Caribbean (Axline, 1979).  Axline then went further to expand his framework to 
include the role of external factors in his analysis in order to broaden its explanatory 
power beyond economic integration schemes (Axline, 1984).  The most valuable 
contribution of Axline, for this thesis, is the recognition of the point that while models of 
integration grounded in the European experience are not irrelevant, they must appreciate 
the economic and political conditions of cooperation among underdeveloped states.34  
Since, it has been determined that regional cooperation is more sensitive to the national 
interest in developing states; it requires that the foreign policy of the nation-state, rather 
than the level of integration is the appropriate unit of analysis.  Consequently, the politics 
of regional negotiations, as well as a rational liberal intergovernmentalist perspective are 
justifiable elements of a political economy framework. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
33 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Integration, op cit., pp. 185-86. 
34 Axline, Caribbean Integration, The Politics of Regionalism, op cit., pp. xvii-xviii & p. 34. 
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It remains now to outline these elements to build a working framework to apply to Pacific 
regionalism, with the future of cooperation among the PACP states in mind.  Firstly, 
recalling Nye’s modifications to neofunctionalism, Axline argued that to understand the 
politics of regional cooperation, the factors that influence the perceptual opportunities of 
participation must be examined, since the reason for cooperation (the dependent variable) 
is not economic or political union, but the efficient functioning of a regime for the benefit 
of the region.  Economic integration schemes remain the easiest to analyse, then, because 
the relative welfare benefits from common policies can be easily determined.  However, 
as argued, since the nature of even economic cooperation among developing countries is 
fundamentally related to the pursuit of national development goals, each member state is 
likely to assess regional policies in terms of its individual costs and benefits, especially 
where those policies may be associated with an intergovernmental institution.  As 
indicated, as the gains are unlikely to be distributed evenly, there may be mixed reaction 
or opposition.  This led Axline to develop several broad generalisations concerning the 
politics of regional cooperation. 
 
1. Regional organisations are more likely to succeed when member states see their 
needs being met by the institutions and policies which are meant to benefit the 
region. 
2. Regional cooperation is more likely to succeed if “package deals” can be 
negotiated that bring regional benefits and can satisfy member states. 
3. Support for a policy package will be according to the perceived opportunity costs 
and benefits, and is necessary for cooperation to proceed around packages. 
 
Thus, the analysis then turns to the pattern of negotiations and the various forces which 
condition national political positions.  Using this information, the positions of member 
states may be postulated, and by extension, the likelihood of success of integration in a 
region can be predicted.  Since, member states are more likely to accept deals which 
satisfy their needs, in general, the more comprehensive a regional policy, the more likely 
regional policies and institutions will be accepted.  Therefore, Axline concludes that there 
will be a direct relationship between comprehensiveness and the viability of a regional 
integration scheme.35  Although, as cooperation moves further from strict economic 
                                                          
35 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Integration, op cit., pp. 191-92. 
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integration, the costs and benefits will be harder to quantify, and integrative potential 
harder to predict.36
 
In this way, it is possible to identify types of regional policy packages and the likelihood 
of their success.  Axline drew on the models of integration in the developing world, 
developed by Lynn K. Mytelka (1975).  These helpfully summarise the peculiarities of 
developing world regional cooperation, and summarise the relationship between political 
and economic integration.  Mytelka outlined three categories of regional cooperation in 
the developing world, which draws on the discourse on development and integration 
discussed.  Briefly, these are: 
 
1. A laissez faire model of traditional economic integration, based on the European 
pattern of FTAs and customs unions, whose main purpose is to expand intra-
regional trade.  Among underdeveloped countries it will lead to polarisation and 
increased dependence. 
2. A redistributive model, which seeks to address the problems of the first.  It is 
more complex, as it involves redistributive mechanisms, often involving state 
direction or intervention. 
3. A compromise model, which included elements of both prior models, but also 
includes measures to reduce dependency; which corresponds to a collective self-
reliance scheme. 
 
The third model is the most likely to achieve the development goals of regional 
integration, but as it requires comprehensive integration, will be the most politically 
difficult to achieve.37  This is because of the more complicated institutions, the wider 
scope of decision-making and greater commitment to regional cooperation than in the 
first two models. 
 
Based on this classification of integration schemes, the policies which may be pursued by 
member states or regional institutions have been described in loosely similar terms: 
 
                                                          
36 W. Andrew Axline, (1984), 'South Pacific Region Cooperation in Comparative Perspective: An 
Analytical Framework', Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 2, December, p. 44. 
37 Axline, 'Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: the Politics of Regionalism in the Third 
World', op cit., pp. 84-90. 
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1. Expansive policies, which most closely correspond to laissez faire integration, 
which aim to make absolute increases in gain for the region; 
2. Distributive policies, which anticipate in advance the equal distribution of any of 
the potential gains which may accrue from integration; 
3. Dependency-reducing policies, or expansive-distributive policies, which 
prescribe a collective self-reliance scheme aiming towards free trade, development 
planning and regional redistributive mechanisms. 
 
Naturally, the intensity of state intervention varies in each set of policies.  The political 
dynamics of these models also correspond closely to Nye’s intergovernmentalist 
classification of regionalism based on intensity of interactions and commitments between 
actors, ranging from token integration, to limited functional cooperation and finally to 
customs unions and ultimately full political union.38
 
Generally, during bargaining, the MDCs will favour an expansive strategy, where they 
can reap the majority of the benefits, because of the effects of polarisation.  LDCs on the 
other hand, will prefer distributive policies which address the imbalances of 
cooperation.39  This may result in coalitions that may form around ‘poles of growth’ and 
‘poles of stagnation.’  Therefore, the inference from Axline’s work is that to have the 
greatest integrative potential politically and institutionally, regional cooperation in the 
developing world needs to negotiate package deals which are expansive-dependency 
reducing.  A significant implication of this is a high degree of political integration is 
required at the outset of cooperation, completely opposite to the Western European 
experience.  This in turn requires both national and sub national actors in MDCs and 
LDCs to commit to compensatory and corrective measures which need to compensate for 
the effects of polarisation. 
 
The politics of cost-benefit analysis therefore gives more emphasis to national and sub 
national actors in the integration process to produce a theoretically appropriate framework 
to frame integration in the developing world, based initially on economic integration, as it 
                                                          
38 Joseph S. Nye, (1968), 'Central American Regional Integration', in Joseph S. Nye (ed.), International 
Regionalism, Little Brown & Co., Boston cited in R.A. Herr, (1980), Institutional Sources of Stress in 
Pacific Regionalism, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, pp. 3-4. 
39 Axline, 'South Pacific Region Cooperation in Comparative Perspective: An Analytical Framework', op 
cit., p. 42. 
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can encompass negotiations over common policies in such areas as cooperation in 
transport, communications, services, the environment, education and security.  However, 
factors such as the preferences of national leaders, business elites and labour, are equally 
important, as the extent to which they support integrative measures will influence the 
mixture of expansive or distributive measures adopted, depending on how far market 
forces are restricted under an integration scheme.  Furthermore, vulnerability will also 
influence the agenda of regional actors and the integration process with respect to the 
economic, political or security affairs of external actors that have interests in the region.  
The relationship to redistributive measures is most cogent in the developing world, since 
aid, foreign investment or security support can supply an alternative to regional 
cooperation if there is congruence in aims between participants and external actors.40  
Interpreted in this way, EU development policy may be considered an important component 
of the calculus of opportunity costs for ACP states. 
 
A further, and final, account of comparative regional analysis worthy of consideration in 
relation to assessing integrative potential is that recently produced by Walter Mattli 
(1999a).  Mattli argues that the impetus for integration is spurred by new technologies 
which increase the scope of gains from wider markets.  In other words, actors who seek to 
gain from scale economies will seek to change the governance structures of a region in 
order to realise these benefits.41  Thus, Mattli argues for similar integrative pressures as 
neofunctionalism, noting the pressure of market integration to supply common rules and 
harmonisation.42  However, while discussing demand for integration, he also introduces 
elite supply of integration into the equation.  Deeper regional cooperation will only occur, 
when political leaders are willing to supply it.  An example is in times of economic 
difficulty, the incentive to pursue more efficient regional policies for national leaders may 
be greater than remaining self-reliant or greater than concerns for fair redistribution of 
benefits to domestic interest groups, given that regional cooperation will impose certain 
structural changes and costs.  Hence, Mattli offers a rational actor model of integration, 
combining several strands of political economy, including coordination games, to predict 
when states will favour cooperation.43
                                                          
40 ibid., pp.45-46. 
41 Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration, Europe and Beyond, op cit., p. 46. 
42 cf. Pressure from European industrialists and market forces as an explanation for the completion of the 
Single European Market, as argued in Sandholtz, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', op cit. 
43 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, op cit.p. 184. 
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Moreover, Mattli’s rational market model of regionalism offers several important insights 
for the costs and pressures associated with developing world regional cooperation.  The 
first is that a regional ‘paymaster,’ or lead state, will help to lower the perceptual costs of 
cooperation in the life of a regional integration scheme.  Another important contribution 
to the political economy of regional cooperation is the reaction of states outside a region 
to ‘externalities,’ or external effects of cooperation.  Countries outside an integrated 
region may have to face discriminatory trade policies, a high external tariff or strict rules 
of origin rules associated with FTAs.  Furthermore, a regional cooperation scheme may 
attract foreign investment more readily than autonomous states; especially in the case of 
developing countries.  Lastly, regional cooperation schemes that establish regional 
institutions are likely to lower the cost of cooperation for states on the margins and 
improve market efficiency.  However, such institutions could not succeed without the 
support of lead states to underwrite them, at least at first. 
 
Hence, according to Mattli, regional cooperation may encourage two possible kinds of 
‘integrative responses.’  One is for outsiders to attempt to join the integrating region.  As 
noted, this is more likely when a performance gap occurs.  If denied, because of 
prohibitive membership terms, or possibly where synergies exist with other outsiders, 
these countries may elect to pursue the second integrative response, which is to form their 
own ‘counter-union.’  Mattli contends that counter-unions do not endure because of the 
absence of two fundamental conditions: undisputed leadership, to direct expansive-
distributional issues, and strong market pressures for integration.  Especially in the case of 
the underdeveloped world, it might also be added that the small size of a regional 
economy, a distinct lack in export markets, or the potential for comparative advantage 
among the states in a region, because of a limited range of industrial or agricultural 
products, limits the logic of regional cooperation.  Overall, Mattli’s study is a valuable 
tool for understanding the integrative potential of a region, as his aim is to establish a 
basic driving logic behind regionalism.  Mattli concludes that regional cooperation will 
deliver increases in welfare when important gains can be made from operating 
collectively, and when there is a state that can act as a focal point for regional 
cooperation, but only by using longevity and sustained stability as measures of success.  
Thus, where Axline’s formula predicts possible positions member states might take in 
relation to certain policy packages, Mattli’s propositions are more generally predictive of 
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the sustainability of integration schemes.  Development goals would have to be 
substituted in the case of developing world states.  Nevertheless, Axline’s conclusions are 
still invaluable for appreciating the differences between regionalism in developed and 
underdeveloped states. 
 
3. The Political Economy Framework Described and Appraised 
In an attempt to synthesise and simplify the discussion, the elements of the political 
economy approach outlined for assessing the integrative potential of underdeveloped 
regions of the world have been tabulated (Figure 2.3).  The rows of the table list the 
various actors involved in the integration process.  They have been differentiated by 
geographical relationship to the integrating region, firstly by endogenous actors, including 
the member states, and secondly by exogenous actors to the region.  The columns of the 
table give the possible relationship to the process of regional integration in terms of roles 
and interests, and the analytical perspective, with respect to the key variables and issues 
outlined in the discussion that are a part of or consequence of integration in 
underdeveloped states, as well as the key activity of actors that can be analysed and the 
primary theoretical focus.  The framework marries the key insights of Axline and Mattli.  
The key modification to Axline’s cost-benefit analysis is the inclusion of rational market 
pressures, regional leadership and the role of externalities.  This produces a political 
economy framework with an emphasis on process in a single case, as opposed to a 
broader comparative study of regionalism, which was Axline’s guiding intention. 
 
Among the many elements, the choice of integration scheme, along the continuum of 
limited functional cooperation, or institutionally intense regionalism as the model of 
regional cooperation appears to be most the important point in judging whether a region 
has the potential to cooperate through joint political institutions and or to construct an 
economic integration scheme.  Unless the model adopted can comprehensively meet the 
development needs of the region, and share congruence with its member’s policies, the 
scheme will be likely to stagnate.  Regional organisations must therefore create, through 
bargaining and negotiations, packages of measures which represent the elements of 
expansive, distributive and dependency-reducing policies which will attract the support of 
all  
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Figure 2.3: 
Political Economy Framework for Analysis of the Potential for 
Regional Cooperation in Underdeveloped States 
 Relationship to Process 
of Regional Cooperation 
Analysis of Relationship to Process 
Actors Interests Role Activity Theoretical Focus Key Variables  
Endogenous Factors 
Member 
States 
(Elite 
Leadership) 
Increasing 
national 
benefits 
through 
regional 
policies 
(economic, 
functional, 
political…) 
Direct 
participation, 
negotiation and 
adoption of 
regional 
policies; 
Provision of 
regional 
policies in 
response to 
market forces 
Bargaining and 
negotiations, 
trade-offs and 
package deals 
Perceptual 
conditions of 
regional 
cooperation; 
Distribution of 
perceived 
opportunity costs of 
regional policies  
 
Model of Integration 
Scheme Adopted: 
ie. Mixture of 
Expansive & 
Distributive 
elements 
Number of 
member states; 
Method of 
decision-
making 
Foreign policy 
of the member 
states; 
Goal of 
regional 
cooperation is 
economic 
development, 
(not economic 
growth); 
Polarisation of 
development; 
Factor 
movements 
Regional 
Hegemon 
(Paymaster) 
Welfare 
benefits from 
an enlarged 
regional 
economy 
Supply: 
Provides a pole 
of growth; and 
Economic and 
Political 
Leadership 
Meets demand 
by 
underwriting 
most costs 
(demand) for 
cross border 
benefits 
External effects of 
integration; 
Response of other 
member states and 
third countries 
outside region-group 
to integration 
Preferences for 
regional 
distribution of 
benefits; 
Relationship 
with 
metropolitan 
powers 
Exogenous Factors 
Regional 
Powers 
Strategic 
concerns, 
ideological 
and economic 
interests, 
regional 
solidarity 
Regional 
Cooperation 
projects; 
Economic and 
military aid 
and trade, 
diplomacy 
Impact of 
Externalities 
Global and 
Hemispheric 
Powers 
Strategic 
concerns, 
retention of 
traditional 
patterns of 
influence, 
economic 
interests 
 
 
 
 
Exercise of 
diplomatic 
influence on 
members 
states: aid, 
good 
governance 
conditionality 
Economic and 
military aid 
and trade, 
diplomacy 
 
 
 
 
Influence on the 
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common rules 
Based on Axline, 1984, p. 48; & Mattli, 1999a, pp. 59-64. 
 
member states to build successful regionalism in the developing world.  Cooperation in 
functional sectors will produce less comprehensive policy packages, while economic 
integration will produce more comprehensive regional redistributive policies and 
institutions.  However, as economic integration is politically intense, sectoral cooperation 
may be easier.  Therefore, the framework suggests that where there is little incentive for 
neoliberal market integration, less intensive forms of cooperation may be pursued, but 
because of their nature, may not fulfil development goals, and consequently may deliver 
suboptimal policy outcomes and integrative results. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Before making some final conclusions, it must be acknowledged that the propositions and 
theory outlined is predominantly based on work conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
before the neoliberal age.  The framework presented represents the lessons learned from 
the first wave of regional cooperation for development, where integration schemes failed 
because the Western experience of development could not be duplicated.  The “new” or 
revived regionalism in the developing world is consequently more attuned to the relative 
political economy context, but it may also be crudely argued that “what goes around 
comes around,” or more specifically that the mindset liberal policy makers have adopted 
today towards regional cooperation is not significantly different from the thought of thirty 
years ago.44  In the age of globalisation, neoliberalism, and the WTO multilateral free 
trade agenda, approaches to regional cooperation have returned to more traditional 
models of trade liberalisation, pursuit of the cost reductions from economies of scale as 
well as unilateral tariff reduction.  The EPA negotiations are an example of this, 
particularly as the EU has driven the agenda towards using free trade as a mechanism for 
development.45  Consequently, the issues raised by earlier theorists of integration in the 
developing world are not irrelevant to the debate on EU development policy.  The 
perspective theorists such as Axline offer is advantageous because it can interpret the 
                                                          
44 Peter Robson, (1993), 'The New Regionalism and Developing Countries', Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 329-347; Robson, The Economics of International Integration, op cit., pp. 294-
97. 
45 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Assisting Countries to Benefit from Trade, COM(2002) 513 final, 18 September, European 
Community, Brussels. 
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integrative potential of an EPA-style FTA not only from the potential economic costs or 
benefits it may bring to a region, but also for its political implications.  As illustrated 
regional cooperation based on economic integration requires considerable political 
commitment on the part of participants since in theory only comprehensive regional 
policies will achieve the goal of development.  Therefore, the more informal nature of 
FTAs and the less dirigiste nature of new regionalism mean that the EU agenda for EPAs 
as a tool of development is at odds with the realities of building strong regions to trade 
with in the ACP.  The solutions to the problems related to the dynamic effects of 
economic integration require stronger institutions. 
 
A political economy approach to regional cooperation is therefore justified, because 
regionalism reflects the nexus between politics and economics.  A political economy 
approach may help to cast analysis of regional cooperation in a context removed from 
constant referral to the norms of theories of European integration, whose explanations of 
cooperation are perhaps too distinctive to Europe, where the motivation for regionalism 
originated from politico-security issues to provide peace and prosperity for the 
continent.46  Political economy can also analyse regional cooperation in a context of costs 
and benefits in relation to regional opportunities.  Most importantly, a political economy 
approach recognises that regional cooperation is a way for states to advance national interests 
and goals among developing states in general, as well as how RIAs may be initiated, expand 
or collapse, as numerous scholars of regional integration in the developing world have 
demonstrated.  Hence, a political economy approach is an overall useful framework to adopt 
to assess integration in the Pacific because it captures the tension between the exogenous and 
endogenous political forces acting upon the region, as well as the economic implications of 
the reforms introduced under the post-Cotonou process.  The lessons learned and the 
contribution to the theory of regional integration in the developing world is therefore 
instructive for the regions of the ACP as they are faced with an apparent regional free 
trade fait accompli, about which few of the implications are clear. 
 
The task remains now to test the propositions about regional integration in the developing 
world empirically against the Pacific.  For this purpose, the succeeding chapters will 
discuss the institutional experience of the region, and the extent that the region possesses 
                                                          
46 William Wallace, (1994), Regional Integration: The West European Experience, Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, p. 9. 
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a collective identity and desire to cooperate regionally.  This is not to mention the 
problem of the physical capacity to cooperate, which will be addressed separately.  The 
next chapter, however, will look at the various ways in which the Pacific has been 
defined, together with the EU definition of the region, since the way the region is defined 
by the EU determines who is left in or out of development cooperation. 
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Chapter Three 
 
“Pacific Dreams” 
Defining ‘the Pacific’ 
 
“There is a world of difference between viewing the Pacific as “islands in a far sea” and 
as “a sea of islands.”” 
Epeli Hau’ofa (1994) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter was devoted to locating the post-Cotonou process in the literature of 
regional integration, in order to provide some criteria and concepts against which to 
evaluate the viability of economic integration as a strategy of development in the Pacific.  
Thus far, though, definition of what actually constitutes the Pacific region remains 
undefined.  It is an important subject.  The way that the region is defined will influence 
the policy agenda for development in the region.  The argument that has been developed 
so far is that the EPA framework is premised by the assumptions of traditional theories of 
European integration.  The EU has divided the ACP into six sub regions, four in Africa, 
as well as the Caribbean and the Pacific ACP states (Appendix Three).  The essential 
question then is whether this EU definition of “the Pacific” accurately captures the 
dynamics of Pacific regionalism.  The Cotonou Agreement is supposed to address the 
particular region-specific needs of development,1 however this may be unlikely if the 
definition of the region ignores or excludes significant features of the ‘regional terrain.’  
Hence, another purpose of this chapter will be to examine how the Pacific has been 
defined and for whose purpose.  This should also reveal the extent to which Pacific 
                                                          
1 For example, “The ACP states shall determine the development principles, strategies and models of their 
economies and societies in all sovereignty (Article 4)”; and “Economic and trade cooperation shall take 
account of different needs and levels of development of the ACP countries and regions (Article 35).” 
Commission of the European Communities, (2000), The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, The Courier, 
Special Issue, September 2000, European Community, Brussels. 
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islanders possess a common identity, which is perhaps an implicit assumption in Brussels.  
It will be demonstrated that the EU employs a rationalised definition of the Pacific, which 
does not accurately reflect Pacific patterns of regionalism or how Pacific islanders may 
conceptualise the region. 
 
To attempt to define the various dynamics of Pacific regional identity is consequently a 
call to engage with research and commentary from the literature on archaeology, 
anthropology and geography.  This evidence has not yet been juxtaposed against the 
neoliberal EU agenda for the region.  To do so, after firstly establishing the way that the 
EU views the Pacific, conceptualisation of regional identity will be investigated from 
three angles: “inside,” or early indigenous expressions of Pacific community; “outside,” 
documenting the influence of Western norms of civilisation on the region; and “inside-
out,” illustrating how Pacific islanders in the contemporary world are adapting some of 
their original conceptions of the region in response to globalisation. 
 
 
II. THE EU DEFINITION OF THE “PACIFIC” 
The “Pacific” is an imprecise term.  Crocombe (2001, 17-19) has surveyed the numerous 
geographical vectors along which it is possible to define the Pacific.  Australia and New 
Zealand generally refer to the Pacific as “the islands,” to the north, as far as Hawaii.  
Conversely, northern hemispheric partners of the region, like Europe, perceive the Pacific 
generally as “south” of where they are.  In North America, the term Pacific more often 
than not bears no relation to the islands at all, and is used to describe the Asia-Pacific rim, 
including South East Asia, or the large countries bordering the Pacific Ocean, including 
Russia, China and Japan, giving the impression that a ‘doughnut hole’ – an area of 
emptiness – exists where the Pacific Ocean is.2  There are East-West boundaries too.  The 
South East Asian archipelago is too far removed from the ocean to be part of the Pacific. 
However, the Western border is less certain, because there is a history of interaction with 
West New Guinea and the islands, as well as the recent independence of East Timor and 
its quest to join the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).  More assuredly, Easter Island is the 
maximum extent of the Eastern boundary of the Pacific. 
 
                                                          
2 Greg Fry, (1997b), 'Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of “the 
South Pacific”', The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 9, No. 2, Fall, p. 305. 
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The EU definition of the Pacific, then, is a similar bound concept, based on the 
membership of the Pacific ACP group, which have traditionally been the ACP states 
which are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement.  The membership of the PACP also 
corresponds to the membership of the region’s premiere intergovernmental organisation, 
the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (Map 3.1).  The EU recognises the Pacific Islands Forum 
as the primary collective political and geographic expression of the region.  Previously to 
the Cotonou Agreement, the Pacific ACP membership had been defined exclusively in 
terms of associationist rationale; almost as a kind of ‘add-on’ thrown in along side the 
core ex-colonies in Africa and the Caribbean.  The original eight PACP states were Fiji, 
Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.  
The expansion of the PACP to include the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the 
Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru, the Cook Islands and Niue in 2000 means that the PACP 
now includes PICs which do not have a previous associationist relationship with Europe, 
broadening the geographic scope and range of interests in the PACP.  However, these 
states lack an established, or indeed the potential for, a significant trading relationship 
with the EU.  In general, the Pacific states add comparatively little to the EU-ACP 
relationship (cf. Appendix Nine). 
 
 
 
Map 3.1: The Boundaries of the Pacific ACP Region.  Note the limited area that is 
covered by the PACP in relation to 22 islands territories covered by the Pacific Community.  
Source: (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, p. 8). 
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The PACP/PIF has a total population of just 7.09 million, and the enlargement of the 
PACP added only 226,500 more people: less than the population of the Solomon Islands.  
Trade volumes typically amount to less than five per cent of total imports into the Pacific 
and next to nothing for exports to the EU.3  Although perhaps less important to Europe 
for these reasons, the increase in size of the PACP has reduced the imbalance in favour of 
Africa in the ACP, and consequently may raise the salience of particular small island 
states (SIS) issues on the agenda of the ACP-EU partnership, beyond the general 
provisions in Articles 84 and 89.4  In any case, the countries which comprise the PACP 
are predominately South Pacific island states, which produces an artificial set of 
teleological boundaries for the Pacific different to those accepted in most other definitions 
of the region. 
 
Complicating the definition of the PACP however, has been the accession of East Timor 
to the ACP in May 2003, which was classified as a PACP state.5  This classification of 
East Timor as a “Pacific” state is unique compared to other foreign and donor definitions 
of the Pacific, except perhaps for the UN which deals with Asia and the Pacific as one 
entity.  Possibly East Timor’s inclusion in the PACP illustrates that development status as 
much as geography determines the definition of the ACP.  As a small newly independent 
territory, East Timor is not dissimilar in characteristics to the PICs, and can be treated 
similarly according to the provisions in Articles 2, 34 and 35 of Cotonou.  However, with 
respect to constructing an FTA in the Pacific, it seems unlikely that a republic with no 
previous contact or affinity with the PICs, as well as possessing no capacity for trade can 
be a meaningful player in Pacific regional cooperation.6  There appears to be no paradox 
in the mind of the European Commission, as it believes East Timor will be able to be 
                                                          
3 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), The Pacific and the European Union, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, p. 23.  Also see Appendix Nine, Table A. 
4 Such issues include vulnerability, global warming, sustainable development as well as economic viability, 
commensurate with the development status and ability of these states to meet these challenges.  David 
MacRae, (2000), An Opportunity for the New Pacific ACP Members, The Courier, Special Issue, 
September, Directorate-General for Development, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, pp. 
24-26. 
5 Commission of the European Communities., 'Europa: DG Development website', Vol. 2004, No. 26 
January, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development. 
6 “In late 1999, about 70% of the economic infrastructure of East Timor was laid waste by Indonesian 
troops and anti-independence militias.”  Furthermore, East Timor’s imports were valued at US $237 
million, as opposed to only $8 million of exports in complementary goods, such as coffee and sandalwood.  
United States Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center (U.S.), (2003), CIA World 
Factbook, Supt. of Docs, Washington, D.C. 
 68
fully integrated into the PACP.7  The inclusion of East Timor in the PACP creates an 
anomaly in the regional architecture of the Pacific PCP, raising the question of whether it 
is geographical contiguity or shared experience which is the most important delimiter of a 
region. 
 
Furthermore, because of the patchwork of relationships that exist between Europe and the 
developing world, the Pacific development partnership still treats the two wealthiest 
island OCTs in the Pacific, French Polynesia and New Caledonia (Map 3.2), separately 
and fails to adequately acknowledge the numerous other islands, sub regional relations or 
regional dynamics in the Pacific, which will be discussed subsequently (cf. Appendix 
Six).  Perhaps in recognition of some of the limitations of the PACP boundaries, The 
Courier (Commission of the European Communities, 2000) also acknowledges the 
Pacific Community, detailed in Chapter Five, to describe a much broader Pacific region in 
terms of the 22 countries and territories of the Pacific excluding New Zealand, Australia 
and Hawaii (Appendix One).  In this way it allows the scope of aid assistance to the 
region to be discussed more broadly than the assistance which will be given under the 
Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), with funds matching from ACP and OCT 
programmes.  Therefore, the definition of the PACP has certain logic to it, as it covers the 
most vulnerable states in the developing world, but its boundaries do not always 
complement existing Pacific regional groupings well. 
 
Moreover, it might be surmised that the expansion of the PACP to parallel the 
membership of the PIF is to make economic integration efforts consistent between Forum 
initiatives, such as the PICTA, described in Chapter Six, and the EPA process.  The PIF is 
the most similar integration scheme to the EU in the Pacific, because it is based on the 
membership of nation-states, and operates through a set of regional institutions to which 
authority is delegated over particular common functions.  Hence, the EU chooses to deal 
with a definition of the region similar to its own.  However, the EU definition of the 
South Pacific would have an observer believe that the Pacific is a homogenous unit, 
where the states are all more or less alike because they are by and large all small island 
developing states.  Such taxonomy may have been acceptable under Lomé, when 
                                                          
7 Koos Richelle, (2003), Statement by Mr Koos Richelle Director-General for Development, European 
Commission, Fifteenth Post-Forum Dialogue Partners Meeting, Commission of European Communities, 
Auckland, New Zealand, p. 1. 
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appreciation of the Pacific as a region was less important, but since the post-Cotonou 
process engages political actors directly and indirectly through economic integration, in 
its analysis of how the region is composed, it is arguable that the European Commission 
needs to look beyond intergovernmental cooperation to gain a fuller appreciation of the 
complexion of Pacific ‘regionness,’ and therefore how the PCP can gain legitimacy 
among the PACP states.  There is in fact a diverse range of regional identities and sub-
regional integration processes at work in the Pacific. 
 
 
Map 3.2: The Pacific Overseas Countries and Territories. 
Source: Europa, DG Development website: accessed at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/oct/index_en.htm, 21 June 2004 
 
 
III. “INSIDE”: PRE-CONTACT THREADS OF IDENTITY 
1. “Islands in the Sea” or a “Sea of Islands”? 
The previous section also implicitly shows that the Pacific has often been defined by 
Western ideas and assumptions, based on over 200 years of sustained exploration and 
contact.8  The division of the Pacific into geographical spaces, the shape of current 
borders, and even some of the ‘native’ conceptualisations about traditional society, such 
as the nationalist taukei movement in Fiji, have been shaped by European contact and 
                                                          
8 Robert C. Kiste, (1994), 'Precolonial Times', in K. Howe, R.C. Kiste, and B.V. Lal (eds.), Tides of 
History, The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, p. 3; Kerri 
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colonisation.  Although Pacific islanders may have seemed to inhabit small and isolated 
territories in the ocean, from the point of view of the first European explorers, if the 
perspective of the islanders themselves is considered, it may be argued that the island 
world was in fact larger than Europeans have considered. 
 
The key issues here are size and space.  Epeli Hau’ofa (1994) has been a vocal proponent 
of tackling Western paradigms of underdevelopment and dependency in the Pacific 
through building up a regional consciousness through the shared identity and resources 
that all Pacific Islanders possess in the ocean.  Hau’ofa argues that Western contact has 
had the tendency to take island identity and island societies and belittle them, thus 
instilling a subordinate mindset in Pacific islanders.  In fairness, Europeans did not 
introduce belittling tendencies into the Pacific, since Polynesian societies have operated 
under systems of dominance and hierarchy.  Nonetheless, Hau’ofa cites cases of how 
missionaries condemned Oceanic cultures wholesale in the time of imperialism, as 
savage, lascivious and barbaric, or how Melanesians were treated as an inferior child-like 
people, since, for example, grown men were often called “boys.”  Moreover, this trend 
has had implications for the modern era since if islanders believe that they lack the 
resources or the size to combat their current position of inequality in the international 
system in which they now find themselves, it may influence their ability to act with 
relative autonomy.  As fragmented, isolated islands in the sea, this may be true; but the 
islands may prosper if they can overcome these belittling tendencies which Hau’ofa 
argues they have been taught to believe. 
 
To combat belittlement, Hau’ofa presents a revivified concept of the Pacific as 
“Oceania,” which denotes more than a set of geographical boundaries, but instead a 
region of people, islands and the interconnections among them.  Although Te Rangi 
Hiroa’s (Sir Peter Buck) Pacific ‘fly-fish’ representation of the Pacific, produced in 1938, 
acknowledges a symbolic Pacific message of oceanic exploration towards the East, 
describing Polynesians as “Vikings of the Sunrise,” and celebrates South Pacific 
islanders’ technology, courage and sense of worth, the ocean is even more central to 
Hau’ofa’s idea of Oceania.9  To Hau’ofa, the idea of smallness is relative; it depends on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Howe, (1997), Nature, Culture and Histroy: The Knowing of Oceania, University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu, p. 2. 
9 R. Gerard Ward, , (1999), Widening Worlds, Shrinking Worlds?: The Reshaping of Oceania, Centre for 
the Contemporary Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 2-3. 
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what is excluded or what is included.  Those who originate from Europe or North 
America have tended to see a Polynesian or Micronesian island and judge it small or tiny, 
hence the term microstate.  But the calculation is probably a misnomer, after a long 
tradition of outsiders misnaming the Pacific.  The myths, legends and oral traditions of 
the Pacific Islanders show that they have not thought of their world in microscopic 
proportions.  Their world included the ocean around them, and the sky and heavens above 
them.  The world of early islanders was a place to explore.  It was an environment where 
people were at home with the sea.  From this affinity with the ocean, came the capacity 
with which to reach out towards the horizons.  Boundaries came later, when colonial 
powers drew lines on the map, and curbed the pre-contact lines of communication of the 
islanders.  In time before contact with Europe, extensive intra and inter-island networks 
were built up to trade, exchange items of wealth, marry and consequently expand social 
networks.  In essence, the threads of island identity are contained in islanders’ 
relationship with the ocean. 
 
2. The Lapita Phenomenon and Patterns of Exchange from Pre-contact Times 
Although Hau’ofa’s think-piece is romantic, and his view of Oceania is perhaps more a 
rhetorical device than a concrete methodology to build a Pacific identity, his claims that a 
common Pacific identity might be found in the shared connections and resources through 
a common heritage in the Pacific Ocean has antecedents in prehistory, supported by 
considerable archaeological and anthropological evidence.  Recalling the transactionalist 
commitology of Deutsch, the rubric of new regionalism and the processes of 
regionalisation, as discussed in Chapter Two, the movement of goods, peoples and ideas 
are also relevant to the construction of regional identities.  Pacific identity has it origins in 
the original population, or “peopling” of the Pacific.  The lessons from the study of the 
migratory processes also shows how inward migration established criss-crossing patterns 
of exchange, or cross-regional linkages, which Pacific Islanders have drawn upon as they 
have defined their own style of regionalism. 
 
The first, and the earliest, pattern of exchange is the emergence of the Lapita people, 
about 4,000 years ago in the late Hallocene period.  The Lapita were named after the 
particular style of ceramic pottery associated with the archaeological sites of their original 
civilisation, found in Near Ocenia, or the present day area encompassing New Caledonia 
and New Britain.  The Lapita period is notable because it marked the emergence within 
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around 500 years of a well-marked cultural horizon, which appears to have been the first 
to expand into Remote Oceania.  From the archaelological record, it appears the Lapita 
spread quite rapidly from the Solomons archipelago to Fiji, Tonga and Samoa within 
perhaps 300 years, covering a distance of 4,000 km, since Lapita pottery has been found 
throughout this chain of islands.10
 
Consequently, the Lapita people pioneered a long-distance exchange network across the 
ocean, as there was a corresponding expansion of trade both geographically and in 
quantity with their appearance.  Archaeologists have discovered New Britain Talasea 
obsidian anywhere from between 2,000 km to 3,700 km from its source in the Reef 
Islands and Fiji.  Evidence for imports into these islands includes ceramics, chert, oven 
stones and stone adzes.  Therefore, it is possible that the Lapita people carried out trade 
through direct access and local reciprocity over short distances of less than 30 km; one-
stop reciprocity with groups 300-400 km distant; and lastly, ‘down-the-line’ exchange 
over greater distances.  For example, within the Bismarck Archipelago, there has been 
interest in the changes in frequency of obsidian over time (Map 3.3). 
 
 
Map 3.3: Direction of Obsidian Exchange in the 
 Southwest Pacific (After Rapaport, 1999). 
 
                                                          
10 Steven Roger Fischer, (2002), A History of the Pacific Islands, Palgrave, New York, pp. 13-19; Frank R. 
Thomas, (1999), 'The Precontact Period', in Moshe Rapaport (ed.), The Pacific Islands, Environment and 
Society, The Bess Press, Honolulu, pp. 122-23. 
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Among the islands of Remote Oceania, far less has been discovered about the intensity of 
interaction; but it appears nonetheless from ethnographic evidence that trade was 
entrenched within an intricate system of alliances, reflected primarily in the exchange of 
status items.11  One locus of exchange was centred on Polynesia among the islands of 
Fiji, Samoa, Tonga,Niue, Rotuma, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Futuna and Uvea (Map 3.4).  The 
high chiefs of Fiji, Tonga and Samoa were bound by strong kinship connections; as well 
as through the less benign forces of conquest and local empire.  For example, the Tongan 
world became a mini-maritime empire, centred on the rule of the Tongan nobility before 
the nineteenth century.12  Seafarers from Polynesia returned to Melanesia, and resettled 
there, while others pressed eastwards, to found similar settlements in the Cook Islands 
and French Polynesia.  Under King Tupaia, this territory stretched from the Marquesas 
and Tuamotus to as far as Samoa, at the time of Cook’s voyage in 1769 (Map 3.5).  
Others pressed into the north to the Hawaiian islands, the Carolines and Marianas, or to 
New Zealand in the south.  Ties of blood, language and oral tradition show that although 
island communities were separated they were in no way isolated by the ocean.  Even in 
the case of a multiplicity of localised communities in Melanesia, large regions of the 
Bismarck Archipelago were still integrated by sophisticated trading and cultural exchange 
systems.  A highly documented case is the Kula Ring, in the Massim area of eastern 
Papua, where necklaces and amulets were exchanged in opposite directions around a 
circuit of islands (Map 3.6).13  Hence, even if ‘the world’ was smaller to them, the ocean 
and the islands were apparently a hub of activity for the ocean people who lived and 
explored it (cf. Map 3.7). 
 
Map 3.4: 
A Sample Pre-contact Sub Region in Polynesia 
After Ward, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Thomas, 'The Precontact Period', op cit., p. 125. 
12 Ward, Widening Worlds, Shrinking Worlds?: The Reshaping of Oceania, op cit., p. 13. 
13 ibid., pp. 9-13. 
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Map 3.5: Tupaia’s World. King Tupaia of Tahiti possessed one of the largest island 
worlds in the Pacific.  After Ward, 1999. 
 
 
 
Map 3.6: The Kula Ring Exchange System 
After Ward, 1999. 
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Map 3.7: Oceanic Worlds – Comparative Perspective 
After Ward, 1999. 
 
In geography, mental maps of an area are important for the way that we deal with the 
spatial aspects of our lives to simplify the world in which we live.14  Thus, the Lapita may 
be considered one of the earliest founders of the Pacific world through their in-migration 
into Remote Oceania.  As they did, they interacted with earlier migrants from the 
Pleistocene period.  Moreover then, a series of insular, but inter-connected indigenous 
Pacific island communities were produced, which had the potential for shared affinity, but 
at the same time due to the vagaries of distance, these communities were able to develop 
separately into a set of autonomous, but diverse island regions.15  Consequently, the 
evidence from the archaeological and anthropological sciences indicates that the Pacific 
should not be thought of as a dull, vacant region, but instead one in which contact and 
exchange has taken place over thousands of years.  If islanders were able to maintain 
various kinds of cross regional connections, and had high horizons, this however begs the 
question of how islanders have tended to become the objects of belittlement, or 
‘smallness,’ as Hau’ofa argues. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 ibid., pp. 6-7. 
15 Thomas, 'The Precontact Period', op cit., pp. 121-24. 
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IV. “OUTSIDE”: REDRAWING THE MAP 
1. Cultural Mapping 
In response to this question, analysis now turns to ‘cultural mapping.’16  Thus, the 
contemporary Pacific as a region, or the islands as a collective entity, only came into 
being as a result of European imperialism, which located it on the world map.  This is not 
the place to repeat the story of European colonisation of the Pacific.  Excellent works, 
such as Campbell (1990) cover this period of history in superior detail and analysis.  
Suffice to say, contact began with the famous exploratory voyages of Magellan, Cook, 
Bougainville and d’Urville.  Europe began to colour in the Pacific in its colours relatively 
late in the colonial rush of the nineteenth century.  This can be easily recognised by the 
naming of individual islands: for example, New Britain, New Ireland, the Admiralty 
Islands, the Sandwich Islands or the Cook Islands.  By 1900, the entire Pacific had fallen 
under the authority of the competing hegemonic powers; Britain, France, the US and 
Germany.  However, it must also be said that division and rivalry among islanders as 
much as calculated imperial design for territory led to annexation.  Hence, as can be 
recognised from the nature of pre-contact identity, islanders did not consider themselves 
as part of a greater regional identity, except as far as they might have seen themselves as 
part of a sea of islands connected by kin, trade and oceanic voyages until explorers 
connected them to the wider world.  The age of European exploration in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries did however produce the long-held subdivisions of the Pacific 
islands into the artificially constructed zones of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. 
 
2. European ‘Naming’ of the Region 
 (i) Dumont d’Urville and the tripartite classification: 
Micronesia, Melanesia & Polynesia 
Dumont d’Urville is acknowledged as the first explorer to categorise the islands into the 
three regions in 1832, with a fourth, Malaysia added in to account for island South East 
Asia.  However, d’Urville also made two racial categorisations as well.  D’Urville 
discerned two distinct kinds of islanders, based on skin-type.  Melanesians, occupying Fiji 
to New Guinea, were distinguished by dark skin and fuzzy hair.  Polynesia and 
Micronesia consisted of the islands east of Fiji and New Zealand, up to Hawaii, and the 
islands from Palau, to the Marianas and across to Kiribati in the north, respectively.  
                                                          
16 Howe, Nature, Culture and Histroy: The Knowing of Oceania, op cit., p. 60 
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Racially, they were distinct from the Melanesians because of their lighter skin colour.  
Although d’Urville noted variation within each region, each region was distinct enough 
from the others because of different physical and cultural characteristics of its inhabitants.  
d’Urville may have been encouraged to make such assumptions since both Polynesian 
and Micronesian societies tend to be more hierarchical and aristocratic in structure, with 
the rule of paramount chiefs and kings, similar to the world of the incoming explorers, 
which distinguished these peoples to the Europeans more than the Melanesians, who had 
developed egalitarian leadership structures, where ‘big men,’ or the men who held status 
and competed for power because of their wealth and possessions, who d’Urville likened 
to despots.  Consequently, the islanders were ordered on a racial scale, with Melanesians 
at the bottom and Polynesians at the top, because of their superior political institutions, 
laws, organised religion and of course appearance in the eyes of Europeans.17
 
In the contemporary Pacific, the boundaries between these culture areas are not as precise 
as d’Urville imagined.  The evidence cited previously in the disciplines of archaeology, 
linguistics and genetics showed that the colonisation of the Pacific by Austronesian 
speakers was rapid, but still was spread over a number of generations.  Therefore, the 
peoples adjusted to new surroundings, intermingled with existing cultures, in the case of 
Melanesia and Micronesia, which meant that although each island culture had common 
ancestral roots, the local culture evolved at a different trajectory.  Thus, as D’Arcy (2003) 
presents, Samoans became Samoan in Samoa, Tongans in Tonga, and so on.  It follows 
that it is incredibly difficult to make accurate generalisations that distinguish Melanesia 
from Micronesia or Polynesia.  Perhaps all that can be positively said is that certain traits 
occur with greater frequency across general geographical constructs.  Hence the tripartite 
division of the Pacific into Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia has come under much 
attack.18
                                                          
17 Paul D'Arcy, (2003), 'Cultural Divisions and Island Environments since the Time of Dumont d'Urville', 
The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 218. 
18 One interesting debate is the supposed contrast of political forms of leadership, noted earlier between 
East and West Pacific.  Marshall Sahlins (1963) had claimed that Polynesia and Melanesia were distinct 
cultural entities based on the two stereotypes of leadership, “big man” achieved status versus Polynesia’s 
hierarchy of hereditary chiefdoms.  However, Bronwen Douglas (1979) showed that the model was too 
static, since Sahlins was comparing the ideology of leadership in Polynesia with the practice of leadership 
in Melanesia, concluding that ascription and achievement of status are not polar opposites.  Douglas also 
produced evidence of diversity of organisation with in Melanesia; noting that Fiji and New Caledonia are 
not egalitarian societies, as well as examples of less stratified forms of hereditary leadership than in 
Polynesia were present.  See Marshall Sahlins, (1963), 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief: Political 
Types in Melanesia and Polynesia', in Ian Hogbin & L.R. Hiatt (eds.), Readings in Australian & Pacific 
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Moreover, d’Urville’s classifications have been adopted as modern day cultural sub 
regions.  Melanesia equates to the Western South Pacific, occupied by the Solomons, 
Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Papua New Guinea, with Fiji often included.  The sub 
region is marked by a high degree of physical, linguistic and cultural diversity.  Although 
it contains 95 per cent habited land in the Pacific, and around three-quarters of the 
population within, Melanesian communities have tended to be more isolated from each 
other and smaller decentralised kinship societies have flourished.  Nevertheless, the larger 
islands in Melanesia have blessed these communities with greater resources for trade.  By 
contrast, Micronesia is made up predominantly of low-lying atolls, while Polynesian 
islands are most often high islands, sometimes volcanic.  What is more, in general, the 
further one travels from West to East, the more rank and status are ascribed to centralised 
leadership, as a result of greater competition for land on smaller islands.19  Oceania is the 
is now considered the largest geographical construct, used as an overarching term to 
include New Zealand and Australia, as well as the islands.  Consequently, there is an 
important relationship between the environment, culture and power in Pacific societies, 
since the extent of isolation and resources has influenced whether power is ascribed or 
achieved, how resources are distributed and how communities might act across a region-
space. 
 
Nonetheless, d’Urville’s categorisations indelibly shaped subsequent imperial scholarship 
on island identity and origins, as the age of colonisation and imperialism reinterpreted the 
origins of the islanders, in relation to Western culture and origins.  Diffusion theories 
were popular until the 1950s, where it was believed Pacific islanders were possibly the 
descendents of Shem, one of Noah’s sons, dispersed after the great flood had, who had 
migrated from some where in the East.  The more dignified nature of Polynesian society 
was explained by ethnologists because of their likely origins in Eurasia.  Often the 
islanders were lumped together as a homogenous group in these stories.  Imperial 
historical study of the Pacific therefore served two purposes.  Firstly, it told islanders who 
they were, where they came from and how their culture might be interpreted; often 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Anthropology, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne; & Bronwen Douglas, (1979), 'Rank, Power and 
Authority', The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 14. 
19 Michael Charles Howard, and Simione Durutalo, (1987), The Political Economy of the South Pacific to 
1945, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, James Cook University of North Queensland, Townsville, 
Queensland , p. 8 & 20 and Kiste, 'Precolonial Times', p. 11. 
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informing them that their current condition was a degenerate version of what they had 
once been.  It also appears that the Pacific was studied intensively for the sake of 
knowledge itself, as a kind of voyage of self-discovery, or defining oneself through 
examination of the habits, laws and customs of the “Other.”20  Ultimately, though, this 
rendering of the islanders was used to justify European colonial annexation. 
 
(ii) The influence of “Nature” on cultural interpretations of the Pacific 
Brief mention must also be made of how the Western mind has defined the Pacific with 
respect to the relationship between nature and culture, as argued vigorously by Howe 
(1997).  In the first era of European exploration of the Pacific, the notion of “paradise” 
was attached to the concept of the tropical oceanic island.  Islands lent themselves well to 
the imagination in this respect, since they “engendered notions of the fantastic and the 
inversion of values.”21  The reports of the eighteenth century explorers and literary 
inventions such as Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, created a psychological space in the 
Western mind, offering the promise of safety, destiny, travel and adventure in an 
environment without the trappings of regimented industrial civilisation.  Consequently, 
when Banks and Bougainville related tales of an earthly Pacific paradise and the noble 
savage – the “Tahitian mirage” – Howe argues that this was a rerun of a very old Western 
theme.22
 
From that point on, the Western perception of the Pacific is the story of how paradise was 
lost, or the loss of innocence and destruction of island cultures.  However, as the 
European agenda for the Pacific changed under imperial expansion, the islanders became 
the untamed ‘Other.’  The noble savage became the brute savage.  These ideas were 
solidified in the European consciousness, by the privations and stress of missionaries, and 
the rough dislocated and desolate reality of life in the islands expressed through the 
                                                          
20 D'Arcy, 'Cultural Divisions and Island Environments since the Time of Dumont d'Urville', op cit., pp. 
218-221. 
21 Howe, Nature, Culture and Histroy: The Knowing of Oceania, op cit., p. 11. 
22 From the Cook voyages comes this account from his botanist, Banks: 
We walked for 4 or 5 miles under groves of Cocoa nut and bread fruit tress loaded with a profusion of 
fruit and giving the most grateful shade I have ever experienced, under these were the habitations of 
the people most of them without walls: in short the scene we saw was the truest picture of an arcadia 
of which we were going to be kings that the imagination can form…scarcely can it be said that they 
earn their bread with the sweat of their brow when their chiefest sustenance Bread fruit is procured 
with no more trouble than that of climbing a tree and pulling it down.” 
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Conradian literature of the day that described the ruination of the white man as they were 
affected by their environment; in some cases going native. 
 
“Oceania was thus a wretched place, characterised by danger, poor living conditions, 
sickness, tropical torpor, degeneration, and sometimes death for white men…these views, 
unfashionable as they are now, were predominant for well over a hundred years.” 
(Howe, 1997, p. 19) 
 
This perhaps indicates, as Howe argues, that paradise was never actually there to lose.  
Yet, the contemporary Pacific is still portrayed as a sensuous island paradise.  Howe 
believes this is explained by changing appreciation of the power of nature over humans 
and subsequent Western adaptation to the harsh island environment.  Technological 
advancement and colonisation had the affect of taming the brutal Pacific environment, 
making it a subservient and safe region again to explore.  As a result, the exotic elements 
of island life have been romanticised again, mainly by the tourist industry, to lure 
foreigners back into an island paradise.  To put it more succinctly, Western European 
representations of islanders have varied according to the reformulation of nature to meet 
changing expectations and requirements of Western culture, and have preserved the 
notion that islanders are a happy people who live in a tropical island paradise. 
 
3. Contemporary implications of European contact for islander identity 
Consequently, European naming and subsequent academic study of the Pacific has 
created a series pseudo-identities for Pacific islanders.  While not entirely accurate, they 
have become entrenched in common use.  For instance, Melanesian leaders have 
advanced the expression, “the Melanesian Way,” promoted by PNG lawyer, writer and 
politician, Bernard Narokobi, as a way to foster an identity for their new nations 
differentiated from colonialism in the era of independence.  Interestingly, the Melanesian 
Way pays homage to traditional custom as well as claiming Christianity as its own.  
Despite its European origins, Christianity is still a powerful transnational force, as much 
because the church was the only learned institution permitted by nervous colonial 
administrators which could educate and foster independence leaders, as for its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Joseph Banks in Beaglehole, J.C., Ed., (1962), The "Endeavour" Journal of Joseph Banks 1768-1771, 
Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p. 252 & 342, cited in Howe, Nature, Culture and Histroy: The Knowing of 
Oceania, op cit., p. 7. 
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principles.23  As a result, many Melanesian nationalists originated from the church.  The 
Melanesian Spearhead Group is another advanced expression of empowerment across the 
sub-regional level, based upon trade liberalisation, another concept of identity introduced 
from a foreign source. 
 
Furthermore, in 1970, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the most influential Pacific island 
political leader in the age of independence, first advanced a common Pacific island 
identity around the slogan, “The Pacific Way,” which in essence describes common 
values and consensus and incrementalism, is defined in reaction against Western ways of 
conducting political decision-making and diplomacy.  Accurate or not, the phrase remains 
in usage.24  The influence of missionaries in the training and commissioning of Pacific 
islander evangelists in the 1800s from Polynesia was also significant in fostering regional 
connections through the entrenchment of Christian values in island culture and politics, as 
they ventured Melanesia.25  Less pleasant, but an equally valid method of regional 
interaction was ‘blackbirding,’ or the indentured labour trade from Melanesia to 
plantations in Queensland, which was at its peak in the 1860s, affecting more than 
100,000 Melanesians, drawing together people from dispersed communities into a 
collective.26
 
To summarise, the Western world has been responsible for defining the Pacific 
specifically as a region through the various forces of exploration and colonisation.  
Furthermore, European sub-regional constructs have become part of the vocabulary of 
Pacific studies since the late nineteenth century, and have become so ingrained that 
islanders have come to adopt these constructs for their own regional political purposes.  In 
short, the very mapping of the Pacific has placed a European template on the island 
world.27  Perhaps the most important observation to note at this point is that European 
naming and division of the Pacific has reinforced the island nation and also particularly 
                                                          
23 Douglas, Bronwen, (2000), Weak States and Other Nationalisms: Emerging Melanesian Paradigms?, 
State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 00/03, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australia National University, Canberra, pp. 4-5. 
24 Michael Haas, (1989), The Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific, Praeger, New York, 
p. 13; Ron G. Crocombe, (2001), The South Pacific, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific, Suva, p. 157. 
25 Ian C. Campbell, (1990), A History of the Pacific Islands, University of Canterbury Press, Christchurch, 
New Zealand, p. 116f. 
26 ibid., p. 115. 
27 Kiste, 'Precolonial Times', op cit., p. 4. 
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the sub region as the salient units of regional interaction.  Furthermore, Western contact 
has contributed to revitalisation of ‘traditional’ identities. 
 
 
V. “INSIDE-OUT”: ISLANDER IDENTITY IN A GLOBALISED WORLD 
1. Regional Identity: a Response to Western Influences 
Another conclusion that might be drawn about the influence of Western contact on the 
islands is that by bringing them into contact with the wider world, they have been forced 
to articulate regional interests and build a regional consciousness.  Until the 1940s, the 
indigenous population was still only recognised in the world by the romantic, but vague 
term, the “South Seas.”  The more accurate contemporary term “South Pacific” only came 
into use after the Second World War, and remained in currency throughout the Cold War, 
as strategic definition of the region.  However, as the twenty-first century progresses, the 
term “Pacific Islands Region,” or variations of it, is being used more assertively, as the 
old colonial and Cold War powers lose interest in the region.  The renaming of the South 
Pacific Forum to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000 acknowledged the growing autonomy 
of the region distinct from the metropol.28  More poignantly, though, as the modern day 
PICs are no longer needed as much by outsiders they are now being told by donors and 
neighbours to adopt neo-liberal reform.29  Thus, even in the age of island independence, it 
is arguable that even expressions of Pacific identity generated by islanders are devised to 
reflect the agenda of Western global imperatives, and thus are represent another way of 
managing island life from beyond the Pacific. 
 
2. Invented Tradition in the Contemporary Pacific 
The first issue is that raised by the dichotomy between “traditional” and “Western 
culture.”  Islanders have created pasts, myths of ancestral ways of life to use as political 
symbols in a bid to build national identities in response to decolonisation and 
independence.  However, rhetorical tradition may not bear much resemblance to the real 
past, documented ethnographically or archaeologically.  Examples of where “invented 
tradition” has been used include the Melanesian Way or the Pacific Way, introduced 
earlier; traditional leadership structures, such as chiefdoms in Melanesia.  One of the best 
                                                          
28 Epeli Hau'ofa, (ed.), (1998), 'The Ocean in Us', The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall, pp. 395-
97. 
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examples of invented culture being accepted as tradition remains Fiji’s chiefdom.  The 
Great Council of Chiefs was created by a deal between the British colonial rulers and the 
Fijian chiefs to codify the power of the Fijian aristocracy, in return for the transformation 
of land tenure into a commodity.  The protection of traditional Fijian culture for those 
who benefited from colonial reorganisation has been driving issues behind Fiji’s 
numerous coups and subsequent constitutional reform.  New Caledonia and Hawaii have 
also pursued political demands based on a shared idealised pre-colonial past.  The 
University of the South Pacific (USP) although based on the notion of a pan-Pacific 
society, has been described as a hatchery for regional identity. 
 
Roger Keesing (1989) argued in an influential article that the formation of counter-
colonial identities in the new nations of the Pacific could be described through Gramscian 
analysis, which hypothesises that the counter-hegemonic discourse pervasively 
incorporates the structures and premises of the hegemonic discourse.  Thus, in the Pacific, 
islanders have drawn upon elements of their authentic past, and accentuated them to 
differentiate themselves more strikingly from the culture of their colonisers, such that 
objects and rituals metonymically represent the whole of culture, representing an island 
variety of essentialism.30  The past tends to be simplified in comparison to the rich 
interactive world of regional identities it is argued were present before European contact.  
This phenomenon is not restricted to the present, as the pre-colonial Pacific world 
described by the ethnographers was not static, as they experienced the same region-wide 
political expansions and contractions, and whose leaders would invent or utilise symbols 
and cosmic genealogies to reinforce or legitimate their power.  The essential contribution 
of Gramscian analysis is to illustrate that national or regional identities are both invented 
concepts, grounded in reaction to Western culture, colonialism and independence, as 
islanders attempt to build grounds upon which to define them apart from the outside 
world.  What is more, these more modern expressions of identity therefore marry culture 
for a particular political purpose, and do little to contribute what it actually means to be a 
Pacific islander. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
29 William Sutherland, (2000), 'Global Imperatives and Economic Reform in the Pacific Island States', 
Development and Change, Vol. 31, No. 2, March, pp. 459-480. 
30 Roger M. Keesing, (1989), 'Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific', The 
Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 1, No. 1-2, Spring & Fall, pp. 19-42. 
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3. Who is the Pacific for?  Reform and Continuing Western Rendering of 
Islanders 
In closing, the Cotonou Agreement, the impetus for liberalisation within the PIF, as well 
as the forecasts of Australian research, predicting a neo-Malthusian ‘doomsday’ scenario 
for the Pacific islands,31 demonstrates that the Pacific is still being defined through 
Western discourses of development.  This time the formula emphasises liberalisation, 
multilateralism and integration.  ‘Doomsdayists’ argue that the region will fail to become 
part of the era of prosperity – the “Pacific Century” – according to small and unstable 
growth in GDP, unsustainable population growth and risk of marginalisation in the global 
trading order.  These definitions, or frames, of the region have been given legitimacy by 
the authority of high profile research conducted in the early 1990s by the National Centre 
for Development Studies of Australia National University.  The regional and hemispheric 
powers therefore take it upon themselves to define the interests and agenda for the region, 
or as Fry (1997b) argues, they take it upon them to show islanders that they are falling 
behind, and make it clear that nothing short of compliance with foreign development 
imperatives will avoid the predicted calamities.  Consequently, the frame which 
contemporary Westerners are applying to the Pacific, may, as Fry argues represent only a 
superficial departure from the process of belittlement and smallness that Hau’ofa argues 
islanders have been taught to accept.32  The Australian government, in particular, has 
been vocal in framing islanders in relation to neoliberal reform since 1994, as a way of 
managing island identity. 
 
In a similar fashion, through the Cotonou Agreement, the EU shapes the policy agenda of 
a patchwork of Pacific states according to a neoliberal agenda.  Such strategies operate on 
the assumption that the Pacific region can be dealt with as a cohesive unit.  The previous 
arguments illustrate that islanders do not have significant natural tendencies of 
identification at the regional level, to which these solutions are proposed for 
implementation, as the sub region is more salient.  Consequently, it is arguable the reform 
agenda of the new development orthodoxy, of which the PCP is a part of, may be setting 
                                                          
31 Rowan Callick, (1993), 'Pacific 2010: A Doomsday Scenario?' in R.V. Cole (ed.), Pacific 2010: 
Challenging the Future, National Centre for Development Studies Research School of Pacific Studies 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
32 Fry, 'Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of “the South Pacific”', 
op cit., p. 309. 
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islanders up for suboptimal development policy outcomes not of their own making,33 as 
regional programmes may not be able to coalesce around a strong regional will or identity 
that place the onus on the Pacific to conduct deeper integration.  In essence, the new 
development orthodoxy divorces the Pacific culture from its definition of the region, and 
does not offer solutions beyond the rhetoric of the standard parameters of regional 
economic cooperation and institution-building.  In a broader sense, region-wide 
integration is a phenomenon which lacks legitimacy, as it has been a process defined by 
global imperatives, rather than Pacific imperatives.  In order to address this deficit, the 
Pacific post-Cotonou negotiations must appreciate the ways Pacific islanders define their 
region, so that integration works in ways which benefit them, at the grassroots.  If not, the 
Pacific is in danger of being defined for the purposes of those outside of the region, rather 
than regionalism existing as a strategy for progress owned by islanders. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As the previous analysis has demonstrated, the EU definition of the Pacific is an artificial 
construct.  Although the PACP group brings together a number of Pacific island states, 
the EU definition omits significant regional partners of the PACP states.  As will be 
illustrated in later chapters this has significant implications for the scope and pace of 
integration for the PACP states, as various overlapping regional linkages challenge the 
negotiation and implementation of a Pacific EPA.  Moreover, the EU definition of the 
Pacific assumes that the PACP region is a natural region for a shared identity.  However, 
investigation of how identities have formed in the Pacific shows that in both the pre-
contact and post-colonial eras, the sub region has in fact been the more natural unit of 
regional cooperation in the Pacific.  This is due to the diverse range of peoples and 
societies that are represented throughout the Pacific, and the way that the region was 
populated and how exchange networks subsequently formed, which is in contrast to the 
EU perception, or ambition, that the Pacific may be treated as a single unit.  Moreover, 
this misperception illustrates how the West has tended to create a ‘Pacific Order’ onto 
which it projects its priorities and assumes its expectations will be met. 
 
                                                          
33 Greg Fry, (1994), 'Climbing Back onto the Map? The South Pacific Forum and the New Development 
Orthodoxy', Journal of Pacific History (Bibliography), Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 64-72; & Fry, 'Framing the 
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Furthermore, the potential for a contemporary regional identity has been weakened due to 
the legacy of European contact and colonisation, as this stimulated the formation of 
stronger sub regional and national identities, and has contributed to the absence of a 
tendency for islanders to think of themselves as Pacific islanders.  Consequently, as 
islanders begin to think of themselves more as a region in the early twenty-first century, 
the best attempt at a common indigenous identity for islanders is perhaps their affinity 
and shared interest in the ocean, as it is apparent that all other significant definitions of 
the Pacific are inspired from beyond the region.  In general, though, the capacity for a 
common Pacific identity is weak, since there has never been a strong commitment to 
identify with other Pacific communities at this level. 
 
This point perhaps suggests one other important concluding observation.  In the absence 
of a strong common identity or regional interest, the Pacific is often defined beyond the 
region in response to the question, “whose region, for which purpose?”  For the EU, it is 
for the purposes of political partnership and an economic development agenda.  
Consequently, the PIF structure represents a neat identity with which to construct a 
region-to-region trade partnership.  In summary, the EU neglects the strong sub regional 
elements of islander identity and the important connections across the ocean which offers 
more insight into commonality among the Pacific islands.  The Community’s regional 
approach to development cooperation simplifies the world.  In some ways, the EU 
continues a strong tradition of European naming, and misnaming, of the Pacific.  The 
nature and state of the political economy of Pacific regional integration has also been 
influenced by this disparate, fragmented regional complexion, which will form the focus 
of Chapter Five.  Prior to this, though, the next chapter will consider the conceptual 
arguments for how the capacity for regional integration may be measured in the Pacific, 
as the integration process proceeds. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Is an Island an ‘Island’? 
Approaches to “Capacity Building” in the Pacific: 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established the various forms of inter-connectedness in the Pacific 
that have influenced the formation of regional and sub-regional identities.  Although a 
number of sub-regional identities were created in the Pacific because of the physical 
distance between the island groups, patterns of exchange across the ocean nonetheless 
illustrated that island communities possessed the ability to maintain cross-regional contact 
through such processes of regionalisation as trade, migration, exploration, evangelical 
mission and conquest.  Hence, it is a misconception to believe that because the Pacific 
islands are small that they are isolated from each other.  However, in the post-industrial 
age, the PICs are posed with new challenges of maintaining interconnection presented by 
globalisation.  Simultaneously, the PICs are faced with complex problems at several levels.  
As a first example, the Cotonou Agreement calls upon PICs to participate in trade 
negotiations with the EU and in the WTO.  Bilateral relations with PIC’s regional partners 
in Australia, New Zealand and the United States also have to be maintained.  This is not to 
mention the significant regional development targets PICs have set themselves through the 
Pacific Islands Forum, in particular the ongoing trade negotiations regarding the PICTA 
and PACER agreements.  All of these issues combined mean that the scarce resources of 
PICs are being pushed to the limit by policies to implement sustainable development and 
liberalise trade.  It is little surprise then that globalisation has been identified as the 
overarching challenge facing the Pacific by the EU.1  Hence, the challenge of interaction 
with the rest of the world is qualitatively different for societies where the physical and 
institutional infrastructure lacks the capacity to deal with the demands of regionalisation, 
even if a strong regional identity or will for integration is present.  It is this broader issue of 
                                                          
1 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy 
Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, European Community, Brussels, p. 5. 
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technical capacity to act as an integrated region which will form the focus of this chapter.  
It is intended to sketch out some of the approaches to measuring capacity in relation to the 
particular problems of capacity building in the Pacific.  The questions which it is 
concerned with relate to how capacity building might be defined and measured in a 
developing region like the Pacific.  This is important to a study of the challenges of the 
Cotonou Agreement to the Pacific because development by free trade through regional 
integration cannot be a useful strategy if there are doubts that the region can support 
regionalisation processes and the infrastructure of cooperation associated with the political 
economy of economic integration schemes. 
 
 
II. THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF “CAPACITY BUILDING” 
1. What is Capacity Building? 
Although there has been much discussion of the concept of capacity building, neither the 
academic literature nor the assistance programmes that target capacity building have come 
to a consensus about what the term means.  It still has a very fluid definition.  The term 
became popular in response to widely acknowledged shortcomings of development 
assistance among donors.  It was conceded that “technical assistance” programmes had 
produced limited sustainable impact in priority areas such as poverty reduction because 
they were essentially ready-made, or “off the shelf” package solutions to development 
problems, because they focused on solutions that concentrated on compliance with rules on 
trade, instead of addressing the longer term contextual issues of sustainable development.2  
“Technical cooperation” in the 1980s was a first attempt to address the problem, but it lost 
favour to the term “capacity building,” as it implies that the beneficiary of assistance is 
involved, or ‘owns’ the process, in partnership with the donor.3  Hence, capacity could be 
narrowly defined as the individual ability or competence to carry out a specific task.  For 
example, such strategies may require farmers to adjust their methods to the latest 
agricultural standards, or to improve the ability of governmental officials to participate in 
trade negotiations.  However, this limited view of capacity does not cover the broader 
policy context, which would include enhancing the opportunities for individual skills to be 
expanded and that these abilities are acquired over time. 
                                                          
2 Cf. On sustainable development within a Pacific context, see John Overton and Regina Scheyvens, (eds.), 
(1999), Strategies for Sustainable Development: Experiences from the South Pacific, Zed Books, London & 
New York, pp. 2-10. 
3 Stefan Szepesi, (2003), Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and 
Trade Negotiations with the European Union, Masters Thesis, Maastricht University, p. 57. 
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One definition constructed along these lines is the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) description, which removes actors entirely, to address performance, 
or the “ability to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives.”4  
Consequently, this description reveals that capacity building is also a process that is 
measured in degrees, as capacity building projects refer to the conditions and acquisition of 
necessary resources to be able to develop abilities to act.  Hence a good working definition 
of capacity building refers to the approaches, strategies or methodologies used by a 
developing country or external partners to improve performance at the individual, 
organisational or sector level.5
 
However, even if the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of capacity building have been clarified, there 
are other questions of substance that remain unanswered about the concept.  One is ‘whose 
capacity’ is to be enhanced, and for what specific function.  Furthermore, capacity building 
is unlikely to be a linear process, even if a specific purpose is defined for a project.  
Capacity building is likely to imply adaptation and learning, and a willingness to be 
flexible on the behalf of stakeholders in the process of development.  Therefore, the 
principles of capacity building require primarily broad-based participation and a locally 
owned and driven policy agenda that builds upon existing and new capacity, long-term 
investment, and integration of activities across various systemic levels within a country or 
region in order to address complex problems effectively.  Consequently, a framework for 
conceptualising capacity building must also include such dimensions as the individual, 
organisational levels, as well as the ‘enabling’ environments, including investment, 
networks or sectors, and the legislative arena.6  Each of these represent the most important 
actors in delivering comprehensive and sustained capacity building programmes, and takes 
account of the key stakeholders who will be involved in the process. 
 
Capacity development strategies may therefore entail enhancement of old capacity or the 
creation of new capacity.  This may mean removing outmoded or illegitimate institutions; 
improving networks and systems of incentives for organisations and investment; providing 
opportunities for the private sector of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) to use 
                                                          
4 Yemile Mizrahi, (2004), Capacity Enhancement Indicators, Review of the Literature, World Bank Institute 
Working Papers, World Bank Institute, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank, p. 2. 
5 Joe Bolger, (2000), 'Capacity Development: Why, What and How', Capacity Development Occasional 
Series, Vol. 1, No. 1, May, Canadian Institute of Development Assistance, p. 2. 
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capacity creatively, as entrepreneurs of development, or creating new for a for bring 
stakeholders together, such as coordinating councils.  However, the approaches adopted 
should still fundamentally be led by developing countries.  Internally, this requires DCs to 
identify capacity gaps; achieve consensus on a strategy and projects; and ensure ongoing 
support and consultation will occur.7  In conjunction with external donors, DCs need to be 
involved in setting the agenda and coordinating the distribution of resources.  Therefore, 
the key implication for external partners is that they will in theory not define the local 
capacity building programme, as occurred in the earlier era of technical assistance.  
Partnership is the nature of joint North-South capacity building processes. 
 
2. Measuring Capacity Building 
Nevertheless, although the literature on capacity building reflects a paradigm shift towards 
partnership with local initiatives, a significant gap remains in how to actually measure the 
capacity building process, beyond the input and output stages of the process.  This is 
because it is easier to identify and quantify the results of capacity building than it is to 
measure the process while it is unfolding.  Furthermore, to measure whether a standard has 
been reached may require a subjective judgement, on perhaps incomplete information. It is 
also less glamorous to develop indicators to measure capacity building than final 
outcomes.8  However, because capacity building is a non-linear process, and successful 
performance may be uneven across the dimensions identified, it is necessary to address this 
gap in the understanding of the capacity building process. 
 
In the absence of specific objectives within the individual elements of capacity, it is 
difficult to monitor capacity building.  Thus capacity building indicators have operational 
value when they are addressed to concrete objectives and the actors involved.  In order to 
build reliable indicators, then, the significance of the questions of ‘capacity for what?’ and 
‘for whom?’ assume importance.  Nevertheless, consensus, political will and commitment 
on the part of recipients of assistance is also necessary to understand the extent to which a 
country or region has developed a sense of ownership and responsibility. 
 
Thus, in order to build up a reliable set of indicators, capacity needs to be disaggregated, as 
done previously by targeting analysis at various systemic levels.  Morgan (1997) identifies 
                                                                                                                                                                                
6 ibid., pp. 3-4. 
7 ibid., pp. 5-6. 
8 Mizrahi, Capacity Enhancement Indicators, Review of the Literature, op cit., p. 4. 
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several ‘boiler plate’ principles which might be used, targeted particularly at the 
organisational level.  These have been modified here to lay the foundation for some 
indicators of how technical capacity might be measured in the Pacific.  Firstly, can an 
organisation learn and adapt to changing circumstances – does it have self-renewing 
capacity?  Secondly, are relationships forged among the various actors in the process?  Is 
the capacity building process legitimate, and can objectives be identified and managed 
over time?  Finally, do organisations and individuals have a culture that motivates and 
rewards performance?9  As abstract elements, these can be more specifically adapted to 
concrete programmes and development goals, and incorporate analysis of each dimension 
of capacity building.  With reference to the dynamic element of capacity building, that 
capacity should be measured over time, it is also suggested that overall goals need to be 
disaggregated into firstly immediate goals, for example improving methodologies or 
institutions, and then introducing possibly a series of intermediate policies that build 
towards the end goal.  With these considerations in mind, analysis turns to two key issues 
of how capacity to act as a region in the Pacific is extremely important to enhance the 
region’s ability to meet the challenges posed by globalisation and the Cotonou Agreement: 
trade facilitation and regional information and communications policy. 
 
 
III. PACIFIC CAPACITY FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION: 
GAPS, SOLUTIONS AND MEASURING CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE 
REGION 
1. Regional Trade Capacity Building: Trade Facilitation Programmes 
The elements of the Cotonou Agreement which speak directly to capacity building, in 
relation to the two issues of trade facilitation and communications policy are Articles 33 
and 43.  Article 33 acknowledges the multidimensional aspects of the process of capacity 
building.  For example in Article 33.1, “cooperation shall pay systematic attention to 
institutional aspects (and) shall support the efforts of the ACP states to develop and 
strengthen structures, institutions and procedures”; and in Article 33.4, “Cooperation shall 
also assist to restore and/or enhance critical public sector capacity and to support 
institutions needed to underpin a market economy.”  Article 33.4 also goes further to 
pinpoint capacity enhancement in legal and regulatory matters, research and analysis of 
policy and to strengthen and reform financial institutions and procedures, to create a stable 
                                                          
9 ibid., pp. 9-16. 
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environment for investment.  The provision for trade facilitation is general, to be 
negotiated at the region-to-region level, stating a desire to develop “capacity in other 
critical areas such as: international negotiations; and management and coordination of 
external aid.”10  Article 43 deals with the role of information and communications 
technology (ICT) in development and integration: 
 
“The Parties recognise the important role of information and communications technologies, 
as well as the active participation in the Information Society, as a pre-requisite for the 
successful integration of the ACP countries into the world economy…the Parties will 
therefore take measures that will enable inhabitants of ACP countries easy access to ICTs…” 
Article 43.1 & 43.4 (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 28) 
 
Hence, Article 43 recognises the crucial role of ICT in bridging the divide between North 
and South in the context of closer integration, and facilitating regionalisation processes 
within the ACP regions. 
 
Therefore, the regional strategy adopted between the EU and the PACP states will attempt 
to enhance capacity in these areas.  Given the emphasis of developing economic 
integration processes in the Pacific by the EU to facilitate a region-to-region partnership, 
the EU in its Pacific Regional Response Strategy intends to commit 31%, or €9million, of 
the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) to support regional economic integration.  The 
PICTA and PACER agreement processes will be the main beneficiaries, as they will be the 
vehicle upon which a Pacific EPA can be based.  The main areas include Trade Related 
Technical Assistance and specific financial assistance, across all 14 PACP/FICs.  
Therefore the assistance will take shape in the form of legislative and fiscal reform; 
awareness campaigns for government, private sector and NGOs, implementation of tariff 
reductions and negative lists; quarantine and customs harmonisation; studies in 
government procurement, and, looking to the future, how regional trade in goods might be 
expanded to trade in services and implications for competition policy.  Human Resource 
Development is a second focal sector, receiving €8 million, to enhance educational and 
vocational opportunities, and review of training schemes so that skills developed match 
employment requirements, expressed in the Forum Basic Education Action Plan.11  This 
                                                          
10 Commission of the European Communities, (2000), The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, The Courier, 
Special Issue, September 2000, European Community, Brussels, p. 24. 
11 Commission of the European Communities, Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy Paper 
and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, op cit., pp. 33-34. 
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plan would help to increase the potential for other economic sectors to develop in the 
future, outside the boom in the government bureaucracy described by the MIRAB model 
referred to in chapter six,12 but will require stimulation as well from implementation of 
integration assistance. 
 
These processes are already underway, with swift release of funds to all of the PACP 
states, the Forum and the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) which 
manages specific capacity building projects with EU funding.  EU Development 
Commissioner, Poul Nielsen, personally signed off, in Suva on 6 February 2004, the 
Regional Economic Integration Programme (REIP), to be implemented by the Forum 
Secretariat, as well as three other financing agreements for sustainable development of 
agricultural and fisheries industries.13  The fisheries industry itself will benefit from €5 
million to promote regional management of this vital resource in which PICs have 
comparative advantage to bolster various fragile small island PIC economies.14  The three 
separate financing arrangements also extended the scope of EDF funding beyond that 
granted in EDF 8 to the region, allowing the six new PACP states to benefit immediately 
from the aid, rather than having to wait until completion of the revised EU-PACP 
partnership.  Moreover, the REIP stimulates and augments FIC efforts to construct regional 
cross-cutting trade facilitation programmes.  In April 2003, all parties to the PACER 
agreement and various Pacific NGO observers met at the Regional Trade Facilitation 
Forum to discuss and agree on priorities for a draft Pacific Regional Trade Facilitation 
Programme, as required by PACER.15  In general then, the support of the EU is creating an 
enabling environment for regional economic integration. 
 
Naturally, the overall intent of the trade facilitation programme is to prepare the PACP 
states to be able to participate in EPA negotiations as well as in the WTO.  Therefore, in 
                                                          
12 On the merits and weaknesses of the MIRAB (migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy) model of 
economic development, based on rent from transnational flows of money and people across the Pacific, see 
I.G. Bertram and R.F. Watters, (1985), 'The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates', Pacific 
Viewpoint, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 497-519; G. Bertram, (1999), 'The MIRAB Model Twelve Years On', 
Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spr, pp. 105-138; & B. Poirine, (1998), 'Should We Hate or Love 
MIRAB?' Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring, pp. 65-105. 
13 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, (2004), Statement by EU Commissioner Poul Nielson, at Signing of 4 
EDF Projects, Pacific Islands Forum, Suva, accessed at: http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2004/Feb, 6 April 
2004. 
14 Commission of the European Communities, Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy Paper 
and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, op cit., p. 35. 
15 W Noel Levi, (2003), Regional Trade Facilitation Forum Opening Statement, Press Statement 45/03, 15 
April 2003, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed at: 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2003/Apr/, 25 March 2004. 
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order to assess whether the PACP states are making progress towards the goals which have 
been outlined in the EU-PACP strategy, the theoretical implications of capacity building 
discussed in relation to trade negotiations must be considered in order to construct some 
basic indicators.  In the context of trade agreements it is crucial that the parties can 
contribute to its elaboration, and be fully involved in each stage of negotiation and 
implementation.  Hence, the long-term goal of trade capacity development (TCD) for the 
PACP is to establish a comprehensive trade policy framework.  This involves building 
cross-cutting systems or networks among public and private sector, to involve each local 
stakeholder in ownership of the process.  Summarising the opinion of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD (2001), an effective trade policy for developing 
countries will include a coherent trade strategy that is closely integrated with a country’s 
overall development strategy; effective mechanisms for consultation among government; 
the enterprise sector and civil society; effective networks to research and disseminate trade 
information and a commitment by all key trade stakeholders to outward-oriented regional 
strategies.16  An effective trade policy enabling environment will therefore identify its 
trade interests in line with its development strategy by involving a wide range of actors.  
This will involve delegation of roles among actors and identified interests will be 
translated into action by allocation of resources  To drive the process forward, the role of 
clear political leadership is paramount in addition to which is the development of 
appropriate institutions. 
 
The dynamics of TCD, or the intermediate steps along the way to implementation of a 
common regional trade policy, should move from analysis of the issues, or monitoring, to 
formulation of a development strategy and how to achieve it (Table 4.1).  Subsequently, 
negotiation, or consultation and alliance building will occur, with implementation of trade 
policy being secured last.  In the Pacific, several key policy priorities have already been 
determined, during the RTFF, in the areas of standards and conformance; biosecurity 
support for FIC exports and upgrading the technical capacity of customs controls, based on 
the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO).  However, as was noted by Secretary General 
Noel Levi, progress had been lacking to establish institutions called National Trade 
                                                          
16 San Bilal, (2003), Preparing for the Negotiation of Preferential Trade Agreements with the EU Preliminary 
Lessons from Some Developing Countries, 23 May, European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at: http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/documents/BILAL_2003_Preparing%20for%20the%20Negotiation%20of%20%20PTAs.pdf, 
August 2003, p. 4. 
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Facilitation Committees (NTFC) to coordinate trade facilitation at the national level.17  
Hence, it is arguable that the capacity to sustain a functioning Pacific island FTA is being  
Table 4.1: Intermediate Steps for Trade Capacity Building 
– The Policy Process and Cross-Level Determinants of Capacity 
Level of Intervention Objective Main Actors 
Policy 
Macro-
economic 
policies (other 
than trade) 
Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, 
legal business framework, investment 
regulations at regional and national levels; 
regional redistribution mechanism 
Stable and predictable macro-economic and 
legal environment 
 
Coherence in government policies 
Analysis Monitoring of trade and 
trade policy issues 
Government 
Think Tanks 
Universities 
Formulation Definition of strategic trade 
and development objectives 
(national and regional levels) 
Coherence with development 
strategy 
Negotiation Promotion of country’s 
interests, reactively and 
actively, in various for a 
(WTO, regional 
organisations) 
Consultation between 
regional and national levels 
 
 
Government bureaucracy 
and ministries – trade, 
finance, foreign affairs 
 
Professional organisations 
Civil Society 
 
Regional Organisations & 
Donors 
Trade Policy 
Implementation Actual and efficient 
implementation of trade 
policy: 
Domestic (legislation, 
tariffs, regulatory reform) 
International (compliance 
with obligations; 
exercising rights) 
Customs 
 
Standards 
 
Trade Facilitation 
programme & bodies 
 
Judicial 
Cross-level Determinants of Capacity 
Factors other 
than trade-
related 
Education, health, non-trade infrastructure Human Capital 
Access to production factors (credit, 
capital) 
Factor costs 
Infrastructure Physical access to markets – 
Road, Air, Sea 
Government 
Professional organisations 
Firms 
Information Monitoring of market 
information – consumer 
demand; prices; competition; 
business opportunities; trade 
policy 
Standards Capacity to access export 
markets 
Awareness of standards 
Training 
Support for improvement 
Trade related 
factors 
Marketing and management Promotion of business 
contacts 
Funding for studies and 
consulting 
 
 
 
 
Professional organisations 
 
Firms 
 
Consultants 
Source: Solignac Lecomte, 2001, p. 15. 
                                                          
17 Levi, Regional Trade Facilitation Forum Opening Statement. 
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hastily developed in response to, rather than preparation for, the PICTA process.  
Functional cooperation is galvanising the will at the regional level to address cooperation 
in other areas, but the REIP and CROP programmes will take some time to address the 
deficiencies within FICs, as much has to be done to harmonise standards and lower the 
costs of commitment to integration beyond trade in goods to generate the political will for 
Pacific regionalism.  Similarly, the PACP will also have to be watchful during EPA 
negotiations to avoid the risks of biased aid, where certain kinds of capacity assistance may 
be tied to concessions.18  In summary, the architecture of trade capacity is beginning to 
form, but has yet to take root at the national level. 
 
2. Information and Communication Technology 
Development of capacity in communications is another key element of capacity building in 
the Pacific to examine, because the ability to keep pace with the rest of the world in the 
information age will indicate whether the region has the technical potential to sustain 
effective integration.  The FICs realise that the creation of a digital strategy is an urgent 
area for action for the Pacific region.  A picture of the limited diffusion of digital 
communications technology is contained in Table 4.2.  The 2004 Eminent Persons’ Group 
Review outlined Forum’s current outlook on the potential benefits of enhanced ICT 
capacity: 
 
“Digital communication offers potential for drawing the countries and people of the Pacific 
closer together, and linking them more firmly to the wider world.  It offers a means of 
harnessing the process of globalisation…through opening up new forms of economic and 
social development in which remoteness and small land area are less relevant…in both rural 
and urban areas.  There would be likely spin-offs in terms of reduced need for business or 
official travel, or for distance education.” 
(Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, 2004, p. 24) 
 
The key problem for the Pacific is that the countries in the region gained independence 
prior to the development of satellite, fiber optic or cellular-wireless technologies, and as a 
result possess only antiquated communication infrastructures.  Prior to the introduction of 
postal services in the mid-1800s, and the first undersea telegraphic cable, the Pacific cable,  
                                                          
18 Szepesi, Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and Trade 
Negotiations with the European Union, op cit., pp. 60-61. 
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Table 4.2: Profile of Current Information and Communications Technology 
Capacity in Forum Island Countries 
 Population 
(2002 
estimates) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(US $) 
Market Structure Number 
of 
Internet 
Providers 
Internet 
Customers 
Cellphone 
Customers
Cook Islands 12,400 4,950 Monopoly – Telecom 
Cook Is. 
One 1,201 1,499 
Fiji 118,100 2,680 Monopoly – Sectoral One 2,076 90,000 
FSM 880,000 2,157 Monopoly – FSM 
Telecom 
One 8,000 1,750 
Kiribati 84,494 420 Monopoly – Telecom 
Kiribati 
One 521 - 
Nauru 11,500 3,900 Dept. of 
Communications 
One - - 
Niue 1,900 1,900 Monopoly – Telecom 
Niue 
One 200 88 
Palau 19,200 8,030 National 
Communications 
Corporation 
Five 1,700 2,000 
PNG 4,790,800 1,200 Monopoly – Telikom 
PNG 
One 24,600 7,700 
RMI 51,800 2,210 Monopoly – Marshall 
Is. 
Telecommunications 
One 668 582 
Samoa 176,848 2,000 10 year Monopoly – 
Samoa 
Communications 
Three 1,320 3,300 
Solomon 
Islands 
447,900 340 Monopoly – Solomon 
Telekom 
One 900 650 
Tonga 110,000 1,400 Tonga 
Communications & 
Shoreline Ltd. 
One 1,200 4,000 
Tuvalu 9,900 1,160 Monopoly – Tuvalu 
Communications 
One 250 No service 
Vanuatu 199,800 1,230 Monoploy – Telecom 
Vanuatu Ltd. 
One 2,000 5,000 
Source: Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2003. 
 
in 1902, the slit gong, oratory or storytelling were the main forms of mass communication 
and information exchange.  The single most important technological innovation though, 
was the introduction of High Frequency radio throughout the Pacific during the Second 
World War, as it was the most economic means of maintaining contact with metropolitan 
areas and isolated areas, where telephone lines were more expensive.19  In the mid-1970s, 
the Forum initiated introduction of satellite communications operations, when the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (Intelsat) lowered its prices, 
                                                          
19 Michael R. Ogden, and Suzanna Layton, (1999), 'Communications', in Moshe Rapaport (ed.), The Pacific 
Islands, Environment and Society, pp. 405-418, The Bess Press, Honolulu, pp. 405-09. 
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allowing smaller cheaper earth stations and access to its network.  Again, satellite 
technology has helped to link digitally, remote areas which only had HF connections. 
 
Despite such advances and that communications are an essential public concern, the 
Pacific faces barriers to expand modern communications infrastructure.  In general, 
internet access has become available only recently, beginning first in 1995 in Fiji, and most 
recently in Tuvalu in 2000.  Only 25 per cent of Pacific islanders have regular internet 
access.  Except for in Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga there is only one internet 
service provider in each PIC.  Difficult topography and small dispersed populations make 
provision of basic utilities, including equipment and opening access is expensive, in a 
region where there is limited or no access even to telephones.  The cost of dial up access 
has been estimated on average at US $50 per month; perhaps equating to one-quarter to 
one-half of the average annual per capita GDP among PICs.20  Telephone density averages 
from between 20 to 60 per hundred of population (Table 4.3), and is very poor in rural 
areas.  Only four PICs have digital mobile phone services, the remainder analogue.  Tuvalu 
offers none.  If internet access is a solution to future Pacific communications capacity gaps, 
then access to phone lines is essential; as is a reliable power source.  Existing internet 
connections also operate along limited international bandwidth. 
 
Table 4.3: Teledensities in the PACP States/FICs 
(Teledensities by number of lines per 100 inhabitants) 
 National Urban Rural 
Cook Islands 45 55 1 
FSM 10 - 1.5 
Fiji 12 20 0.8 
Kiribati 30 1 < 1 
Nauru    
Niue 69.4 66 25 
Palau 90 80 - 
Papua New Guinea 1.3 - < 1 
Marshall Islands 15 - - 
Samoa 50.2 17 2 
Solomon Islands 2 1.5 0.3 
Tonga 8 23 3 
Tuvalu 8.6 13 3 
Vanuatu 5 25 1 
Source: Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2003, p. 3. 
 
                                                          
20 Robert Guild, (2003), ICTs for Every Pacific Islanders: Potential, Constraints, and Opportunities, Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council, Singapore, p. 3. 
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Policy and regulatory frameworks are also outdated, as they have overwhelmingly been 
provided and regulated by FIC government departments or corporations, and there is a 
huge deficiency in the training of personnel skilled in ICT because of lack of funding from 
public and private sector budgets.21
 
Hence, in relation to measuring ICT capacity building in the FICs, the key benchmarks of 
development will be found in a networked economy, regulatory reform, and national policy 
reform.  Individually, PICs can encourage cross-level cooperation in the information age 
by embracing e-governance and e-commerce, to keep stakeholders in touch and to promote 
investment in services, tourism and trade in goods.  Regulatory reform is necessary to 
address significant gaps in policy planning and formulation of a strategy, and to create an 
enabling environment to encourage investment and competition in the provision of 
communications infrastructure so that service may be improved and expanded. 
 
As with TCD, the architecture for policy development and implementation is more 
developed at the regional level, with the early adoption of the 1999 Forum Communication 
Action Plan, and the gradual expansion of the role of the Pacific Islands 
Telecommunications Association (PITA) as a coordinating mechanism and a broader 
forum for discussion to include various stakeholders in the process.22  At the national level, 
there is more work to be done.  Indicators of capacity development perhaps will first be 
evident when resources provided by international agencies, such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Pacific Governance Project (PGP), are taken 
advantage of to improve intellectual capacity to improve the regulation of the 
communications sector in relation to the overall development objectives of the country.  To 
facilitate this, concrete short-term indicators would be the planning and provision of wide 
access to communications technologies, through the establishment of community 
telecentres, as part of local and regional strategies.  This in turn would open up 
opportunities for connectivity and distance education options.  In this way, the wide-area 
network offered by the University of the South Pacific that offers real time resources and 
                                                          
21 Cf. Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, (2003), Working Paper: Pacific ICT Capacity and Prospects, Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed at: http://www.forumsec.org.fj/forumdocs, 13 March 2004, pp. 11-
13; Guild, ICTs for Every Pacific Islanders: Potential, Constraints, and Opportunities, op cit., p. 1. 
22 Seán Ó Siochrú, and Bruce Girard, (2001), Issues and Options for ACP Countries in Global Knowledge 
Partnerships, Phase 1: Final Report, May-June 2001, Comunex, European Community & The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development /The World Bank, accessed at: 
http://comunex.comunica.org/acp/index.htm, 15 October, pp. 34-35. 
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collaboration could be utilised to improve human resources in remote areas.23  Again 
similarly to measuring progress in TCD, the key to effective progress is support for 
political leadership to drive the process and use digital technology to resolve a few of the 
disadvantages of isolation which the Pacific faces in the information age. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: 
Even if it has been difficult to arrive at a definition of capacity building, the development 
community agrees that strengthening capacity is fundamental to development.  In relation 
to key questions of development for ‘what’ and ‘for whom?’, for the PACP states, the core 
capacities to meet the challenges of integration and globalisation are clearly TCD and ICT 
development.  The key recipients of capacity building efforts clearly include national and 
regional regulatory structures, and support for human resources, to cope with the changes 
ahead.  The review of the literature revealed that it is not easy to measure capacity 
development, since capacity building is a non-linear process.  This is true of the Pacific, as 
in the cases analysed, regional planning and institutional development has outstripped 
national capacity to implement regional integration schemes in these areas.  Therefore, the 
role of committed political leadership and cross-cutting dialogue across all governmental, 
donor and private sector interests is paramount to the legitimate and sustainable 
implementation of capacity building efforts. 
 
Thus, the Pacific region shows promise to build capacity and address certain deficiencies; 
with appropriate donor aid and technical assistance.  Appropriate indicators of capacity 
development can be developed by measuring the implementation and performance of 
intermediate steps towards the general development goal of capacity building within a 
sector.  However, the PACP/FICs must be careful that they do not lose control of the 
capacity building agenda, although to meet the obligations of the wider Cotonou 
partnership agenda for the Pacific, since even though Pacific islanders will be responsible 
for their implementation compromise on the direction and shape of development strategies 
is possible. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Guild, ICTs for Every Pacific Islanders: Potential, Constraints, and Opportunities, op cit., pp. 5-6. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Nature and State of Pacific 
Regional Cooperation: 
The Political Economy of Contemporary Pacific Regionalism 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first section of this thesis was predominantly devoted to establishing both the 
European historical and theoretical context of the post-Cotonou process, in order to 
produce a set of propositions that can be used to examine the depth of Pacific integration.  
This chapter will utilise these propositions to answer this question in two particular ways.  
The first is to identify the contours of Pacific regional integration, through an historical 
survey which identifies the key influences on the shape of regional governance.  
Secondly, it more implicitly seeks to explore the relationship between institutionalism and 
regional cooperation in the Pacific.  On the surface, the Pacific possesses a 
comprehensive network of regional agencies and institutions, of which the Pacific Islands 
Forum is only one example.  However, building on the arguments of Chapter Three, this 
may not necessarily be evidence of a strong indigenous trans-regional identification with 
supranational integration, as in the EU.  Deploying a political economy approach to 
contemporary Pacific regional cooperation will help to indicate the extent to which the 
Pacific possesses the capacity to conduct more intensive cooperation at a collective 
institutional level.  This is vitally important to the future of the PCP in the Pacific, 
because, according to the Cotonou Agreement, the ACP states are responsible for 
determining the strategies for development cooperation.  Local integration schemes are to 
be the foundation for the EU model of development through regional economic 
integration wherever possible.  Implicit in this assumption is that the political will to act 
in unity as a region is present and will endure, as well as the continued national 
commitment to implement regional policy, lest regional cooperation succumb to the 
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realms of pseudo-policy.1  Through the thirty year life of the PIF, the PICs have proven 
they can act together on points of common interest, particularly where the environment is 
concerned.  Clearly, then, regional cooperation in the Pacific is not a shallow facade.  
However, even if the ocean may unite Pacific Islanders, as Hau’ofa argues, the track 
record of Pacific regional integration shows that cooperation has not been a consistently 
fruitful mechanism for improving inter-island community.  This may be attributed to the 
legacy of Western involvement in the regional structures of the Pacific, as well as the 
response of Pacific Islanders to the challenges of modernity through the “Pacific Way.”  
Nevertheless, a review of the PIF completed in April 2004 has reasserted that regional 
integration is a key strategy to enhance the welfare of the Pacific.  Despite this, it is 
argued here that the calculus of the political economy of Pacific Island regional 
cooperation may not easily conform to the parameters of integration envisaged by both 
the review and the EU.2
 
In order to illustrate these arguments, this chapter will firstly examine the EU account of 
the state of Pacific regional cooperation given in the Commission’s 2002 Pacific Regional 
Strategy Paper (RSP) (Commission of the European Communities, 2002).  Next, the 
analysis will move to describe how the nature of contemporary Pacific regional 
cooperation has been influenced by Western designs, immediately after the Second World 
War.  In particular the PIF, as well as the Forum Fisheries Association (FFA), the Forum 
Fishing Line (FFL) and Air Pacific will feature as key case studies to highlight the most 
significant facets of Pacific regionalism.  Thirdly, the imperatives of the new 
development orthodoxy will be revisited, as these are steadily altering the complexion of 
regional cooperation.  It will then be possible to apply the elements of the political 
economy framework developed in the second chapter to this evidence to interpret the 
nature of Pacific political institutional integration so that an appraisal can be made of the 
                                                          
1 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy 
Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, European Community, Brussels, pp. 
40-42. 
2 Uentabo Fakaofo Neemia, , (1986), Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in 
Pacific Regional Cooperation, Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji; 
William Sutherland, , (2003), 'Regional Governance, Peace and Security in the Pacific: A Case for Give 
and Take', (unpublished), Australia National University, Canberra, pp. 11-16; Pacific Islands Forum 
Eminent Persons Group, (2004), Pacific Cooperation, Voices of the Pacific, The Eminent Persons’ Group 
Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 2004, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 
Wellington, accessed at: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/pdf/PIF%20Report.pdf, 8 
April 2004. 
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potential for the PACP states to engage in more intensive integration.  Although it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, this may also allow cross comparisons with other cases 
of regional cooperation among the six ACP sub regions, and beyond. 
 
 
II. AN EU APPRAISAL OF PACIFIC REGIONAL COOPERATION: 
1. The Pacific Regional Strategy Paper 
It is little surprise that the PIF has become the vehicle for the implementation of the EU 
agenda in the Pacific.  One reason is because of historical ties.  When the Community’s 
relationship with the PICs began in 1975 under the first Lomé Convention, only Fiji, 
Tonga and Samoa were part of the ACP.  Since these were also the only independent 
states, which of course belonged to the Forum, the PIF became associated with European 
development policy.  Hence, the PIF is now the Mandated Regional Body (MRB) for the 
Pacific, and the Forum Secretary-General acts as the Regional Authorising Officer (RAO) 
for the PACP.  Furthermore, the EU tasks the CROP with the coordination of 
development programmes which the EU funds through the Regional Indicative 
Programme (RIP).3  Essentially, because the history of development cooperation between 
the EU and the Pacific covers a similar timeframe to the experience of decolonisation and 
independence in the region, the EU’s mental map of the Pacific has become the PIF and 
its institutions. 
 
Hence, the account given of the history and structure of regional integration in the Pacific 
in Annex Seven of the PACP Regional Strategy Paper is limited to a history of the key 
achievements and trends associated with the Forum.  In Chapter Two of the RSP, where 
the policy agenda of the region is assessed, only the Forum institutions are covered under 
the key institutional relationships.  The EU concludes that “the Forum Secretariat is the 
key regional integrating organisation.”4  Additionally, the overall distribution and 
management of aid has been optimised for delivery at the regional level, even though the 
EU has produced a series of Country Strategy Papers (CSP) to tailor aid programming to 
national requirements, in order to improve the full and efficient distribution and 
monitoring of aid.  Indicative funding is calculated for the Pacific as a region, and 
                                                          
3 Commission of the European Communities, Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy Paper 
and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, op cit., p. 36. 
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oversight of programming is now the responsibility of the local EU Delegation under the 
strategy of “deconcentration,” as part of the reform of external assistance initiated by the 
Commission.5  This approach neglects, however, the pervasive phenomenon of sub 
regionalism, around the culture-area divisions of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia 
which has coloured the island mindset towards regional community. 
 
It may also be argued that because the Forum membership comprises a representative 
cross-section of the countries in the Pacific, is involved in administering common 
functional projects and has taken steps to begin economic integration, it is most efficient 
for the EU to link into the regional activities of the Forum.  This may be explained more 
fully by the programming provisions in Article Seven of Annex IV of the Cotonou 
Agreement, where the clause states that to “the maximum extent, regional programmes 
should correspond to the programmes of existing regional organisations with a mandate 
for economic integration” (Figure 5.1).  Thus, the Forum provides a stepping stone for 
building EPAs in the ACP sub regions.  However, the Forum is only one instance of 
intergovernmentalism and functional cooperation, and studying its structure and 
organisation does not give a complete picture of Pacific Island regional cooperation. 
 
In general, the portrait which the European Commission has portrayed in its official 
development publications is that the Pacific has a young, but strong regional structure, but 
also significant structural problems, specific to small states, which need to be resolved.  
Evidence of the former is the PIC’s willingness to comply with the imperatives of donors 
to adopt liberal regional economic integration under the PICTA, and associated 
development of human resources in the private sector and governance.  Evidence of the 
latter are the essential problems related to distance, size, small subsistence economies and 
susceptibility to natural disasters, which produce income volatility and can only support 
weak public and commercial sectors.  The EU therefore emphasises the barriers of 
oceanic society in terms of land area, resources and location.  However, even if the total 
land area of the PACP is around 500,000 square kilometres, the Exclusive Economic  
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 ibid., p. 10. 
5 Commission of the European Communities, (2003), Annual Report 2003 on the European Community's 
Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2002, European Commission: 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office & Directorate-General Development, Brussels; Eurostep, (2004), 
'Commission's 2003 Report on Efficiency of External Aid', Proactive File, No. 344, 30 January, p. 2. 
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Figure 5.1: 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Annex IV 
Organising Principles of Region-to-Region Cooperation 
Article 6 
• “Regional Cooperation shall cover operations benefiting and involving: 
• two or more or all ACP states; and/or 
• a regional body of which at least two ACP states are members. 
• Regional cooperation can also involve OCTs and outermost regions.  Funding…shall be 
additional to funds allocated to the ACP states under this agreement.” 
 
Article 7 
• Regional Programmes 
• “The ACP states concerned shall decide on the definition of geographical regions.  To the 
maximum extent possible, regional integration programmes should correspond to 
programmes of existing regional organisations with a mandate for economic integration.  
In principle, in case the membership of these organisations overlaps, the regional 
integration programme should correspond to the combined membership of these 
organisations.  In this context, the Community will provide specific support from regional 
programmes to groups of ACP states who are committed to negotiate economic 
partnership agreements with the EU.” 
 
Article 8 
• Programming shall take place at the level of each region. 
Source: (Commission of the European Communities, 2000) 
 
Zones of its members totals 20 million square kilometres combined; more than the land 
area of the US.6
 
The Commission is confident that the PICs will continue integrative efforts, as the RSP 
argues that development through integration, and in particular economic integration, 
poses little risk to the PACP states.  This view was echoed in the EU post-Forum 
Dialogue meeting, by the Director-General for Development, Koos Richelle in August 
2003.  Richelle unequivocally stated that more integration should produce more peace and 
more stability, as had occurred in Europe.7  In a minute section of the RSP (3.93), the 
Commission does concede that the medium term sustainability of policies and integration 
in the Pacific may be qualitatively different to other ACP sub regions: 
 
                                                          
6 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), The Pacific and the European Union, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, p. 11. 
7 Koos Richelle, , (2003), Statement by Mr Koos Richelle Director-General for Development, European 
Commission, Fifteenth Post-Forum Dialogue Partners Meeting, Commission of European Communities, 
Auckland, New Zealand. 
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“The Pacific ACP are characterised by dispersion, frustrated by their isolation and 
smallness and among them have quite different strengths and weaknesses.  Combined with 
a variety in their respective colonial experience and heritage, this means that their instinct 
for regional integration and collective approaches can be more limited than the Caribbean 
and probably the African ACP.  Nonetheless, there has been a strong tendency over the past 
three decades for the Pacific Islands to increasingly work together and to cooperate, 
especially when under pressure from the rest of the world…The sustainability of current 
integration initiatives depends on how well policies are formulated and implemented, and 
the perception of Pacific Islanders as to whether these are making a positive contribution to 
their quality of life.” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002, p. 24) 
 
This small admission alludes to the deeper dynamics of regional cooperation in the 
Pacific, that there is actually a trend of uneven development among PICs that undermines 
their potential for integration.  What is more, this observation is a reminder of the 
problems of integration in a context of under development.  Perceptual costs and benefits 
(Nye, 1971) in relation to national interests are an essential component of the calculus of 
regional cooperation, particularly in the case of vulnerable island states.  Therefore, to 
equate the Forum with “the Pacific,” as the EU tends to, while a convenient way of 
reifying the dynamics of regional integration in the Pacific, ultimately presents a static 
picture of the nature and state of Pacific regional cooperation.  As Fry (1994) argues, the 
full story of Pacific regional cooperation cannot be told as the history of the Forum 
network, as one can do so in South-East Asia with ASEAN, or Caribbean cooperation 
with CARICOM.8  The dynamics of Pacific regional cooperation are much more complex 
than the EU acknowledges. 
 
 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF PACIFIC POLITICAL REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
The first formal institutional structures in the Pacific were formed as late as the end as the 
end of the Second World War.  However, the Pacific would not be completely 
decolonised for another three decades from the end of the war.  The colonial powers 
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defined the objectives of the very first expression of Pacific regional cooperation.  
Islanders’ were only allowed to make a politically symbolic contribution to cooperation.  
The metropolitan powers were concerned with balancing the agenda promoted by the 
newly formed United Nations decolonisation committee for trusteeship and native 
welfare, with their desire to impose a reconstituted Western order on the Pacific which 
suited their interests.9
 
1. Initial Post-war Regional Cooperation: the SPC 
The South Pacific Health Service (SPHS) and the South Pacific Air Transport Council 
(SPATC) were both established in 1946-47 as the first two forms of intergovernmental 
cooperation in the Pacific.  The organisations both fulfilled welfare functions to improve 
the quality of medical care in the region, and to administer and provide capital for the 
upgrading of air services among the islands, and for trans-Pacific services, respectively.  
When their objectives were met in the 1970s, both were disbanded.10  The most 
significant regional organisation of the period was also established to fulfil a welfare 
function, the South Pacific Commission (SPC).  Unlike the SPHS or the SPATC, the SPC 
was far more comprehensive in scale.  Its membership comprised 18 Pacific states, and 
influenced the present political boundaries of the Pacific. 
 
The SPC was founded in 1947, when the six colonial powers in the region, Australia, 
France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, signed 
the Canberra Agreement.  Nevertheless, the initiative for the SPC came primarily from 
the Australian and New Zealand governments, and the proposals aired in a discussion 
paper in 1944, drafted by W.D. Forsyth of the Australian Ministry of External Affairs for 
a ‘South Seas Commission.’  Both countries were concerned with how they could 
participate in the construction of the post-war world order through leading regional 
arrangements in their corner of the globe, in the context of the power vacuum left in the 
Pacific by the decline of British imperial power.  The purpose of the Commission was 
more limited than Australia and New Zealand had proposed in 1944, as the goals of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Greg Fry, (1994), 'International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to 
Collective Diplomacy', in Andrew W. Axline (ed.), The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation, Pinter, 
London. 
9 ibid.; Epeli Hau'ofa, (ed.), (1998), 'The Ocean in Us', The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall, p. 
398. 
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Canberra Agreement did not include the rights of dependent peoples to development, as 
in the Atlantic Charter, and a security dimension to cooperation was irrelevant to the 
majority of Western powers with an agenda for the Pacific.11  The preamble to the 
Canberra Agreement stated the SPC’s mission was to promote “the economic and social 
welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories in the South 
Pacific region administered by them.”12  Hence, the SPC was a functional institution 
devoid of political powers.  Its responsibility would be to improve welfare through the 
provision of advice to its members on economic, health and social development.  
Nevertheless, the SPC allowed the colonial powers to continue to maintain an influence 
over the islands, providing a measure of security against Communism and liberation 
ideologies, but in way which Islanders and the international community found acceptable. 
 
Perhaps the primary reason for Australia and New Zealand losing the battle for a more 
comprehensive SPC was because the other colonial powers, while not as concerned with 
the Pacific as with other regions, feared that the Commission might become a vehicle for 
political independence.  This was the origin of the “no-politics” rule in the operation of 
the SPC.13  This decision had lasting repercussions for the course of regional cooperation, 
as the island states were prevented from participating in decision-making in SPC 
deliberations, except for channelling requests and information to the international 
governments.  The SPC effectively put regional self-determination into stasis.  
Nonetheless, the SPC did make a series of positive contributions to regional cooperation.  
The SPC structure introduced a Secretariat for administration under the guidance of a 
Secretary General, as well as an auxiliary Research Council.  The other major institutional 
innovation was the South Pacific Conference, a triennial meeting which began in 1950 
and became an annual event in 1967, composed of two representatives from each member 
state.  In this respect, the first meeting of the Conference, the Nasinu Conference in Suva 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 Michael Haas, (1989), The Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific, Praeger, New York, 
pp. 19-30. 
11 R.A. Herr, (1994), 'Regionalism and Nationalism', in K. Howe, R.C. Kiste, and B.V. Lal (eds.), Tides of 
History, The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 284-85. 
12 Quoted in Neemia, Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in Pacific Regional 
Cooperation, op cit., p. 20. 
13 Greg Fry, (1991), 'The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation', in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), The 
South Pacific: Problems, Issues, and Prospects, St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 172-73. 
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in 1950, was a landmark event.  Although merely an advisory body, it regularised the 
practice of islanders meeting together to discuss matters of mutual interest.14
 
Greg Fry (Fry, 1997a) has also insightfully argued that the Nasinu Conference was a 
novel experiment for the colonial powers in trusteeship, to see if islanders from different 
cultural backgrounds in Melanesia and Polynesia could work together, and grapple with 
the problems of development using Western forms of political cooperation.  Both parties 
considered it a milestone event.  Sir Brian Feeston, Western Pacific High Commisioner, 
described the gathering as a “Parliament of Pacific peoples” that had never met before 
under one roof.  Tupua Tamasese Mea’ole of the Council of Ministers of Western Samoa 
made a more cryptic comment that Nasinu marked “the end of the beginning”; a reference 
to future independence for the peoples of the South Seas.  Paradoxically, compared to 
earlier representations of islanders, implicit in the colonial powers’ expectations was 
whether it could be demonstrated that islanders had the potential to form a collective 
identity.  Thus, two countervailing experiments were in operation at Nasinu, since a 
conjuncture was emerging between the informal maintenance of empire and the germ of 
an islands independence movement.15
 
2. Independence and a Stronger Island Voice 
The conjuncture occurred in a sequence of events in 1965.  Samoa, as the first 
independent Pacific state in 1962, became a member of the SPC; the leaders of Fiji, 
Tonga and Samoa led their own initiative to establish a regional organisation; and lastly, 
the “Lae Rebellion” at that year’s South Pacific Conference signalled the first concerted 
effort of Pacific leaders to challenge the colonial structures of the SPC.  A Fijian minister 
of the time, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was active in the latter two developments.  The goal 
of the protest at Lae was to give the Conference a larger role in deciding the work of the 
Commission.  Mara was quoted as saying, “We were sick of having little to say and no 
authority.”16  With more islands becoming independent in Polynesia in the late 1960s and 
early to mid ‘70s, the pressure for equality with the metropolitan powers in the SPC grew, 
                                                          
14 R.A. Herr, , (1980), Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalism, University of Hawaii at 
Manoa, Honolulu, p. 6. 
15 Greg Fry, (1997a), 'The South-Pacific 'experiment': Reflections on the Origins of Regional Identity', 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 32, No. 2, Dec, pp. 180-202, note 68. 
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such that in 1973-74 it was agreed the Commission and the Conference would merge.  In 
1976, multi-voting by the metropolitan powers was abolished to address the imbalance in 
decision-making power from the merger.  However the right to political debate was still 
denied.  By 1983, in an attempt to make the SPC an attractive vehicle for regional 
cooperation, total equality in representation and voting power was granted, irrespective of 
political status.  The SPC still exists in this form, and pursues the same welfare agenda as 
previously.  However, it never achieved the status of an overarching regional 
organisation.  This can be explained by how islanders were frustrated that they could not 
discuss political issues together that affected them.  In reaction, they sought to circumvent 
these restrictions by developing regional institutions of their own: the Pacific Island 
Producers’ Association (PIPA), the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and the South Pacific 
Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). 
 
(i) PIPA, SPEC and the South Pacific Forum 
PIPA’s purpose was to create a commercial pressure group, among the banana exporting 
countries of Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa, and later it expanded to include the Cook 
Islands, Niue and Kiribati.  Its sole function was to negotiate improved prices with New 
Zealand.  In this early organisation, the nature of cooperation was limited and economic, 
yet PIPA only survived eight years.  It failed essentially because it was an association of 
the weak, operating on a limited budget, and because it did not lead to an increase in the 
price for banana exports.  It was an early reflection of the context of dependence the 
islands were, and remain, in.  PIPA nonetheless consolidated the idea of island collective 
action, and that such endeavours could only be successful with the mutual support of 
Islanders.17
 
The seeds of the South Pacific Forum18 were sown in the heat of Fiji’s independence 
celebrations, and informal consultation among island leaders of the five independent PICs 
at the 1970 South Pacific Conference.  When they gathered together in August 1971 for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, (1974), Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific, Address delivered at the 
University of Papua New Guinea, May 1974, p. 7, cited in Fry, G., (1981), 'Regionalism and International 
Politics of the South Pacific', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 3, Fall, p. 462. 
17 Neemia, Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in Pacific Regional 
Cooperation, op cit., pp. 25-26. 
18 The South Pacific Forum was the name for the Pacific Islands Forum prior to 2000.  The Forum changed 
its name to reflect the membership of PICs that were located above the equator.  Hence it was no longer 
appropriate to refer to the Forum as a southern hemispheric organisation. 
 112
the first Forum meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, self-determination in regional 
affairs was their main objective.  Consequently, the Forum was fundamentally different to 
the SPC, as only sovereign island states were allowed to participate.  This meant that the 
Forum was limited in geographical scope until more independent countries were admitted 
during the 1970s.  Learning from PIPA’s failure, though, the islanders sought the 
membership of Australia and New Zealand.  The invitation to Australia and New Zealand 
to join acknowledges the important point that both states are ‘in, but not of,’ the Pacific.  
They are essential contributors to the region, especially in terms of aid and technical 
support for regional cooperation, even if they are excluded from it for the purposes of the 
mutual development of the FICs.19  In 2002, Australia contributed Fijian $2.9 million to 
the Forum budget and New Zealand, $756,000, compared to only $3.472 million from all 
of the FICs.20  Overall, non-island governments have funded as much as 90 per cent of 
the costs of regional organisation.21  Without their support, the Forum and its agencies 
would be unable to carry out their work, since, small island states would be less 
enthusiastic about participating in regional cooperation if they had to foot the bill.22  The 
scenario is a double-edged sword though for Islanders, because Australia, New Zealand 
and the other international donors to the Forum are all able to maintain an interest in the 
agenda of the region, particularly to ensure stability in the region by helping PICs to meet 
the basic obligations of statehood.23
 
One of the reasons for the rapid formation of the Forum was its distinct lack of formal 
rules for governing its operation or the conduct of its meetings.  The annual Forum 
meeting is chaired by the Head of Government of the host nation for that year.  Decisions 
are reached by consensus and are outlined in the Forum Communiqué, from which 
policies and work programmes are developed.  Nevertheless, for political leaders, the 
shared collective will to reject neo-colonialism, as well as basic cultural affinity and 
shared aspirations towards political and economic viability have been just as important in 
                                                          
19 Fry, 'International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to Collective 
Diplomacy', op cit., pp. 141-142. 
20 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, (2003), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Annual Report, Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed at 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/Annual%20Report/Annual%20Report%202002-2003.pdf, 30 January 
2004, p. 27. 
21 Herr, 'Regionalism and Nationalism', op cit., p. 288. 
22 Ron G. Crocombe, , (2001), The South Pacific, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific, Suva, p. 622. 
23 Herr, 'Regionalism and Nationalism', op cit., p. 288. 
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uniting Pacific states.  In other words the Forum does not have a founding charter or a 
treaty to give it legal character.  The informality of Pacific regionalism is one of the key 
reasons for how regional cooperation has endured, as it avoids contentious political 
forms.  The present day Forum has therefore come to be based on two types of political 
organisation; service divisions and semi-autonomous agencies.  Ministerial meetings 
make recommendations to the Forum in the form of Action Statements or 
Communications in the areas of economics, aviation and communications.  The Forum’s 
work is divided into four divisions: Development and Economic Policy; Political 
International and Legal Affairs; Trade and Investment and Corporate Services, under the 
control of the Secretary General who is responsible to the Forum Officials Committee.  
The Secretary-General is usually appointed by the consensus of the Forum Heads of 
Government.  Presently, there are eight key regional organisations that have specialist 
functions, similar to how PIPA and SPEC operated.  Their names and mandates are 
described in Table 5.1. 
 
In summary, there is a high degree of institutional plurality in the Pacific, perhaps 
blunting the effectiveness of the limited amount of resources available to support 
collective action.  In recognition of this point, the CROP also exists to reduce duplication 
and harmonise activities among these organisations, and with international actors.  The 
style of regional cooperation has adapted according to the current issues facing regional 
cooperation.24  The formation of the SPEC in 1973 was very much due to the Forum’s 
informal approach to politics.  SPEC unnecessarily duplicated the role of PIPA, as its 
mandate to enhance the export capacity of the FICs was similar, but its competencies 
included facilitation of research and technical advice for the Forum.  Hence, it became the 
basis for the Forum Secretariat in 1975; formalised in name in 1988.  One of the most 
significant early tasks of SPEC was to negotiate the terms of association with the 
European Community, as well as investigating the potential for economic integration.25  
In 1974 PIPA was subsumed by SPEC.  More controversial than this was the real 
challenge that the Forum and SPEC represented to the SPC by the mid-1970s.  The 
tension created a lasting debate on whether there should be one or several regional  
                                                          
24 Yoko Ogashiwa, (2002), 'South Pacific Forum: Survival under External Pressure', in Shaun Breslin, 
Christopher W. Hughes, Nicola Phillips, and Ben Rosamond (eds.), New Regionalisms in the Global 
Political Economy, Routledge, London & New York, pp. 213-14 & p. 219. 
25 Fry, 'Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific', p. 464. 
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Table 5.1: Pacific Regional Organisations 
in Operation in 2004 
Organisation Establishing 
Agreement Year 
Mandated Area of Work 
Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (SPC) 
1948 Agriculture, health, education, fisheries 
University of the South Pacific 
(USP) 
1968 Provide for the tertiary education needs of 
the Pacific; 
Promote social and economic advancement, 
good governance and regional cultures 
Pacific Islands Forum 
(Secretariat) 
1971 
(1973) 
Regional policy (and until 1976 shipping, 
civil aviation, energy and 
telecommunications) 
Fosters regional cooperation and integration, 
particularly on economic and trade matters 
Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) 
1979 Fisheries management; offers research and 
technical advice to Forum members 
South Pacific Tourism 
Organisation (SPTO) 
1980 Promote cooperation in marketing the 
Pacific as a region for tourism 
Pacific Islands Development 
Program (PIDP) 
1980 Contribute to sustainable development 
policy research through between Pacific 
countries and regional “Pacific Rim” 
countries. 
Council of Regional 
Organisations in the Pacific 
(CROP) 
1988 Coordinates activities of the regional 
organisations to avoid duplication and 
improve efficiency of activities 
South Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme 
(SPREP) 
1993 Promote cooperation to protect the 
environment and employ methods of 
sustainable development 
South Pacific Geoscience 
Commission (SOPAC) 
1995 Identify, assess and develop non-living 
marine resource potential under UNCLOS 
Source: (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, pp. 53-54); (Sutherland, 2003, p. 5). 
 
organisations.  As it happened, the Forum and its agencies became the nexus for regional 
projects, since it encapsulated the aims of Pacific leaders which Herr (Herr, 1980) 
attributes to the prevailing historical determinism for indigenous regional coordination.  It 
tackled the problems that were relevant to PICs, like environmental management, 
opposition to French nuclear testing and fisheries.26  However, a single regional 
architecture has not proven to be practical, because the Forum still does not incorporate 
all Pacific territories, and institutionalisation would also have worked against the 
emerging conventions of Pacific cooperation in the 1970s, embodied in the “Pacific 
Way.” 
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To summarise, the prime goal of the Forum, in its formative years in the 1970s, was to 
establish a cooperative process in which the islanders could control the agenda unfettered.  
The crucial issues were the political symbolism of having independent regional 
organisations and about the membership and control of those organisations.27  Hence, the 
nature of the present institutional structures of Pacific regional cooperation lies in the PIC 
backlash against the apolitical conventions that the colonial powers imposed on them 
through the SPC.  As the divide between the SPC and the Forum persisted, two regional 
organisational networks have emerged in the Pacific, but it is only in the Forum that joint 
positions can be adopted regarding political issues affecting the region.  The Forum 
network also reveals that one of the characteristics of Pacific regionalism is that 
cooperation occurs in functional areas of low politics, not only to assert independence, but 
as the primary expansive mechanism of regional cooperation.  Nevertheless, metropolitan 
powers will most likely always need to be involved in cooperation for collective action to 
be viable.  It is a necessary tension that will continue to colour the nature of PIC 
cooperation. 
 
3. Is the “Pacific Way” a Unique Form of International Interaction? 
The Pacific Way is a concept associated unequivocally with the articulation of an 
independent identity in the Pacific to match the self-determination agenda of the Forum.28  
It can be defined in more detail as the practice among Pacific people to resolve communal 
conflict in a manner in which rank and status do not matter.  Unanimous compromise is 
the ideal outcome.  Ratu Mara and the SPF were the most vocal proponents of the Pacific 
Way as an attempt to reconstruct practices of the past to ‘unlearn’ Western modes of 
negotiation.  It places Pacific aspirations and unity at the core of regional politics.  
However, its emphasis on consensus and equality often leads to political will prevailing 
over pragmatism.  It is also characterised by “optimistic incrementalism,” which means 
that Island leaders are often content to let things work out over time, rather than to plan 
ahead.  Overall, it perhaps represents a synergy between public and private life, which the 
West keeps separate.  Furthermore, it tends to generate a conscious recognition among 
Pacific leaders that different combinations of participants will be appropriate for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 Herr, Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalism, op cit., p. 9-10. 
27 Fry, 'The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation', op cit., p. 174. 
28 The seminal work on this subject is Ron G.Crocombe, (1976), The Pacific Way: an Emerging Identity, 
Lotu Pasifika, Suva, Fiji. 
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particular regional purpose in mind.  Lastly, the Pacific Way evidences the importance of 
regionalisation to incorporate processes of cooperation that are not economic or strictly 
political.29  Specifically in relation to Forum decision-making, this meant that decisions 
should be arrived at through a process with a minimum of bureaucracy and which is 
agreeable to all parties.30
 
Hence, there is a long contested debate over whether or not the Pacific Way really reflects 
a real picture of a unified Pacific and a unique communal way of conducting 
intergovernmental politics at the regional level, or whether it is really political mythology; 
or an artificial recreation of past ‘tradition.’  Certainly, commentators admit that there is a 
strong collective dynamic in Pacific regionalism which is difficult to quantify, chiefly 
because of the multiplicity of linkages between individuals and organisations that 
strengthen the formal intergovernmental strands.  However, as alluded to earlier, many 
argue that the Pacific Way is a shield for island elites to shape the agenda of the region 
and defend their own privileges and luxuries which they derive from participating in 
intergovernmental events, such as travel.31  Michael Haas (1989) argued that the Pacific 
Way represents “a new form of international statecraft (which) has developed in the 
region.”32  Peace among regional actors is seen as the normative condition of inter-state 
relations in the Pacific because of shared values, as well as a common focus against the 
outside world due to the problems of dependency.  Elaborating further, Haas believed that 
the Pacific Way supplied an additional contribution to thought on functionalist theory 
because cooperation proceeds in the first instance on the basis of cultural solidarity, 
which gives elites a solid foundation to develop common political resolve to make 
regional economic and technical projects possible: 
 
                                                          
29 Haas, The Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific, op cit., pp. 8-13. 
30 Fry, 'International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to Collective 
Diplomacy', op cit., p. 142. 
31 See for example, Roger M. Keesing, , (1989), 'Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the 
Contemporary Pacific', The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 1, No. 1-2, Spring & Fall, pp. 19-42; University of 
the South Pacific Institute of Pacific Studies., (1992), Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific, Institute 
of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji; Stephanie Lawson, (1996), Tradition versus 
Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
Melbourne; Sutherland, 'Regional Governance, Peace and Security in the Pacific: A Case for Give and 
Take', p. 3. 
32 Haas, The Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific, op cit., p. xii. 
 117
“…the most promising form of discussion between countries seeking to improve relations 
begins with areas of agreement and moves to areas of ambiguity, but scrupulously avoids 
unfruitful areas for cooperation.” 
(Haas, 1989, pp. 168-69) 
 
However, the genius of early Pacific regional cooperation, as well as the evidence from 
subsequent phases of cooperation would indicate that the conduct of regional politics 
following the Pacific Way is not inherently different from intergovernmental politics.  
The self-determination agenda of the Pacific Way has been as much about the pursuit of 
shared national interests as presenting a common counter-cultural front to the West.  
Crocombe (Crocombe, 2001) cites evidence that regionalism does not have significant 
grass-roots support, as sub regional and national loyalties are stronger in terms of 
accountability of leaders and officials to their native communities.  Furthermore, the 
MIRAB model shows that extra-national linkages are often orientated towards the 
industrialised world than among the islands, where travel, labour, goods, information and 
services exchanges are concerned.33  Similar to Western mental construction of a tranquil 
Pacific island paradise discussed in Chapter Three, Haas perhaps equates the lack of 
conflict and depth of conformity and consensus in Pacific politics as an indicator of a 
distinctly different quality to Pacific Island regionalism.  This might be explained better 
by how the successful cases of Pacific regional cooperation have avoided a significant 
degree of supranational commitment, at least until the twenty-first century.  The rhetoric 
of regional cooperation is stronger than the reality.  Hence, as some of the succeeding 
cases will describe, it is doubtful that the Pacific Way represents a fundamentally 
different form of functional integration, but it has been a catalyst for a regional attitude 
that the PICs should determine future developments, rather than foreign powers. 
 
 
IV. CLEAVAGES, PATTERNS & PROGRAMMES  
1. Culture Area Regionalism: Cleavages based on Ethnicity and Geography 
While it has been seen that certain political-institutional linkages are strong, regional 
intergovernmental activity accounts for as little as three per cent of total governmental 
expenditure, even though it provides useful services and more political cohesion and 
                                                          
33 Crocombe, The South Pacific, op cit., pp. 616-18. 
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bargaining power for island states than could be achieved without it.34  Consequently, the 
analysis now turns to some of the important disintegrative elements that are part and 
parcel of Pacific regional cooperation.  The first of these relates to the island cultural 
divisions discussed earlier that have now entered the political language of contemporary 
Pacific cooperation.  It has been argued that Pacific regionalism has been facilitated by 
the region’s water boundaries, since island states have clearly defined non-contiguous 
borders which reduce the possibility of inter-state disputes, producing a more peaceful 
environment for cooperation.  Other arguments include an absence of conflicting 
ideologies, and a shared pragmatic approach to island politics among islanders.35  Yet, 
sub-regionalism has become a persuasive alternative to area wide regional frameworks as 
Pacific states achieved independence (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Key Sub-Regional Groupings in the Pacific, showing approximate geographic 
distribution of cross regional linkages and extra-regional relationships. 
 
                                                          
34 ibid., pp. 618-19. 
35 ibid., p. 619. 
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(i) Melanesian sub regionalism 
Concurrently, with the expansion of the Forum, Pacific states in Melanesia achieved 
independence in the second wave of decolonisation between 1974 and 1980.  Until that 
time, the story of Pacific regional cooperation had been the tale of Polynesian 
regionalism, since they were the independent Pacific.36  As latecomers the Melanesian 
leaders were often critical of Polynesian progress.  The independence of Papua New 
Guinea (1975), the Solomon Islands (1978) and independence struggles in Vanuatu and 
New Caledonia contributed a more uncompromising point of view on the principle of 
self-determination.  D’Urville’s racial categorisations also produced latent tensions 
between Melanesians and Polynesians due to how Melanesians were ‘ranked’ lower than 
their Eastern cousins.  Melanesians also speak Pidgin, which is the preferred language for 
social situations, again differentiating them from the other Islanders around them.  The 
larger Melanesian islands also have different priorities in development because of the 
differences between their islands and the high volcanic islands of Polynesia.  Just as 
important, more tuna are found in Melanesian and Micronesian waters than in Polynesia, 
which has encouraged sub regional protection of this resource.  Ratu Mara and Fiji also 
became more closely associated with the Melanesian states from the 1978 Forum onward, 
because of their mutual interest in limiting involvement in Forum initiatives to sovereign 
Pacific states, and opposing French colonialism. 
 
Sub regional identification was consolidated in Melanesia in 1986, when the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG) was created.  Their radical position on independence bound 
together initially PNG, the Solomons, Vanuatu and the Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Scoialiste (FLNKS) liberation movement in New Caledonia.  Border tensions 
between PNG and the Solomons, another legacy of colonialism, threatened to implode the 
MSG.  More recently, though, the group concluded the MSG Agreement in July 1993 to 
liberalise tariffs and subsequently in 2000 to create a customs union.  It is intended that by 
2008 liberalisation will be complete.  Fiji had initially declined membership to stifle fears 
of culture area regionalism, but in 1996 it was admitted since it has the largest 
                                                          
36 Fry, 'International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to Collective 
Diplomacy', op cit., p. 143. 
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manufacturing industry in the Pacific and stood to benefit significantly.37  In 2003, the 
MSG leaders agreed that the trade agreement should be extended to New Caledonia, 
which puts more pressure on the OCT to reach independence, as agreed with France 
under the Noumea Accord in 1998.  In 2004, the MSG intends to take a deeper step 
towards integration, as they agreed the previous year as well to establish a Permanent 
Secretariat, in Port Vila, which brings the MSG another step closer to achieving a degree 
of integration to rival the Forum.38
 
(ii) A Polynesian riposte 
A fleeting attempt to build a Polynesian Community occurred in 1987, principally from 
the French Secretary of State for the Pacific, Gaston Flosse and the Cook Islands Prime 
Minister, Sir Tom Davis.  Its emphasis was to be cultural and economic, but it collapsed 
because only Tonga and Niue seriously supported it, since too many other Polynesian 
states feared upsetting the balance of relations with outside powers, who refused to help 
fund the project, and fears of Tongan dominance.  Where the Polynesian Community 
failed, however, the Small Islands States Summit, founded in 1992, has succeeded.  It 
brings together the Cook Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Niue, Nauru, and Tuvalu, 
while French Polynesia sits as an observer.  The SIS sits within the Forum, and 
consequently its most important function is to advance the interests of the microstates to 
the wider Forum, which include climate change, water and energy.  The Forum also 
recognises the special needs of the smallest and most vulnerable states in its work 
programme, begun under SPEC.  The SIS again, however, is highly dependent on outside 
funding for its activities and programmes to occur, as illustrated by the EU signing 
several Indicative Programmes and Financing Agreements with several SIS members in 
August 2003.39  Coupled with the small scale of these economies, it is extremely unlikely 
that sub regional integration as the MSG is attempting could happen. 
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38 Allan Kemakeza, , (2003), 'Melanesian Spearhead Group Statement, Forum Leaders Summit, 16 August 
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39 Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific, (2003), Media Release: EU signs Financing 
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Less significant, but not to be forgotten, are the sub regional linkages inspired by the 
metropolitan powers.  Micronesia, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall 
Islands and Palau all remained under the tutelage of the United States under the Compact 
of Free Association, which gave the US responsibility for defence, but autonomy to the 
islands for decision-making.  The Compact has afforded these states high income and 
higher standards of living than they could have had otherwise because of the aid they 
have received in United States dollars.40  The Cook Islands, Niue and possibly soon 
Tokelau’s relationship of Free Association with New Zealand represents another set of 
extra-regional linkages.  Besides the trans-national aspects of the relationship previously 
mentioned, the Cook Islands are New Zealand’s largest destination for bilateral aid, at 
NZ$6.24 million, while one-quarter of Niue’s budget is derived from New Zealand aid.41
 
Interestingly, in the RSP, the European Commission isolates only the MSG as a 
significant sub regional collective integration process outside of the Forum.  The 
Commission praises the MSG for “fostering a sense of cultural and political identity in a 
region long used to two-way relationships with distant metropolitan powers,” and unlike 
commentators of the MSG in its early days, does not consider it to be working against 
regional integration through the Forum.  From the EU’s perspective, the economic 
integration initiatives that the MSG is pursuing are now perhaps just as important as 
stepping-stones to comply with the neoliberal reforms of the PCP.  The important 
conclusion though, is that sub regionalism has been pursued as a strategy for cooperation 
when national interests have not been shared at the regional level.  Hence, although 
foreign interests may prefer to deal with the Pacific as a single entity for the sake of 
convenience, regional identification may actually be just as strong in some instances 
among sub regions, because of the diversity of islands interests and because of the 
overlapping informal processes through which cooperation coalesces in the Pacific. 
                                                          
40 Palau, received is entitled to US$700 million in assistance from the date of its independence in 1994, until 
the Compact finishes in 2009.  In 2001, the RMI and FSM Compacts, signed in 1986 at independence, 
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41 New Zealand Agency for International Development, (2003), Pacific Fact-Sheet, Wellington, accessed at 
http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/pdf/pacificfactsheet.pdf, 3 February 2004. 
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2. Contrasting Cases of Regionalism: National Interests and Polarisation of 
Costs and Benefits of Regional Cooperation 
Hence, once the Forum had established itself as a leading intergovernmental body, its 
focus shifted initially to the business of the economic development of the Pacific, away 
from the galvanising issue of self-determination that had previously united the first FICs.  
In 1971, economic integration was outlined as one of the ambitions of the Forum.  Issues 
on the agenda now included the form that integration schemes should take, where 
organisations should be located, who should fill key posts, and how contributions to 
regional endeavours should be determined.  These were all matters with great potential 
for national interests to diverge.  The shift in the nature of the agenda also meant that the 
Forum members began to focus on specific functional projects. One of SPEC’s first tasks 
was to investigate the possibilities.  As argued earlier, it was a logical course of action, 
given the precedence of economic integration as a model of cooperation, because of its 
success in Europe and its employment in other parts of the developing world.  Working 
together to pool resources to create economies of scale seemed to make perfect sense in a 
vulnerable island environment. 
 
Surprisingly, economic integration along the lines of a free trade area, customs union or 
economic union were firmly rejected as possible models of cooperation at the urging of 
consultants and officials who realised that the islands lacked an economic base for 
integration.  Their conclusions were made on the basis that the island states did not 
naturally comprise an economic unit, since they were scattered into sub regional clusters, 
only Fiji possessed an industrial economy, and intra-regional trade was only 2 per cent of 
total trade because of the similarity of products exported by PICs.  For these reasons, a 
Pacific federation, although sometimes proposed, has not been considered practical.  
Thus, cooperative endeavours began as sectoral integration, in areas of specific mutual 
benefit to the islanders, including fisheries, shipping, civil aviation and tertiary education.  
Environmental protection has also caused national interests to coalesce.  Several case 
studies could therefore be examined to highlight the particular nature and state of regional 
cooperation programmes in the Pacific.  However, the sectoral integration efforts in the 
areas of regional fisheries management and transport have been selected for detailed 
analysis, because these respectively can best illustrate the contrast between factors which 
have facilitated integration and cleavages which have caused cooperation to stall. 
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(i) Fisheries: the Forum Fisheries Agency and the “Tuna Commission” 
Fisheries management may be characterised as a successful case of sectoral integration 
because it meets a need incumbent upon the region since the 1970s to protect a vital 
migratory resource from exploitation.  Tuna represents 10 per cent of the combined GDP 
of all nations and six to eight per cent of wage employment, underlining its value to the 
PICs.42The FFA is the principal agency that carries out this task.  It has its origins in the 
need to manage fisheries resources across the Forum raised by the establishment of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1973.  Adopted in 1982, UNCLOS 
provided each Pacific state with a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.  Thus, the new 
zones needed to be managed and controlled, given the interest of Distant Water Fishing 
Nations (DWFN) such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the United States and the Soviet Union 
to harvest the resource without returning the benefits to PICs.  Since the skipjack tuna is a 
migratory resource, regional cooperation was the only solution.  Nevertheless it took three 
years to negotiate the FFA Convention, principally because there was division over 
whether DWFNs should belong to it, and its scope, whether to maximise benefits, as in a 
cartel, or merely manage resources through broader participation consistent with Article 
64 of UNCLOS. 
 
The more radical elements were favoured.  The Forum states to which fisheries were most 
important, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, PNG, the Solomon Islands and Tonga were opposed to 
anything less than full sovereignty over the FFA.  The United States opposed loss of 
control of its fishing fleets in Pacific waters, which was only ended by a compromise 
negotiated by Australia at the 1978 Forum meeting by satisfying the demands of the 
islands, but not to exclude the possibility of bilateral negotiations in the future.  America 
resisted a bilateral treaty until as late as 1988, but relented to prevent the islands granting 
licences to the Soviet Union.43
 
Following this pattern, the EU initiated negotiations in May 2001 to conclude bilateral 
tuna fishing agreements with the Pacific ACP, with the first arrangement signed with 
Kiribati in July 2002.  Another significant achievement of the FFA was as the principal 
                                                          
42 Commission of the European Communities, The Pacific and the European Union, op cit., p. 12. 
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policy entrepreneur behind a regional ban on drift-net fishing through the UN in 1989, 
which originated in the Tarawa Declaration (see Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3: Major Forum Resolutions – 1971-2003 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). 
SPARTECA is a non-reciprocal trade agreement under which Australia and New Zealand offer 
duty free and concessional access for virtually all products originating from the developing island 
countries of the Forum.  SPARTECA entered into force on 1 January 1981. 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) 1985. 
The SPNFZ treaty seeks to ban all forms of nuclear testing by the Parties.  Under the Protocols, 
the nuclear weapon states agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any 
Party to the Treaty and apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to their respective territories in the 
zone. 
Tarawa Declaration, 1989. 
Expressed concern by the Forum at the damage caused to regional fisheries by drift net fishing.  
As a result of regional efforts, drift net fishing ceased in the South Pacific. 
Honiara Declaration, 1992. 
The Honiara Declaration outlined a framework for priorities to promote peace and security in 
legal, police, customs, drugs and training areas. 
Waigani Convention, 1995. 
The Waigani Convention seeks to ban the importation into FICs of hazardous and radioactive 
wastes, and to control the trans-boundary movement and management of hazardous wastes within 
the region.  The Convention came into force on 21 October 2001. 
Aitutaki Declaration, 1997. 
The Aitaki Declaration contains guiding principles governing regional security cooperation in the 
region. 
Biketawa Declaration, 2000. 
The Biketawa Declaration outlines the guiding principles of for good governance and courses of 
action for a regional response to crises in the region. 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) and Pacific Island Countries 
Trade Agreement (PICTA). 
PACER is a regional economic cooperation between all Forum members, including Australia and 
New Zealand, which came into force on 3 October 2002, after seven members ratified the 
agreement.  The PICTA is a FTA, initially applying to the 14 FICs, which entered into force on 13 
April 2003 after it was ratified by six members.  Eventual trade integration was on the inaugural 
1971 Forum agenda. 
Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security, 2002. 
The Nasonini Declaration further highlights the region’s concerns over and response to trans-
national crime and terrorism. 
Pacific Oceans Policy, 2002. 
The Pacific Oceans Policy aims to ensure the future sustainable use of the Pacific Ocean and its 
resources by Pacific Islands communities and external partners. 
Forum Declaration on the Solomon Islands, 2003. 
The Forum commended the swift and cooperative response of Forum Members in deploying the 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), consistent with the principles of 
the Biketawa Declaration, to help restore law and order, and a programme of assistance to 
strengthen the justice system and restore the economy and basic services. 
Source: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
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Within the past five years, the value of collective management of fisheries was further 
recognised when a Multilateral High Conference was convened between Pacific and 
foreign powers, which in 2000 adopted a Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 
or the “Tuna Convention.”  This has provided the basis for efforts to found a “Tuna 
Commission,” or a regional commission to jointly manage the conservation and 
sustainable development of the fisheries industry in the Pacific.  Pace is gathering behind 
the Commission, with four Preparatory Conferences held thus far.44 As a result of 
negotiations to date, important and difficult concessions have had to be made both by 
FFA’s member countries and by the distant water fishing nations.  Some of the crucial 
remaining issues include how the management role of the Commission will be 
discharged, how management limits will be decided and allocated among EEZs and the 
high seas, and scientific and commercial data collection and usage.  Under these 
circumstances, the FFA will continue to play an invaluable coordinating role with the 
emerging Commission.  It will provide the institutional capacity for enforceable 
management of the high seas, extend under the Tuna Convention.  The Commission will 
place new responsibilities on member countries which will require them to look beyond 
immediate issues and develop longer term perspectives and strategies.  Restriction of 
catches over the whole western and central Pacific tuna resource, whether for biological 
or economic reasons, becomes a distinct possibility.45  Consequently, the Tuna 
Convention raises the stakes of regional cooperation, beyond the non-political role of the 
FFA.  Solidarity in the face of potential external pressure will be essential to enable the 
PICs to protect their national and regional interests. 
 
(ii) Regional Transport: Air Pacific, PIASA and the Pacific Forum Line 
For a region comprised of island archipelagos, and substantial distances between them, 
transportation is an equally vital area of sectoral integration as fisheries for development, 
to transport nearly one million foreign tourists per year to the Pacific, and to serve as a 
                                                          
44 Commission of the European Communities, Pacific ACP European Community Regional Strategy Paper 
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Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Auckland, p. 8. 
45 Forum Fisheries Agency, (2004), The Tuna Commission, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon 
Islands, accessed at http://www.ffa.int/www/index.cfm?itemID=32, 4 February 2004. 
 126
vital line of communication.46  However, in contrast to the successes of Pacific regional 
cooperation in fisheries, it has proved difficult to adopt a sustainable regional architecture 
for air and sea transportation. 
 
Fiji’s national airline, Air Pacific, originally began life as a joint endeavour between the 
governments of Australia, Britain, Fiji and New Zealand with the intention of building a 
regional airline owned by the PICs, and operating routes among them and to Australia and 
New Zealand.  It was a logical approach to the problem of providing regional air transport 
to a region which could not afford the substantial capital costs involved in running an 
international airline, or indeed which possessed the population base to support numerous 
carriers on routes that were regarded as uneconomic by foreign carriers.  In theory, the 
need for cooperation should have been as compelling as was the case with fisheries.  
However, in this case national interests conspired to scuttle these plans.  Air Pacific was 
originally named Fiji Airways.  The consortium of interests wished to expand Fiji 
Airways to use a vehicle for a single regional carrier.  Hence, the base for the new airline 
was in Fiji, and as such it was Fiji which led the local initiative to gain support for the 
concept among the PICs in the early 1970s.  Tonga, Samoa, Nauru and the still then 
colonised Solomon Islands and Kiribati became shareholders as a result, but Fiji was the 
major island shareholder.  Fiji was primarily interested in making the airline work to its 
own advantage, rather than distributing the benefits to the other stakeholders in the 
project.  For instance, Fiji blocked employment of non-Fiji nationals in all but token roles 
in other countries.  Even hostesses were refused.  Fiji kept 97 per cent of jobs, including 
all senior positions and training awards.  More disastrously, all flights had to pass through 
Fiji, even when this was not the most convenient or direct route.  All supplies were 
purchased in Fiji, and all confirmed bookings had to be made in Fiji.  Finally, the local 
franchise for the aircraft chosen by Air Pacific, the British Aerospace 1-11, was owned by 
the Fijian civil aviation minister, which meant that a better aircraft for the airline’s routes, 
the Boeing 737, was passed over.47  For these reasons, the other partners perceived that 
the regional airline was run in the interest of Fiji, and when New Zealand and Australia 
                                                          
46 Based on visitor numbers supplied from SPTO countries in South Pacific Tourism Organisation, (2001), 
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relinquished their shareholding, the islands declined to commit more capital to expand the 
airline.  Thus, by the time of the 1974 Forum the single regional airline concept had died.  
Thus, Air Pacific became a Fijian airline in principle as well as practice.  Today, Qantas 
owns 46 per cent of the airline, and the Fiji government 51 per cent, and remains the 
Pacific’s largest carrier, recording a Fijian $25 million profit.48  The airline has also shed 
its regional routes and concentrates on international routes to Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and the United States.49
 
In whole or in part because of this, demonstrating the crucial role of perceptual costs and 
benefits in decisions relating to progress in integration, the other islands developed their 
own carriers, proving it was possible to fly other routes.  Air Nauru, Air Vanuatu, 
Polynesian Airlines, Air New Guinea, Solomons Airlines and Royal Tongan Airlines are 
a sample of the carriers which have sprung up either in response to frustration at Fiji’s 
self-interest or because of the prestige of owning a national carrier.  Most have been 
characterised by mismanagement, unprofitability and unsustainable operations for the 
islands they serve, however, there is no sign of radical rationalisation. 
 
However, the Forum is again pushing regional cooperation as an effective solution to the 
Pacific’s air transportation problems, as moves are afoot to liberalise and rationalise air 
services in the Pacific by implementing the Forum Aviation Action Plan.50  One of the 
concerns of the Forum Aviation Ministers is to strengthen Pacific airlines so that they can 
eventually survive in a market with larger international carriers.  At the first Aviation 
Policy Meeting in 1998, two main issues were identified as barriers standing in the way of 
this ambition.  The first was the problem of the number of bilateral air services 
agreements which the FICs are party to, when the trend in the worldwide aviation sector 
is to liberalise operating environments.  Altogether, there are 67 bilateral agreements, 
with 25 among the FICs themselves.  The complicated legal environment makes it 
extremely difficult for airlines to gain multiple international route approvals in the Pacific 
region, and consequently have acted as a brake to multi-destination tourism, inward 
investment and industry development.  The second problem is to improve access for 
                                                          
48 Air Pacific Fiji, (2004), About Us, Suva, accessed at http://www.airpacific.com/website.nsf, 4 February 
2004. 
49 Frawley, Gerard, (1995), 'Airline Profile: Air Pacific', Australian Aviation, No. 111, October, p. 45. 
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international capital by liberalising ownership and control issues of airlines so that they 
can be more competitive.  Thus, the Aviation Ministers have investigated and drawn up a 
proposal for a single Pacific aviation market, known as the Pacific Islands Air Services 
Agreement (PIASA).  It was endorsed at Aviation Ministerial meeting in July 2003 and 
also by the Forum in August 2003.  FICs are urged to become parties to PIASA as soon as 
possible. 
 
PIASA is designed to replace the existing bilateral agreements with one agreement to 
cooperatively liberalise air services and introduce a common framework to regulate 
safety, air freight and airspace management.  PIASA envisages that this process will 
occur in three stages to allow FIC airlines and governments to adapt to changes first, and 
then allow international carriers into the FIC market.  To make it easier for small airlines 
to expand in the Single Market, greater access will be granted, as well as general 
provisions for airlines to access foreign capital sources, and for innovative pricing.  
Potential loss of revenue is expected to be offset by development of new routes and 
greater traffic between the FICs, although infrastructure, especially better hotels, is 
needed to increase growth.51  Furthermore, at the 2003 Forum, Leaders agreed that a 
Pacific Regional Aviation and Shipping scoping study to investigate how PICs can 
collaborate to improve regional transport services will be conducted, funded by Australia.  
In doing so, leaders recognised that a regional airline concept is insufficient, or 
inappropriate, to meet the regions needs.52  Rather, PIASA should help alleviate the key 
structural barriers that have prevented commercial aviation from comprehensively 
covering the Pacific, and allow this sector to develop at a pace that is suitable to the 
Islanders, and manage the challenge to national interests. 
 
The trauma caused by Air Pacific tainted regional cooperation in the area of regional 
shipping as well for a number of years.  As in aviation, the idea of a regional shipping line 
was important to increase the frequency of contact with more islands in order to lower the 
cost of imports and exports.  Again, though, high capital costs, and Tonga and Nauru’s 
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reluctance to sacrifice their own lines for an unproven regional concept were stronger 
arguments against economic integration than the logic of the project.  Ultimately, a 
flexible Memorandum of Understanding was signed to appease competing interests.  The 
Pacific Forum Line was established as an operating company for the pooling of national 
vessels, so that ownership of the PFL’s assets was left in individual countries’ hands.  
However, the PFL required substantial investment to set up, and on going support from 
governments to make it viable, which only a handful of islands wished to supply because 
of the perception that national lines better met their needs.  The Air Pacific experience 
engendered scepticism that the benefits would be distributed evenly.  In 1995, the PFL 
was freed from political control to operate as a commercial enterprise, but is still backed 
up by subsidies. 
 
(iii) Evaluation of Sectoral Integration Efforts 
In evaluation of sectoral integration, the FFA has been a successful case because the 
agency has had a clearly defined role to gather and disseminate information to its 
members to manage a sustainable resource, negotiate licences and draft fisheries 
legislation.53  It has been popular because it deals with a migratory resource, and for this 
reason has been able to attract foreign funding to make it viable.  Furthermore, the 
demand for its services has increased over time, as cooperation has become more intense 
and the need for regional coordination has grown to deal with the pressure exerted by 
outside powers, international law and to present a stronger bargaining position, in 
response to stronger interest in tuna fishing in the Pacific Ocean.  In this sense, the agency 
has a good track record of distributing benefits to the region in an equitable manner by 
tightening regulations and adopting agreed standards and minimum terms.  DWFNs now 
realise they cannot disregard PIC policy on fisheries.  The FFA also has no decision-
making authority, and fisheries assets remain in national hands, so it has avoided the 
pitfalls of politicisation.54  Only the Nauru Group challenged the FFA, in response to the 
informal Forum negotiation style which appeared to compromise national self-
determination.  The Tuna Convention is perhaps the greatest opportunity and the greatest 
                                                                                                                                                                             
52 Rt. Hon. John Howard, (2003), Press Release, Regional Aviation and Shipping Scoping Study, 16 
August, Prime Minister of Australia, Auckland, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Forum Communiqué, 
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53 Neemia, Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National Interests in Pacific Regional 
Cooperation, pp. 33-36; Fry, 'International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to 
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challenge to this generally sound track record, because of the higher compliance demands 
and distribution of costs required by a joint regime with the DWFNS. 
 
By contrast, the area of transport has been much more controversial because it has 
involved integration in commercial activities.  These imply that national governments will 
have to make greater sacrifices to the regional cause.  The stakes were much higher in Air 
Pacific and the PFL than in the FFA.  The result of the failure of Air Pacific was 
particularly damaging for the approach of Pacific countries to regionalism for a number of 
years, since the PICs preferred to supplement national projects through shared expertise 
and coordination.  This trajectory has been influenced by fear of the “Fiji hijack.”55  Fiji, 
because of its central location in the Pacific, has often possessed an advantage for the 
location of regional agencies.  The University of the South Pacific, Air Pacific and the 
Forum Secretariat are all based there, as well as the Pacific UN Development Programme.  
Fiji has also offered attractive terms for locating organisations there.  Tiring of the 
criticism that Fiji received from other islands after the Air Pacific debacle, Ratu Mara 
strongly advocated host country management of organisations, out of the belief that 
jointly run projects held up regional development, arguing that “the pace of development 
should not be determined by the slowest member.”56  However, these criticisms are 
perhaps justifiable, since as in the case of Air Pacific, Fiji has been able to nationalise 
significant regional initiatives, like the Central Medical School and the South Pacific 
Telecommunications College, financed by the European Community, and employ its own 
people in these organisations, alienating islanders who could have benefited too.  In effect 
Fiji has become a pivotal state from the benefits which accrue from hosting several 
organisations, which can undermine regionalism as peripheral states turn elsewhere.  
Thus, the early experience gained from ambitious regional projects showed that it was 
better to work at shared specific tasks, to minimise the polarisation of national interests so 
that regional cooperation in general would not collapse.  It is perhaps for this reason that 
Pacific regionalism has endured, because alternative approaches have been found that 
achieve a similar level of comitology as more politically intense integration schemes.  It is 
this conclusion which may influence the view held by Haas that the Pacific Way is 
successful because it begins from a position of mutual understanding to advance 
                                                                                                                                                                             
54 Crocombe, The South Pacific, op cit., pp. 603-05. 
55 ibid., pp. 612-16. 
56 Quoted in Fry, 'Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific', op cit., p. 470. 
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collective interests.  However, as the Tuna Convention and PIASA exemplify, the 
neoliberal reform agenda is altering the contemporary dynamics of Pacific regional 
cooperation, as will be argued next. 
 
 
V. REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE AGE OF REFORM 
1. Donor Regional Reform Agenda Produces a Stronger Compliance Regime 
Returning to themes outlined in Chapter Three, Sutherland (2000; 2003) has argued that 
the imperative for regional reform has come from external forces, particularly outside 
donors, in an attempt to compel the island states to respond to the imperatives of 
globalisation.  In other words, national reforms were shaped by a regional agenda.57  The 
reform agenda has been targeted for delivery through the PIF. 
 
As mentioned, aid has been essential for the viability of regional cooperation, but this has 
meant that island states have not had an incentive to conduct reform, or engage in a 
dependency-reducing collective self-reliance scheme.  This created what the World Bank 
described as the “Pacific Paradox” – low per capita income, despite possessing high per 
capita resources.  To remedy this situation, the Bank prescribed that the region had to 
create a policy environment to facilitate private investment.  To resolve the Pacific 
Paradox, the PICs had to adopt policies which would increase exports, deregulation, 
reform the private sector, finances and labour markets, in the face of the Uruguay Round, 
the end of the Pacific’s geopolitical significance at the end of the Cold War and the 
completion of the European single market.  The message found resonance with Australia, 
as previously noted.  At the 1994 Forum, Australia put sector-focused reform at the 
forefront, under the theme of “Managing our Resources,’ with attention concentrated on 
forestry, fisheries and aviation, and an overhaul of the structure of the Forum process, 
with a Leaders’ Statement aimed at delivering concise decisions rather than general 
statements.  In general, it is indicative of an accelerating trend of a more assertive 
Australian role in Pacific regionalism.58  Hence a new framework for regional 
                                                          
57 William Sutherland, (2000), 'Global Imperatives and Economic Reform in the Pacific Island States', 
Development and Change, Vol. 31, No. 2, March, pp. 461-66. 
58 Robert Keith Reid, (2003), 'Cover Report: Lording Over the Pacific', Islands Business. Vol. 29, No. 9, pp. 
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cooperation with substantially different content was beginning to take shape, from the 
pressure to adapt to new conditions. 
 
In this context, a formal arrangement was necessary to integrate the key donors into the 
Forum architecture.59  In the first instance, it was necessary to develop the reform agenda 
at the regional level, to make it more acceptable to island cultural and political 
sensibilities.  This has been provided by the institution of the post-Forum Dialogue with 
Development Partners in 1989, presently numbering 12 participants, including the EU, 
which allows for comment on progress and concerns at development in the Pacific.  In 
1995, a comprehensive review was conducted of the Forum which led to leaders adopting 
a 25 year Vision Statement for enhancing regional cooperation.  Another key innovation 
funded by Australia was the establishment of first the Forum Finance Ministers’ Meeting 
in 1995, subsequently expanded in 1997 to become the Forum Economic Ministers’ 
Meeting with a mission to see that liberal reform was developed and implemented among 
the FICs.  To assist in this, formal biennial stocktakes of reform progress among members 
were implemented in 2002.  Hence, the trend which has been apparent in the last several 
years has been that the informal, ‘soft’ compliance regime that had operated in the Forum, 
characteristic of the consensus politics of the Pacific Way has been steadily eroded by the 
imperative from outside the region to conform to the neoliberal reform agenda.  As a 
result, Islanders are being forced to adopt a much harsher compliance-inducing regime, 
which might in time lead to stricter regulation of Pacific regional cooperation.  Precedents 
for this prediction already exist in the Tuna Convention, and the Pacific Islands Countries 
Trade Agreement (PICTA), which both have legally enforceable provisions. 
 
2. Good Governance and Regional Security: Stronger Regional Discipline 
Furthermore, good governance and regional security represent two further compliance 
regimes that PICs are adjusting to in the reform age.  The Biketawa Declaration 
originated out of the Forum Economic Action Plan, from the first meeting of the FEMM, 
and the Aitutaki Declaration on regional security, in response to revived concerns about 
an “arc of instability,” which had emerged as a result of the May 2000 coup in Fiji, and 
one two months later in the Solomons Islands.60  Biketawa also responds to the donor 
                                                          
59 Sutherland, 'Regional Governance, Peace and Security in the Pacific: A Case for Give and Take', pp. 6-7. 
60 ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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agenda to address public accountability and transparent leadership, but balanced against 
respect for specific national and local circumstances, a veiled reference to the Pacific 
Way.  In doing so, Biketawa makes a point about the need not only for good governance, 
but democracy, which may be at odds with various island political systems, such as the 
controversy which has surrounded the Tongan monarchy or the integrity of Samoan 
democracy.61  At the 2003 Forum, the Leaders took the tension between tradition and 
democracy into serious consideration when they reaffirmed the primacy of their 
commitment to the rule of law when they adopted the Forum Principles of Good 
Leadership, but also acknowledging regional sensibilities to traditional forms of 
authority.62
 
Regional security has been an item of deep concern in the Pacific since the Forum’s 
endorsement of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, and the first coups in Fiji in 1987.  
Significantly, Biketawa has provided a facility for dealing with regional conflict in a way 
which challenges the previous Forum convention of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of other members.  In response to members’ request for assistance, the Forum may 
take steps to address the underlying causes of tension, including ethnic tension, socio-
economic disparities or land disputes.  In 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI), initiated and funded by Australia, albeit, put the Biketawa 
security provisions into operation for the first time.  According to the declaration, the 
RAMSI will be a long-term intervention to build the capacity for good governance by 
restoring law and order, and achieve social and economic recovery.63  The corollary to 
enhanced regional security provisions though is the cost of implementing them.  A 
Regional Security Fund is envisaged to cover the costs.  In a similar vein, the Nasonini 
Declaration underlines a regional commitment to fully implement the Honiara 
Declaration of 1992, and to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and the 
OECD Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendations to combat international 
terrorism and trans-national crime; including money laundering and drug trafficking.  
Moreover, the declaratory nature of Biketawa over the region continues an approach 
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begun in 1997 that establishes clear principles for FICs to adhere to, but without 
endangering regional cooperation in these areas by making naked criticisms of various 
countries in the Forum.64
 
Both declarations therefore signify that the extent of reform has gathered pace since 1997 
at the influence of outside donors and the high value that is placed on regional security 
and stability as a fundamental prerequisite for development.  The mutual impact of these 
reforms on the sovereignty of island states is evident, in that they have been required to 
make substantial structural changes to their governments and economies quite rapidly to 
meet outside expectations65  The appointment of a new Secretary General in 2003, an 
Australian, Greg Urwin, to the top Forum office to replace Noel Levi may not inspire 
hope of better dialogue with island civil society.  Fears were rife at the time that Australia 
was trying to advance its own security agenda for the Pacific through the Forum and that 
island priorities were being downgraded.  Urwin’s appointment was not by consensus as 
has been the way of the Forum, but by vote.66  Urwin’s appointment also means that the 
RAO for the PACP is not from an ACP state, raising a minor complication for the Pacific 
PCP.  More importantly, the beginning of Urwin’s tenure corresponds with another 
comprehensive review of the Forum architecture, to take stock of where the islands stand 
in relation to the challenges of globalisation.67
 
3. The 2004 Eminent Persons’ Review and Challenges to the Pacific Way 
Therefore, it may be surmised that Pacific regional cooperation is undergoing its most 
challenging transformation since independence.  While the highly institutionalised 
voluntarism of the ‘traditional’ island politics is still apparent, there is definitely a 
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conjuncture developing between the Pacific Way and the global imperatives of the 
regional reform agenda, of which the PCP is one element.  Overall, Islanders have to meet 
more rigorous performance targets in order to obtain donor assistance, and are required to 
participate in regional and international arrangements which stretch their capacity for 
representation.  New commitments for democratic and accountable governance and 
regional security provide further challenges to the rhetoric of traditional politics, which 
elites have used the Pacific Way as a defence against criticism.  Perhaps the appointment 
of Urwin as Secretary-General of the Forum and more stringent directives on peace and 
security in the Pacific show that the politics of consensus and compromise of the Pacific 
Way can no longer occupy an exclusive position in defining the approach of islanders to 
regional, and international, cooperation.  Nevertheless, the FICs have willingly taken 
these steps, and the Forum’s clout has been enhanced as it has become the regional 
mechanism through which neoliberal reforms are being implemented and monitored. 
 
Amongst these tensions, the Forum leaders agreed at the 2003 Forum meeting to conduct 
a thorough review of the Forum and its Secretariat, as a result of their discussions of the 
present and future challenges facing their countries, which may warrant further pooling of 
resources in the Forum.  The review followed a similar process to the 1995 exercise, as it 
was again conducted under the auspices of an Eminent Persons Group, headed by Sir 
Julius Chan.68  The group published its recommendations in April 2004, which were 
subsequently adopted by the Forum leaders at a special retreat.  Although it sought to 
consult civil society, it has been questioned how far the review incorporated sentiment on 
regionalism from the grassroots of Pacific society, and did not simply consult a small 
range of elites, because of the short timeframe over which it was conducted.69  
Nevertheless, the Review, entitled “Pacific Cooperation, Voices of the Region,” 
underpins intensified regional cooperation as the key recommendation for dealing with 
the four key challenges to the region: economic growth, sustainable development, good 
governance and security, under the overarching theme of globalisation.  It lays out a 
vision for the Pacific (Figure 5.4), and a “Pacific Plan,” which sketches out the 
possibilities to create stronger and deeper links between countries of the region, as the 
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report argues that current levels of cooperation are insufficient to assist vulnerable island 
states to cope with the challenges listed above.  
 
“The bottom line is that future inter-country relations will need to be closer and mutually 
supportive if the region is to avoid decline and marginalisation.” 
There is no doubt in our minds that the future prosperity of the region will depend on our 
acknowledging our inter-connectedness, and finding new…means of harnessing our collective 
capacities.  New thinking on the relationships between sovereign states may be required.  
Where practical, the pooling of regional resources in a range of areas of governance would 
offer improved efficiencies in…economic development.” 
(Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, 2004, p. 10 & p. 21) 
 
Thus, the rationale of the Pacific Plan is that PICs must depend on each other to survive 
and prosper.  The Plan also recommends that the Forum should assess all existing 
regional cooperation arrangements, and establish a Pacific Plan Taskforce in 2004 to 
develop the Plan further.  In particular, the Forum Secretary-General and the Chair would 
be given enhanced powers of initiative in regional affairs, and the functions of the 
Secretariat and the CROP would also be streamlined to allow to them to implement 
regional programmes more efficiently.  Therefore, the Pacific Plan is a clear departure 
from the norms of informal regionalism.  However, while ambitious, it is unlikely it will 
be the harbinger of an EU-style “Pacific Union,” as island leaders are not prepared to 
proceed with deep integration yet.70  The Plan’s most important function is to encourage  
leaders to accept interdependence as the guiding principle of the regional political agenda.  
The most significant outcome is likely to be that regional organisations will be reformed 
to enhance coordination of initiatives that aid national interests, and link regionalism to  
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Figure 5.4: The Pacific Way: 
A Pacific “Vision” 
 
“Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security 
and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. 
 
• We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures, traditions and 
religious beliefs are valued, honoured and developed. 
• We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable 
management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values, and for its defence and 
promotion of human rights. 
• We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to develop our knowledge, to improve 
our communications and to ensure a sustainable economic existence for all.” 
 
– Adopted as a guide to Pacific Islands Forum actions and policies in The Auckland Declaration 
by the Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders’ Retreat, Auckland, New Zealand, 6 April 2004. 
(Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, 2004, p. 8) 
 
Pacific communities, particular attuning the Forum’s activities more to the needs of the 
SIS.71
 
In a bold move, the review has also substantially altered the meaning of the Pacific Way.  
The report affirms the values of the Pacific Way, as it has been understood as an idea that 
there is a Pacific way of doing things that is open to, but different from, the Western 
world, and as a way to find unity and consensus, implying values of honesty, mutual 
respect and tolerance.  However, the review argues that this definition must be broadened 
to reach into communities, and also deal with a sensitive issue for Pacific leaders, failure 
of governance and corruption.  Therefore, the Pacific Way has been imbued with several 
Western liberal values.  It should “denote a style of governance that is respected for its 
inclusiveness, effectiveness and freedom from corruption,” and “be people-centred and 
democratic in spirit.”72  Hence, the Pacific Way is again being touted as a founding 
principle for the new vision for the region adopted by the Forum.  However, it is proposed 
                                                          
71 Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, Pacific Cooperation, Voices of the Pacific, The Eminent 
Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 2004, op cit., p. 8. 
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its meaning should now reflect the new challenges and norms imposed upon its designers; 
again indicating the growing significance of global imperatives as a driving force behind 
the new philosophy of Pacific regionalism. 
 
 
VI. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK APPLIED: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NATURE AND STATE OF PACIFIC 
REGIONALISM 
From this extensive survey, it is apparent that the development of Pacific regionalism can 
be divided approximately into three phases.  The first is the era of cooperation where the 
metropolitan powers led regional cooperation initiatives in order to manage the 
decolonisation of the Pacific.  However, the mechanisms for regionalism under this model 
laid the foundations for the era of self-determination, where Pacific Islanders began to 
construct their own regional institutions, and the Pacific Way was articulated as a regional 
approach to cooperation, to constitute a Pacific identity.  Next, as Fry argues, an era of 
“collective diplomacy” became the modus operandi of Pacific regionalism, as the South 
Pacific Forum became the nexus of regional cooperation as the majority of Pacific island 
states became independent.  Finally, as the politics of donor relations with the Pacific has 
forced globalisation and reform onto the agenda of the PICs, Pacific regional cooperation 
is being subjected to a much stricter rule-based regime, where Pacific Islanders are called 
upon to make sacrifices in order to participate with the Western world. 
 
If the categories outlined in Figure 2.3 are applied to the Pacific, it is possible to make the 
following observations about the political economy of Pacific regionalism, expanded and 
summarised in Figure 5.5.  The first point to stress is that the PICs are not attempting 
political integration in the sense of transferring power to a supra-national authority or 
creating a federation.  In this sense it resembles the regional arrangements based on 
economic integration typical of developing world integration schemes.  However, what 
appears to be distinctly different about Pacific regional cooperation, from the empirical 
record, is that Pacific Islanders have not been concerned with economic integration as a 
strategy for cooperation.  For Pacific island leaders, it appears that other factors such as  
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Figure 5.5: Political Economy Framework Applied to  
Contemporary Pacific Regional Cooperation 
Actors Real Names Theoretical Application Nature and State of Integration 
Endogenous Factors 
Regional 
Integration 
Scheme(s) 
 
(Member 
States) 
 
Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF) 
 
 
Pacific Community 
(SPC) 
Functional integration – 
rejection of economic 
integration 
 
2003, economic integration 
Regional cooperation in specific 
sectors; 
Seeks consensus, avoids highly 
political projects; 
National interests advanced 
through collective action – lack of 
general ‘regional interest’ 
Non-Political, but 
2003, positive steps to economic 
integration – PICTA & PACER 
ratified 
Regional 
Hegemon 
(Paymaster) 
Fiji 
 
Papua New Guinea 
Benefits accrue to stronger 
poles of growth and MDCs 
in regional integration 
schemes 
Distribution of host site of 
regional institutions a key 
indicator 
Fiji led Forum initiatives; 
Appropriated institutions; 
Central location; 
Most natural resources in Fiji and 
PNG 
Exogenous Factors 
Regional 
Powers 
Australia 
 
New Zealand 
Are full members of regional 
cooperation schemes; 
Involved in provision of aid and 
technical expertise; 
Fund regional initiatives 
Have attempted to play role of 
regional hegemon, but limited by 
traditional island consensus politics 
Stimulate neoliberal reform – rules-
based compliance regime for PICs 
Hemispheric 
and Global 
Powers 
Post-Forum Dialogue 
partners 
 
Non-regional members 
of SPC 
 
OCT Parent states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence the costs and 
benefits to individual states 
and to regional 
organisations of particular 
regional policies or 
projects; 
Policy agenda setting; 
Facilitate viability of 
regionalism 
 
Possess formal institutional 
architecture for consultation with 
regional decision-making bodies; 
Fund regional cooperation 
initiatives; 
Bilateral aid; 
Bilateral trade agreements (eg. in 
Fisheries) 
Stimulate neoliberal reform – rules-
based compliance regime for PICs 
Non-State 
Actors 
Civil Society 
 
Private Sector 
Neofunctionalism; rational 
market forces; regional 
transaction; 
“Good 
governance”/Democratic 
accountability agenda 
Generally little engagement; 
Regional Negotiating Mechanism 
e.g. Regional Trade Facilitation 
Programme 
Forum Dialogue Meeting 
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perceived cultural affinity, shared historical experience, aspirations for political and 
economic viability as well as the collective rejection of neo-colonialism have been more 
important rationale for cooperation than the imperative for economic integration.73  The 
SPC is still limited to technical matters, and the architects of the Forum strongly rejected 
an economic union as a model of cooperation for the reasons outlined earlier.  Economic 
integration as a strategy for self-reliance among small islands is nonsense if the peculiar 
constraints imposed by being small prevent states from realising the benefits of 
economies of scale.  Furthermore, experiments in regional cooperation in commercial 
endeavours, such as Air Pacific and to a lesser extent the PFL demonstrate that the costs 
to national interests and rivalry among PICs has been a strong disincentive to commit to 
comprehensive integration schemes.  Indeed, as stressed, the participation of donors and 
the key role played by New Zealand and Australia is vital for the effective functioning of 
the Forum and regional programmes, which also mean their priorities and concerns form 
part of the equation in the regional mix of island state concerns.  Therefore, to use the 
terminology developed earlier, it may be concluded that Pacific regional cooperation has 
been, to date, generally typified by less comprehensive ‘non-integration.’  On Nye’s 
typology of integration, the Pacific probably can be characterised as a “fairly effective 
degree of limited functional cooperation,” where the costs to national interests are 
limited.74
 
It was earlier hypothesised that a linked expansive-distributive dependency reducing 
programme for regional policy packages is the most effective integration scheme for 
development, because of the positive relationship between comprehensive measures and 
functioning of a regional integration scheme.  In the Pacific comprehensiveness has not 
been a barrier to functionality, since limited functional integration has been the 
predominant mechanism of expansive integration.  Instead, the distributive mechanism of 
cooperation has often been the location of regional institutions, as the phenomenon of the 
“Fiji hijack” draws illustrates.  Regional cooperation has endured where other more 
comprehensive schemes, such as in the Caribbean, have suffered from divisions between 
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the MDCs and LDCs.75  In the Pacific, this kind of polarisation of the distribution of 
benefits has been lessened because economic integration was rejected and collective 
diplomacy was adopted.  The Forum placed emphasis on commitment to regional 
schemes that involved a minimal sacrifice of sovereignty, in fact promoting projects that 
would serve joint national interests, as opposed to subsuming national designs into a 
general regional interest.  This is why a term like collective diplomacy accurately 
captures the essence of Pacific regionalism, since regional action has been aimed at 
collective projects which were intended to recast the relationship between the region and 
the rest of the world in the PICs favour, rather than trying to construct an expansive 
integration scheme that would have required significant redistributive mechanisms.  
Certainly, in the formative years of independent Pacific regionalism, cooperation would 
have most likely collapsed under such heavy demands.  In other words, the PICs did not 
accept the prevailing wisdom for comprehensive integration, but instead elected to move 
regionalism forward by pursuing workable forms of cooperation in specific sectors that 
have brought benefits to most participants and which do not represent a huge cost to 
national interests. 
 
Nevertheless, a regional paymaster has emerged in the guise of Fiji, with some 
competition from PNG, which has polarised perceptions about the benefits of functional 
cooperation.  Furthermore, the cleavages between big and small states and the salience of 
culture area regionalism have prevented a strong regional interest developing from below 
in the Pacific.  Regional cooperation has undoubtedly been a ‘revolution from above.’  
Fortunately, donor support of regionalism has reduced the possibilities of controversy 
about how the costs of cooperation should be distributed. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
To summarise then, it is possible to say that the kind of cooperation which has occurred in 
the Pacific has been based primarily on limited sectoral integration in areas of mutual 
benefit to PICs through loose intergovernmental fora; primarily through the aegis of the 
PIF and the SPC.  Because islanders have preferred collective diplomacy as a strategy for 
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development, the idea that the Pacific Way is a unique contribution to integration theory 
is perhaps flawed, as islanders have specifically avoided areas of politically intense 
cooperation to work on areas where consensus is easy to achieve.  Therefore, in relation 
to the political economy framework, the regional policy packages that have been adopted 
in the Pacific may still be categorised as expansive, and generally aimed at dependency 
reduction, but the limited comprehensiveness of Pacific regionalism means that it is not a 
case of a linked expansive-distributive integration scheme.  The peculiar mix of limited 
functional cooperation and the permeable boundaries between regional member states and 
exogenous influences from outside powers on regionalism has produced the illusion of 
deep integration, when in fact Pacific regionalism, has been casual in its organisation.  
However, all of these assumptions are open to debate, as the global imperatives of 
regional reform agenda imposes a new set of rules from above for regional cooperation, 
and the Eminent Persons’ Review has articulated an agenda for more intensive integration 
in the Pacific.  These new strategies will politicise cooperation as integration advances 
towards the upper end of the comprehensiveness scale, testing the balance between the 
‘traditional’ political forms of regional cooperation and challenge of participating in the 
global political economy.  It is to such technical concerns that attention turns to next. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Challenges to the post-Cotonou Agreement Process 
in the Pacific: 
The Potential for Island Economic Integration and EPAs 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thus far, the macro historical processes that have shaped how the Pacific has been 
defined as a region have been the focus of investigation.  The previous chapter confirmed 
the most potent strategy for regional cooperation in the Pacific is when national interests 
are maximised; otherwise political consensus for integration may dissipate.  It was also 
noted that the Forum has consistently rejected economic integration schemes and instead 
pursued a strategy of limited functional integration in specific areas of mutual interest, 
and has relied substantially on the involvement of regional and global powers to help 
sustain cooperation, to alleviate the pressures of regional integration.  These features 
perhaps make Pacific regionalism distinctive from other integration initiatives in the 
Caribbean and Africa, which have stressed economic integration.  However, the post-
Cotonou negotiations to conclude regional Economic Partnership Agreements, and not 
least of all the local PICTA and PACER agreements, over the next decade, have assigned 
Pacific regionalism with the task that was dismissed for so long: the construction of a 
Free Trade Area as a keystone of closer regional union.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
assess whether the Pacific has the potential for deeper economic integration, particularly 
with respect to the region-to-region model embodied in the EPA framework, as this 
invokes an intense range of legal compatibility issues with WTO rules on regional trade 
areas.  The lack of deep regional integration in the Pacific and the particular demands of 
integration among small island developing states perhaps suggests the Pacific EPA 
process is an example of EU “pseudo policy,” where decisions are made based on 
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insufficient knowledge for their actual enactment.1  To phrase the problem another way, 
although regionalism and regional economic integration are touted as weapons against the 
challenges of globalisation, is the EU applying regionalism as a solution to development 
purely because it is an area in which it possesses comparative advantage?  Consequently, 
the relevance of the Pacific to Europe and the physical capacity of the region to trade are 
subsequent points which question the validity of a Pacific EPA. 
 
Thus, this chapter is designed to examine the technical ‘mechanics’ of economic 
integration in the Pacific, utilising and extending the theoretical discussion of economic 
cooperation developed in Chapter Two.  Hence, the first section of the chapter will more 
clearly define the rationale and controversy surrounding EPAs.  The ACP regions and the 
EU together face tensions involved with reconciling the compatibility of region-to-region 
FTAs with the multilateral free trade framework, while recognising the special needs of 
the ACP LDCs included under Cotonou.  Consequently, Pacific EPA negotiations must 
take account of the technical feasibility of the model under WTO GATT Article XXIV 
rules for Regional Trade Agreements (RTA).  The following section turns to discussion of 
economic integration in the Pacific.  Of particular interest is whether trade preferences 
offer sustainable value to the region, since they have been a significant factor in 
expanding PIC industry and trade.  While the Lomé Convention is relevant, consideration 
of the SPARTECA agreement is also essential.  However, since it is already assumed that 
a Pacific FTA will be established, with the ratification of PICTA in April 2003, the 
academic question of whether or not an FTA should be constructed in the region is a moot 
point.  Instead, it may be more relevant to evaluate what form an FTA might take in the 
Pacific so that the detrimental impact of free trade is minimised for these small island 
developing states.  In this way, both the extent that the Pacific represents an economic 
region and the applicability of an EPA can be evaluated.  Moreover, the Pacific case 
should illustrate that although EPAs utilise trade and economic integration as a vehicle for 
development, the implications of such agreements are not limited to economic matters. 
 
 
                                                          
1 G. Gustafson, (1983), 'Symbolic and Pseudo Policies as Responses to Diffusion of Power', Policy 
Sciences, Vol. 15, pp. 269-287p. 276, cited in Holland, Martin, (1987), 'Understanding European Political 
Cooperation', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 25, pp. 307-08. 
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II. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS  
1. The Commission’s Rationale for Regional Partnerships 
In Chapter One, it was described how the Cotonou reforms affirmed regionalism as the 
basic unit of future EU-ACP relations.  Consequently, Economic Partnership Agreements 
have become the Commission’s preferred vehicle for cooperation in trade.  The EPAs 
have entrenched the model of region-to-region reciprocal trade spelt out in the 1996 
Green Paper.  The requirement for reciprocity is the natural interpretation of the 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV, which among other conditions, refers to elimination 
of barriers to “substantially all trade” between the members of an RTA (Figure 6.1).2  The 
EPAs will allow EU-ACP trade relations to be compliant with WTO rules on reciprocal 
trade, and will simplify the framework for managing the partnership by dealing with 
regions, rather than bilateral relations with each ACP state.  For the PACP, it would be to 
their advantage if reciprocity was not required, but strategies of non-reciprocal trade have 
become difficult to justify for the EU, which means, like the Cotonou reforms themselves, 
the EPAs are not just about trade. 
 
The EPAs are outlined as one of the key components of the Commission’s development 
strategy,3 in relation to the EU’s own trade regime of region-to-region agreements with 
groups of developing countries, including Mercosur, Latin America and the 
Mediterranean (Table 6.1).  Trade related assistance will be executed at the regional level,  
                                                          
2 Robert Scollay, (2002), Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
with the European Union, A Report for ACP Secretariat and the Pacific ACP States, 28 2002, ACP-EU 
Trade Relations, available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/documents/Scollay%202002%20-
%20Pacific%20EPA%20Impact%20study.pdf, accessed August 2003, p. 8. 
3 The Commission’s philosophy of development, fostering sustainable, growth and poverty reduction, 
through regional integration and free trade, was addressed specifically in the its Communication to the 
Council and the European Parliament in September 2002, entitled Trade and Development, Assisting 
Developing Countries to Benefit from Trade.  The Commission considers that although developing 
countries have increased their share of world trade, through such mechanisms as the Lomé preferences, they 
are lagging behind because their exports are concentrated in a limited number of products, they have 
unskilled labour forces, and most skilled labour is employed in the low-assemblage stages of international 
production, where value-added benefits accrue offshore.  Drawing on analysis from the World Bank, the 
Commission argues that higher levels of participation in international trade and investment, as well as a 
strong emphasis on education and institutional development will create stronger human capital and 
therefore country-owned strategies that will achieve the TEU objective of poverty reduction.  World Bank, 
(2002), Globalisation, Growth and Poverty, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
/The World Bank, Washington DC and Dani Rodrik, (2002), 'Trade Policy Reform as Institutional Reform', 
in World Bank (ed.), Development, Trade and the WTO - A Handbook, The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington DC, cited in Commission of the European 
Communities, (2002), Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: Assisting Countries to 
Benefit from Trade, COM(2002) 513 final, 18 September, European Community, Brussels, p. 10. 
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Table 6.1:  Typology of EU Regional Trade Agreements 
Type of Trade Regime Name of Agreement Countries Involved 
Single Market European Economic Area 
(EEA) 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway 
Customs Union  Turkey, Andorra, San Marino 
Free Trade Areas  
 
 
 
e.g. Switzerland, Israel, South 
Africa, Mexcio, Chile, 
Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority 
 
South-South-North ‘WTO-
plus’ regional Free Trade 
Agreements 
Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) 
ACP regions 
 
Mercosur 
Partnership & Cooperation 
Agreements (MFN Treatment) 
 Russia 
(prior to enlargement on 1 
May 2004, also included 
former Soviet republics) 
Non-reciprocal: contractual 
preferences 
Mediterranean agreements 
Lomé Conventions 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria 
ACP 
Non-reciprocal: autonomous 
preferences 
Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) 
 
Other developing countries & 
members of CIS; Albania, 
Bosnia 
Purely MFN treatment  Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, Japan, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, United 
States, Korea 
Source: Based on Lamy, 2002, p. 1404. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Provisions of GATT Articles XXIV:8(b) and XXXVI:8 
Relevant to EU-ACP Relations 
GATT Article XXIV:8(b) 
‘A free trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which 
the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories’; 
 
GATT Article XXXVI:8 
‘The developed contracting countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed 
contracting parties’. 
 
Explanatory Note: As this provision does not sanction discrimination between “less-developed 
contracting parties,” it may be held that non-discrimination is implicitly assumed.  In this case, an 
FTA or CU with a group of developing countries which discriminates against other DCs would 
not be sanctioned.  Hence, this explains the requirement for EPAs to be compatible with Article 
XXIV in the absence of flexibility provisions. 
Source: cited in Onguglo and Ito, 2003, p. 13 & Scollay, 2002, p. 8. 
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“whenever appropriate,” to complement and reinforce activities at the national level.  
Together, these EU activities introduce a “South-South-North” approach to integration.  
In the first instance, the EU defines South-South integration as the idea that RTAs formed 
among the DCs will allow them to reap the benefits of scale economies and efficiency, 
described by Vinerian Customs Union theory, as well as increasing their attractiveness to 
Foreign Direct Investment, to stimulate competition among peers, to secure greater 
bargaining power, and to consolidate peace and security.  The EU sees this as a way to 
deal with the problems of small economies and the general vulnerability of developing 
states, as well as to provide an incentive to form, or perhaps to lock states into, regional 
solutions to common political and institutional problems, where convergence may save 
resources and enhance responses, in the areas mentioned above.4  South-South integration 
should more easily lead to deeper integration with the North, as developed and 
developing world economies mutually open.  Additional benefits include the “locking in” 
of reforms, technology transfers and stability of market access.  In theory then, this 
rationale should be a profitable strategy for the PICs to apply.  However, in general, the 
potential of South-South-North integration may not be realised, because of the need to 
reform governance and policy in DCs, as well as addressing regional security problems.  
These issues are no less relevant in the Pacific. 
 
2. Economic Partnership Agreements Explained 
(i) The EPA Framework 
Hence, the Commission has defended its rationale that the developing world can benefit 
from regional integration, but how will EPAs specifically realise this general European 
vision?  The Cotonou Agreement is not a trade agreement.  It only went so far as to 
describe in detail the form and timetable for concluding future trade agreements.  The 
specifics of the trade partnership have been left to be worked out in the region-to-region 
negotiations, which must be completed by 1 January 2008, when the seven year window, 
or transition period, allowed by the WTO in 2001 for EPA negotiations, expires.  Except 
for with the PACP, this phase of negotiations commenced between the EU and the ACP 
between October 2003 and April 2004, following immediately after the premature 
conclusion, in September 2003, of the first phase of EU-ACP wide negotiations of the 
                                                          
4 Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Assisting Countries to Benefit from Trade, op cit., p. 24. 
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guidelines for regional EPA talks; one year after the PCP began.5  Consequently, the 
fundamental principles of the EPAs reflect the balancing act which the Commission is 
playing to satisfy most parties which have a stake in the PCP.  They are described below. 
 
(i) Partnership: Firstly, as their name implies EPAs are fundamentally about 
partnership, reaffirming the symbolism of associationism in EU-ACP relations.  
Although the North-South nature of regional negotiations retains an asymmetric power 
relationship, mutual obligations have nevertheless been reformulated to tackle trade 
barriers primarily in the ACP.  However, since 99 per cent of all ACP exports now 
have tariff and quota free access, the burden of liberalisation does not fall to Europe.  
This is because the nature of the partnership is now firmly reciprocal.  The EPAs 
require the ACP states to transform their individual trade preferences granted by 
Europe into FTAs, or else the 40 year EU-ACP partnership may cease to exist. 
 
(ii) Flexibility: Flexibility is the second principle, which acknowledges that the EPAs, 
as WTO-plus FTAs, serve a development function, for sustainable development and 
poverty reduction in appreciation of the constraints on ACP economies to complete 
liberalisation.  Differentiation is also at the core of flexibility, as it will allow the 
Commission to apply Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) to take into account 
the different development levels of partners with respect to the timetable for 
implementation of tariff reductions or how quickly certain economic sectors will be 
included.  Somewhat paradoxically, the 39 ACP LDCs, as defined by the UN Human 
Development Index, are not required to sign an EPA.  Instead they can choose to keep 
their existing level of access.  Flexibility and differentiation may potentially 
complicate the regional integration process, by treating countries belonging to the 
same region differently.  In the Pacific, Cotonou classifies five states as LDCs and 
seven are also given special treatment under the provisions for island states (Articles 
85 & 89) (Table 6.2). 
 
 
                                                          
5 The European Commission and the ACP published a Joint Declaration in October that established 
guidelines for phase II of EPA negotiations, but failed to reach complete consensus with the ACP over 
several issues relating to WTO compatibility.  See Eurostep, (2003), 'EU Gears up for Free Trade 
Negotiations with West Africa and Central Africa without Having Met the Request of ACP for Binding 
Outcome of First Phase of ACP-EU Negotiations', Proactive File, No. 328, 26 September. 
 149
Table 6.2: Pacific ACP States Classified as 
Island or Least-Developed Countries 
(Cotonou Agreement, Annex VI) 
Island and LDC 
ACP State status 
Island ACP State status only 
 - MDC PACP states 
No Official ACP status under 
Cotonou – PACP states 
acceded 2000 or later 
Kiribati 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
 
Fiji 
Papua New Guinea 
Tonga 
FSM 
RMI 
Palau 
Niue 
Cook Islands 
Nauru 
East Timor 
Note also excluded French OCTs – New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna.  
The former two would most likely be treated as Island states under Cotonou. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 158 
 
(iii) Regionalism: Although the Commission still considers the possibility of 
negotiating with individual countries that are eligible to join EPAs, the EU’s 
preference is to negotiate partnership agreements with regional integration schemes in 
each ACP region.6  Among other challenges, each ACP region must begin the process 
of economic integration amongs.  If an economic integration scheme does not exist or 
is failing to liberalise, the Commission would be unlikely to begin EPA negotiations 
with that particular regional entity, and according to Article 37.6 of Cotonou, would 
consider the best alternative arrangements for states unable or unwilling to negotiate an 
EPA.7  This is because the Commission wishes to deal with regional integration 
schemes that are moving towards advanced stages of cooperation.  In the Pacific, 
Cotonou has increased the salience of integration.8  As yet, no states in the ACP have 
opted to negotiate with the EU bilaterally, or sub-regionally.  However, this point will 
be returned to in discussion of the outcome of PACP-EU EPA negotiations. 
 
(iv) Link to the WTO: Finally, as EPAs will take into account the results of the Doha 
Development Agenda in 2005, the EPAs assume WTO rules as a floor.  This is 
                                                          
6 For instance, the 1996 Green Paper only mentioned “Regional Economic Partnership Agreements,” but the 
Cotonou Agreement dropped the word ‘regional,’ so as not to rule out other possibilities in concession to 
the ACP.  Stefan Szepesi, (2003), Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries and Trade Negotiations with the European Union, Masters Thesis, Maastricht University, p. 8; 
Sanoussi Bilal, (2002), The Future of ACP–EU Trade Relations: An Overview of the Forthcoming 
Negotiations, February, Economic Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, accessed at 
http://www.ecdpm.org, 18 March 2004. 
7 Szepesi, Preparing for the Inevitable? The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries and Trade 
Negotiations with the European Union, op cit., p. 8. 
8 Malakai Koloamatangi, (2003), 'EU, Cotonou and EPAs: the View from the Pacific Islands', The Courier, 
No. 200, September-October, pp. 14-15. 
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especially important as EPAs shall cover not only trade in goods and agriculture, but 
eventually services and technical barriers to trade, such as sanitary measures, and other 
areas mentioned previously in regulation and competition.9  EPAs, then, are not an end 
in themselves.  However, as the WTO agenda is a key consideration, EPAs must be 
compatible with rules on developing-developed world trade.  How to make EPAs 
WTO compatible will be discussed in relation to possible reform of the WTO 
provisions for RTAs. 
 
Therefore, the positive effects of EPAs are that they should encourage efficient use of aid 
and resources, deepen the integration and trade relationship between the EU and the ACP 
and allow developing economies to experience benefits in growth.  However, EPAs may 
also increase the opportunities for European exporters to ‘dump’ products into ACP 
markets, stand in the way of ACP states diversifying their export markets, and most 
importantly remove valuable revenue raised from tariff liberalisation.  Of most 
significance to the PACP, is that it forces a set of quite disparate ACP states to construct 
an FTA within a telescoped timeframe, prior to 2020. 
 
Like the other ACP states, the PACP will have to be careful not to lose concessions which 
they already possess and they will be stretched by the simultaneous demands of EU 
negotiations, inter-regional negotiations and the completion of the Doha round of 
negotiations in the WTO.  It should also be readily apparent from this survey of the 
philosophy of EPAs that the fulcrum for the viability of regional integration as a 
development strategy for the EU is the health and the progress towards economic 
integration of the particular regional integration scheme subject to an EPA.  However, the 
EPA template implies that certain regions where integration is weak are compelled 
toward closer union.  Therefore EPAs represent both the carrot and the stick in EU 
development policy, and will require a significant amount of political will to achieve their 
broad objectives.  That the second phase of negotiations is under way shows the desire is 
strong to maintain the partnership, but a question remains how well ACP regions can 
manage the tensions of integration. 
 
 
                                                          
9 Sanoussi Bilal, (2002), Implications of the Doha Development Agenda on the EPA Negotiations, 
COMESA Secretariat, Lusaka, Zambia, accessed at http://www.eu-acp-trade.org, 18 March 2004, p. 2. 
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(ii) Alternatives to EPAs 
Given the asymmetric character of EU-ACP relations and the Cotonou negotiations in 
general, acceptance of reciprocity was perhaps the only feasible option left open to the 
ACP, in order to keep at least a margin of preference, in relation to non-ACP states; and 
to keep future possibilities to negotiate alternative trade arrangements open.10  This 
strategy may be particularly relevant in the context of the Pacific, where trade volumes 
with Europe are not significant, and preferences will be necessary during the transition to 
FTAs and RTAs.11  Indeed, the PACP and its sister ACP regions are caught between a 
rock and a hard place.  Options outside of EPAs which are WTO compatible do exist, but 
they are not as kind to the ACP (Table 6.3).  Without an EPA, the two most likely 
alternatives are the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or its Everything But 
Arms Initiative (EBA). 
 
Under the GSP, the non-LDC ACP states would receive the same tariff rates as all other 
developing countries that trade with the EU.  The disadvantages of this scheme, besides 
losing the unique status of ACP membership, are that even though the value of trade 
preference has eroded, the tariff and non-tariff reductions and exemptions under the GSP 
are significantly less generous than keeping the Lomé preferences.12  The GSP also 
covers far fewer products, notably excluding ‘sensitive’ agricultural products that have 
zero tariffs under Lomé.  The commodity protocols would also definitely disappear under 
the GSP.  Although, the GSP is an accepted part of the WTO framework, overall it does 
not offer the same security, as the GSP is an offer to the DCs, not a negotiated 
relationship. 
 
Parallel to the EU-ACP reforms, the EU introduced in March 2001 the “Everything But 
Arms” initiative (EBA) to allow non-reciprocal duty free and quota free access to the  
 
                                                          
10 Cf. John Ravenhill, (1993), 'When Weakness Is Strength: The Lomé IV Negotiations', in William 
Zartmann (ed.), Europe and Africa: The New Phase, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado & London analyses 
the asymmetric power imbalance in EU-ACP negotiations and European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, (2001), Cotonou Info Kit, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 
Maastricht, accessed at: http://www.ecdpm.org, 24 February 2003, No. 14. 
11 Roman Grynberg, and Bonapas Onguglo, (2002), A Development Agenda for the Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the EU and the Pacific ACP (PACP) A Concept Paper, EU-Least Developed Countries 
Network, accessed at http://www.eu-ldc.org/downloads/PACP.doc, April 2003. 
12 Michael Davenport, , (2002), Preliminary Analysis of Certain Issues for an ACP Position in Post-Cotonou 
Negotiations, in particular WTO-Compatibility and the New EU GSP Scheme, September, Economic 
Affairs Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat, accessed at: http:www.eu-acp-trade.org, 14 July 2003. 
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Table 6.3:  Preferential Trading Schemes and their 
Coverage under WTO Provisions 
 Non-Reciprocal Reciprocal 
Generalised Generalised non-reciprocal 
preferences 
- Enabling Clause 2 (a) and (d) 
- GSP 
- EBA (Special LDC 
preferences) 
Generalised (ie. multilateral) 
reciprocal tariff reduction 
 - GATT I:1 (MFN) and GATT 
XXVIII 
Non-Generalised Non-Generalised non-reciprocal 
preferences 
WTO waiver required 
- ACP-EU Partnership 
(Cotonou) to 2007 
- Fourth Lomé Convention 
- LDC preferences granted by 
developing countries 
Non-Generalised reciprocal 
preferences 
- FTAs, CUs and interim 
arrangements 
- GATT XXIV or Enabling Clause 
2(c) or (d) 
 
 
 
Notes: Options provided under the ACP–EU Partnership Agreement are indicated in italics.  MDCs stands 
for developed country members of a regional trade agreement (FTA or CU); and DCs for developing 
country members. 
* The proposed ‘enhanced GSP option’ may violate the Enabling Clause if preferences are ‘enhanced’ only 
for ACP countries in a discriminatory manner, without being extended to non-ACP developing countries. 
** Special LDC preferences given by developing countries have been granted a GATT waiver (‘Preferential 
Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries’ Decision on Waiver adopted on 15 June 1999 
(WT/L/304)), since coverage of such preferences under the Enabling Clause proved to be contentious. 
Source: Onguglo and Ito, 2003, p. 17. 
 
Table 6.4: GATT/WTO Coverage of 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) by Membership 
Type of RTA GATT/WTO Coverage 
RTAs among developed countries only 
- EU; EFTA 
Article XXIV 
RTAs involving both developed and developing countries 
(“Mixed RTAs”) 
- e.g. EPAs; EU-Morocco; EU-Mercosur; EU-South Africa; 
PACER* 
Article XXIV 
RTAs among developing countries only 
- e.g. Mercosur; Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG); PICTA; 
COMESA: UEMOA 
Enabling Clause 
* Although not specifically a trade agreement, PACERs provisions will in time lead to a mixed 
RTA between the FICs with Australia and New Zealand. 
Source: Based on Onguglo and Ito, 2003, p. 20. 
 
common market for all products except weapons from every LDC.  Conceivably, this is 
an alternative for the 39 ACP LDCs.  Only trade in bananas, sugar and rice will be fully 
liberalised by 2009.  However, the prices under EBA are similar to subsidised domestic 
EU producers, less than under the Commodity Protocols.  Like the GSP, the EBA is also a 
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unilateral offer that could change in the future.  Should an LDC graduate from its status, 
or if exports to the EU rise above normal levels, a Safeguard Clause in the EBA allows 
the EU to withdraw preferences.  The EBA therefore at once destroys the principle that 
geography mattered in defining who was entitled to special preferences, and further 
complicates the implications of “positive differentiation” introduced in Cotonou. 
 
Conceivably, half the ACP could have opted for the status quo.  Instead, as will certainly 
be the case in the Pacific, differentiation will require the regional partnership agreements 
to discriminate against differing levels of development.  They are two concepts which sit 
uncomfortably within the Cotonou framework.  Consequently, which ever way an ACP 
state might turn, structural adjustment is certain, and losses of various kinds are likely, so 
overall it is more rational to belong to the partnership framework.  The implications of the 
GSP and the EBA offer an explanation for why none of the ACP regions have thus far 
dissented from the regional EPA model for negotiations.  However, if the PACP/FICs 
cannot negotiate an EPA, then ‘alternative trade agreements,’ which the Commission will 
review the possible scenarios for in 2004 for non-LDCs, might result in a different 
partnership agreements to the EPA template.  Yet, it has already been demonstrated that 
the two existing alternatives for the PACP states will not facilitate the continuation of the 
EU-ACP relationship. 
 
In order to preserve the advantages of a comprehensive trade and development 
partnership, a compromise will have to be found within the EPA architecture, but this will 
require that the liberalisation is managed in a way which acknowledges the PACP states 
need for flexibility in the context of Article XXIV (Table 6.4).  Therefore, the remainder 
of the chapter will investigate the political economy of EPAs with respect to technical 
compatibility in the WTO and how the model of South-South-North integration might be 
adapted to meet the specific needs of islanders. 
 
 
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EPAs: WTO COMPATIBILITY 
Recalling the political-economy framework developed and applied so far, a significant 
question to consider regarding the Pacific PCP is how an EPA could contribute towards 
the creation of a linked expansive-distributive integration scheme, since it was concluded 
this was the ideal model of integration for developing states.  Consequently, if a North-
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South trade agreement such as an EPA is to fulfil its mandate to have a positive impact on 
both development and economic growth, expansive trade liberalisation measures must 
first of all be compatible with WTO rules, so as to avoid accusations of illegality from 
other members. 
 
1. How to Make EPAs WTO Compatible: Issues and Prospects 
In October in the Joint Declaration issued at the conclusion of the first phase of EPA 
negotiations, the EU and the ACP delivered the following statement on WTO 
compatibility: 
 
“There has been convergence of views that EPAs must be compatible with WTO rules 
prevailing and will need to take account of the evolutionary nature of relevant WTO rules.” 
(Eurostep, Proactive File, No. 330) 
 
This acknowledges that the fundamental context of EPAs is the WTO process, since the 
ACP will seek flexibility and special treatment for EPAs to respect the WTO reform 
agenda to avoid difficulties with immediate liberalisation and reciprocity.  However, the 
Doha WTO Ministerial, in November 2001, launched plans to substantially redraft the 
rules affecting developing countries, parallel to the EPA process.  This creates 
uncertainties for both sides, which have to ensure trade agreements are non-
discriminatory before the Doha programme is concluded in 2005.  GATT Articles I and 
XXIV were introduced in Chapter One.  As well as continuation of commodity protocols, 
the most important subject on the agenda for the EPA negotiations is clarification of the 
provisions for developing countries under Article XXIV.  Consequently, it is necessary to 
elaborate on why RTAs (FTAs and Customs Unions, for example) are considered as 
distortions of the non-discrimination principle in free trade. 
 
Although GATT Article I is sacrosanct, RTAs are acceptable to the WTO if they aim to 
lower trade barriers among a limited number of members.  This ensures that regional 
agreements are not adopted by countries as a shield against liberalisation, but rewards 
those with a genuine desire to integrate.  Although RTAs can be stepping stones to 
multilateral free trade, they are by nature discriminatory.  RTA rules under GATT Article 
XXIV are designed to bring benefits to signatory countries, but within the MFN 
framework that prevents South-South RTAs from forming protectionist blocs against the 
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rest of the world, which might actually lower welfare for the bloc.  If the member states 
continue to import from excluded countries, keeping domestic prices the same, this would 
stifle trade creation, but a welfare loss would also be incurred from increasing trade 
diversion, as members remove barriers within their borders away from cheaper external 
imported goods.13  With the proliferation of RTAs, over-lapping membership can also 
complicate trade relations with third countries.  Hence, if RTAs are not monitored 
through a multilateral framework the risk of distortions in regional markets could 
dramatically increase, as well as problems in implementation, where there are conflicts 
between countries with interests in more than one regional integration scheme.14  As 
such, the benefits of RTAs can be ambiguous, especially if internal distortions also 
undercut their regional economic impact.  A triple condition in GATT Article XXIV 
regulates regional agreements.  The criteria are: 
 
• RTAs must lead to an increase in the overall protection of the region against third 
countries. 
• They must cover “substantially all trade” (and not exclude ‘sensitive’ products) 
(paragraph 8 (b)). 
• They must be established “within a reasonable period of time” (paragraph 5 (c)). 
 
Similarly, the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V sets out the 
rules for trade in services in FTAs (Figure 6.2).  In 1979, the GATT signatories decided to 
allow derogations to the MFN clause in the treatment of developing countries.  This was 
called the Enabling Clause.  It too continues to apply as part of GATT 1994 under the 
WTO.  The clause permits preferential trading agreements among developing countries.  
In particular, paragraph 2(c) allows preferential trade in goods.  Even though an 
‘Understanding’ on RTAs was reached during the Uruguay Round in 1994, there are a 
range of topics to be resolved, made contentious by their ill-definition.  These include 
product coverage, the length of the transition time, and even the adoption of an agreed 
                                                          
13 Maurice Schiff, (2002), Regional Integration and Development in Small States, F1, The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Development Research Group, Washington 
DC, accessed at: http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/biblio_regionalintegration.php, 24 July 2003, pp. 7-8. 
14 World Trade Organisation, (2004), Regional Trade Agreements: Scope of RTAs, Washington DC, 
accessed at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm, 6 April 2004. 
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definition of an RTA.  Clarification of these points would help determine whether EPAs 
should be notified under the Enabling Clause or Article XXIV.15
 
Figure 6.2: GATS Article V 
Economic Integration in Services and Provisions for Flexibility 
 
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or entering into an 
agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an agreement, 
provided that such an agreement: 
 
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage(1), and  
 
(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination…through: 
 
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
 
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame… 
 
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met, consideration may be given 
to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade 
liberalization among the countries concerned. 
 
3.(a) Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to in paragraph 
1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out in paragraph 1, particularly 
with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in accordance with the level of development of the 
countries concerned, both overall and in individual sectors and sub sectors. 
Source: World Trade Organisation, 2004. 
 
 
                                                          
15 The EU is content with conventional interpretations of WTO standards.  The Understanding clarified a 
“reasonable length of time” to mean a maximum of 10 years to establish an FTA or a CU.  The Joint 
Declaration confirmed that the standard originally established by the EU-South Africa FTA, of 90 per cent 
all of trade, without exclusion of any significant sector is still flexible enough for EPA negotiations.  
However, the measure of trade is not defined; or which proportion of trade should be liberalised between 
parties, for example in terms of tariff lines or volume.  Davenport (2002, 11) also questioned how 
worthwhile pursuit of this magic figure was, since if tariffs on sensitive products are set high enough trade 
will fall to negligible levels and the remaining trade in goods is probably of less consequence.  More 
fundamentally a definition of what constitutes an RTA has not been reached because WTO members which 
are party to RTAs obviously do not wish to condemn their own agreements as inconsistent with 
international obligations.  However, if it is not attempted then it will be difficult for EPAs to fulfil 
development function, if the rules on FTAs and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) are not explicitly 
differentiated.  The fundamental conclusion though, is that with the advent of the Doha round, which for the 
first time links development issues into trade negotiations, there is the opportunity to reform and clarify the 
rules that deal with compatibility of RTAs with MFN, so that a balance can be struck between flexibility 
and liberalisation. See Theodore H Cohn, , (2000), Global Political Economy, Theory and Practice, 
Longman, New York, p. 248-49; Szepesi (2003) op cit., p. 9.  Cf. Sam Laird, , (2002), 'A Round by Any 
Other Name: The WTO Agenda After Doha', Development Policy Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 41-62, pp. 
52-53. 
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2. The Paradoxes of Flexibility and Reciprocity for WTO Compatibility 
How might these dilemmas be resolved?  The Doha Ministerial Declaration gives the 
ACP the unique opportunity to engage in negotiations to introduce reforms that address 
their specific trade and development interests in the formation of EPAs, because RTA 
reform is subject to the Doha work programme.16  The Doha Declaration provides for 
“negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the 
existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements.”17  As discussed at 
length, the ACP states need policy flexibility to adjust their economies to benefit from 
freer trade.  However, as EPAs are intended to create FTAs involving the EU as well, to 
be legal against WTO standards they must be notified to the WTO under Article XXIV.  
Unfortunately, as shown, Article XXIV does not have a clause dealing with SDT for 
RTAs involving developing countries.  In other words, the provisions for SDT contained 
in Part IV of GATT cannot be applied to the EPAs as they were to the Yaoundé and 
Lomé Conventions.  Reciprocity once sought cannot be waived.18  Furthermore, at the 
moment, North-South RTAs cannot be notified under the Enabling Clause, as this is 
intended to benefit only South-South arrangements.  Thus, at present there is no provision 
for RTAs between developed and developing countries so that they can comply with 
Article XXIV, except for the vague interpretations used until now.  ‘De facto flexibility’ 
is no longer appropriate protection for EPAs against challenge in the WTO.  Thus, there is 
a strong case for reform to render flexibility, the code word for SDT, to North-South 
RTAs.  Onguglo and Ito (2003), and also Bilal (2002), have identified three possible 
options for reform: 
 
(i) Reform of Article XXIV to introduce flexibility. 
(ii) Reform Part IV of GATT 
(iii) Reform the Enabling Clause. 
                                                          
16 The Doha negotiating agenda consists of seven key items: implementation, by 1 January 2005; 
agriculture; services; market access for non-agricultural products; trade and the environment.  It gives the 
opportunity for DCs to work collectively in the WTO to seek more balanced treatment of these issues which 
concern them, and to address the asymmetries towards developed countries in the initial WTO agreement at 
Uruguay.  A. Panagariya, (2002a), 'Developing Countries at Doha a Political Economy Analysis', The 
World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 9, p. 1210 & pp. 1230-32. 
17 World Trade Organisation, (2001), Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, 
Washington DC, accessed at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#rules, 30 April 2004, paragraph 29. 
18 Bonapas Onguglo and Taisuke Ito, (2003), How to Make EPAs WTO Compatible? Reforming the Rules 
on Regional Trade Agreements, (ECDPM Discussion Paper 40), 17 September, European Centre for 
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Reform of the Enabling Clause might seem a technically simple solution, as it would only 
involve extending the scope of the clause to encompass South-South-North RTAs.  This 
would ensure maximum flexibility for DCs and exclude EPAs from scrutiny under Article 
XXIV.  However, the Enabling Clause has been under a cloud of doubt with challenges 
from some WTO members, and incorporation of North-South RTAs under the Clause 
might threaten the validity of unilateral preferences under the GSP as well as South-South 
RTAs.  The EPA process relies on building partnerships with established regional 
integration schemes.  If the Enabling Clause is threatened, then it is to the detriment of 
mixed member FTAs.  More importantly, this option could not guarantee reciprocity from 
developed parties to the RTA.  Secondly, reform of Part IV would mean introducing an 
amendment to make it possible to apply non-reciprocity granted in multilateral 
negotiations to a regional context.  This is highly unrealistic.  Article XXXVI:8 in Part IV 
which covers this is applicable to multilateral trade negotiations, and could hardly be 
applied to the operation of RTAs. 
 
Thus, the strongest option is to revise and alter Articles XXIV:5(c) and 8(a) and (b) to 
allow flexibility for DCs.  Without these specific modifications, ad hoc interpretations 
would have to be sought.19  To accomplish this, interpretation and operation of flexibility 
would have to be explored, so that the “substantially all trade” requirement results in a 
lesser degree of market openness.  In this way, intra-regional trade can be protected for an 
adequate time period, possibly requiring a longer transition time than 10 years.  
Furthermore, a precedent for introducing SDT into Article XXIV exists, as a paragraph 
similar to the provisions on flexibility in GATS V:3(a) could be adopted.  However, the 
content of EPAs is also dependent on the outcome of Doha, in which case there is some 
uncertainty with respect to the form and level of regional flexibility needed for ACP 
states, unless agreed prior to the conclusion of Doha.20  Otherwise differences between 
the two negotiation outcomes, in timeframe or product coverage, would have to be re-
evaluated in the WTO for EPAs. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at: http://www.ecdpm.org/, 29 October 
2003, pp. 6-7. 
19 ibid., pp. 66-69. 
20 ibid., p. 32. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Hence, major conformity issues confront the PACP/FIC states in the context of EU-ACP 
negotiations.  To cooperate in this intense legal environment with the EU will require a 
deep commitment to integration in the Pacific.  This can work to the PACP states’ 
advantage if an FTA is part of a wide-ranging policy package that tackles the problems 
raised by reciprocal trade in vulnerable economies.  A Pacific FTA, even if driven by 
political imperatives, must have a development edge.  The extent to which the PACP can 
construct a reciprocal trade agreement with Europe will determine whether rules relating 
to preferential trade or free trade will shape the revised EU-PACP partnership.  In other 
words, the issue at stake is whether an EPA, an “alternative trade agreement,” or a hybrid 
model will form the basis for partnership in the Pacific, since the desire for partnership is 
perhaps greater than the rationale that reciprocal free trade is the optimal development 
strategy for the Pacific.21  If not, this raises the possibility that the EU-PACP partnership 
may have to be concluded under the provisions of Article 37.6 of Cotonou, which leaves 
the option of alternatives to EPAs open, but gives the Commission discretion over its 
form (Figure 6.3).  The extent to which the Pacific constitutes an economic integration 
area will be analysed through a brief sketch of island economic integration, including the 
major economic integration schemes.  The economic characteristics of the members of an 
RTA and the characteristics of their existing international trading relations are also 
relevant factors which influence the costs and benefits of constructing an expansive-
distributive agreement.22
 
 
                                                          
21 On this last point, note in particular the opinion of the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), which 
considers strongly that the both the PICTA and PACER agreements are not in Pacific islanders’ interests, 
and have been designed with the interests of development partners in Australia, New Zealand and Europe in 
mind.  Pacific Network on Globalisation, (2002), A Critical Response to PICTA, PACER and the Pacific 
Islands Forum's Social Impact Assessment, PANG, the Pacific Network on Globalisation, accessed at 
http://www.ecrea.org.fj/webpages/publications_files/ESJP/picta.doc, 19 January 2004. 
22Robert Scollay, (2001), Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific 
Islands' Proposed Free Trade Agreement, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study 
Series, No. 10, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), New York and Geneva, 
p. 3. 
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Figure 6.3: “Alternative Trade Agreements” for EPA Negotiations: Cotonou 
Agreement, Article 37.6 
In 2004, the Community will assess the situation of the non-LDC which, after consultations with 
the Community decide that they are not in a position to enter into economic partnership 
agreements and will examine all alternative possibilities, in order to provide these countries with a 
new framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with 
WTO rules. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 26. 
 
1. Current Economic Characteristics, Trends and Conditions in the Pacific 
As discussed, the PIF is now the premier vehicle of Pacific regional cooperation and the 
platform for regional economic integration, although it is not the only example of 
economic integration.  The 14 FICs are all small economies, but among each other they 
still represent a heterogeneous group.  The population was just over 7 million in 2002, of 
which over 80 per cent reside in Papua New Guinea and Fiji (Figure 6.4).  The Pacific 
islands, as have been discussed in relation to SDT, have a special status for the purposes 
of global trade and development cooperation, since they are vulnerable, small island 
states, separated by vast distances.  Moreover, the 2003 FEMM noted that economic 
growth in the FICs continues to be uneven.  After recording growth of less than 1 per cent 
in 2001, down from 6.6 per cent a year earlier, the FICs recorded a “modest” recovery of 
1 per cent for 2002. With an annual population growth rate of 2.7 per cent, per capita, 
GDP declined in 2002 for a third consecutive year.  The Asian Development Bank 
forecasted GDP for the region to grow at an average rate of 2.4 per cent in 2003.  
However, unpredictable international events can easily upset the delicate balance of trade 
for FICs.23
 
Generally, the picture of FIC economic performance tends to be clouded (Table 6.5), 
however, because of severe fluctuations in world prices of their key exports, including 
sugar, palm oil, coffee, gold, minerals, copra and kava.  Samoa, a golden child of the 
World Bank, experienced GDP growth of 8 per cent in 2001, but only registered growth 
of 1 per cent in 2002.  Fiscal problems persist in nearly all of the PICs.  Nauru and the  
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Table 6.5: Key Economic Indicators and Projections for FICs, 2002-04 
 GDP Growth (% per year) Inflation (% 
per year) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 
Cook Islands (2001) 7.9 5.1 0.3 1.5 3.2 3.9 3.4 
Federated States of Micronesia 
(2000) 
4.4 1.1 0.8 2.4 1.5 1.0 1.5 
Fiji (2001) -3.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 3.6 0.9 3.0 
Kiribati (1999) 0.2 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.3 5.1 - 
Nauru - - - - - - - 
Niue (1998) - - - - - - - 
Palau (2000) - - - - - - - 
Papua New Guinea (2001) -1.2 -3.4 -0.5 1.0 2.0 11.8 9.0 
Repbulic of Marshall Islands 
(2000) 
0.7 2.1 4 3 2 2 2.5 
Samoa (2001) 6.9 6.2 1.3 3.6 3.5 9 8 
Tonga (2000) 6.5 0.5 1.6 2.5 2.7 10.4 10 
Tuvalu (1999) 3 4 2 2 1.8 2.6 3 
Vanuatu (2001) 2.7 -2.7 -0.3 1.3 2.2 2.0 2.5 
Source: Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2003, p. 8 
 
Solomon Islands represent two severe cases, as well as Papua New Guinea, which, 
although possessing the richest economy in the region, finds as much as difficulty as 
smaller PICs in providing basic services such as primary education and health care.  The 
blame for these problems lies with corruption in the government bureaucracy and 
inefficient management of resources.24  However, political instability, more prevalent in 
Melanesia, with a number of coups, two as recent as 2000, and lack of discipline in the 
armed forces and police in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have had a real impact 
on growth and confidence in PIC economies.  Rising populations also mean there is a 
discernable, but not yet dangerous trend towards decreasing per capita GDP. 
 
Based on a comprehensive study of FIC national statistics by New Zealand economic 
advisor, Robert Scollay in the mid-1990s,25 a number of specific trends and  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, (2003), Economic Outlook Briefing Paper, Forum Economic Ministers 
Meeting, Session 3, [PIFS(03)FEMM.06], 11-12 June 2003, Forum Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM), 
Pacific Islands Forum, Majuro, Republic of Marshall Islands, p. 2. 
24 Satish Chand, (2003), 'Economic Trends in the Pacific Island Countries', The Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 3-4. 
25 Unless otherwise cited, figures in this subsection are drawn from Robert Scollay’s 2001 UNCTAD report, 
which draws on work commissioned by the FEMM in 1998 to study options for free trade among the FICs.  
See Scollay, Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific Islands' 
Proposed Free Trade Agreement, op cit.. 
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Figure: 6.4: Percentage Distributions of Population and GDP in 
Forum Island Countries (2002) 
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Source: Inman and ANZ Banking Group, 2003, p. 1. 
 
characteristics can be determined.  The combined FIC GDP has been measured at 
approximately 13.5 per cent of New Zealand’s, of which again, Fiji and PNG accounted 
for around 83 per cent.  Hence, intra-regional trade is quite immature.  Current figures 
indicate that it still only represents 2 per cent of total trade, up from 1 per cent in 1995.26  
Specifically, only four FICs, Samoa, Tuvalu and Kiribati and the Cook Islands have a 
percentage of imports and exports with other FICs above 10 per cent (Table 6.6).  As for 
trade with non-FICs, Australia and New Zealand account for the lion’s share of FIC 
imports, in most cases well above 50 per cent of imports for each FIC.  Exports to non-
FICs are more diversified, however.  This is despite preferential access to Australian and 
New Zealand markets through the South Pacific Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (SPARTECA), reflecting the inability of FICs to competitively supply these 
markets, as well as perhaps the attractiveness to supply other markets.  The United States 
and Japan have significant shares of FIC exports, as of course does the EU.  The EU takes 
57 per cent of Kiribati’s exports, 26 per cent of Fiji’s, 21 per cent of Samoa’s and 15 per 
                                                          
26 Commission of the European Communities, (2002), Pacific ACP European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002 – 2007, European Community, 
Brussels, p. 11; Michael Moran, (2003), Pacific Islands Free Trade Agreements: Briefing Paper for the 
Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting, Oxfam International, Auckland, p. 6. 
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cent of PNG’s.  The export orientation of trade also suggests that there might be similar 
variability or disinclination for FICs to trade with one other. 
 
Limited production structures also weaken the potential for regional trade.  Agriculture, 
fishing and forestry account for anywhere between 15 to 27 per cent of GDP in most 
cases, while the service sector accounts for as much as two-thirds.  Manufacturing has 
developed little, because of the small market size making diversification and competition  
 
Table 6.6: Intra-regional Trade Profiles of PACP States/FICs 
1998 Figures, Forum Secretariat, Own Currency Value 
 Merchandise Imports 
from PACP States 
(millions) 
Total Merchandise 
Imports 
(millions) 
Imports from Pacific 
ACP as Proportion of 
Total 
Cook Islands 8.891 73.274 12.1% 
FSM 16.000 99.728 0.02% 
Fiji 5.489 1,366.634 0.40% 
Kiribati 12.226 61.025 20.03% 
Nauru 0.885 87.885 1.01% 
Niue 0.837 23.530 3.56% 
Palau 1.095 12.164 9.00% 
Papua New Guinea 165.000 83,263.000 0.20% 
Marshall Islands 0.006 1.529 0.39% 
Samoa 42.187 296.425 14.23% 
Solomon Islands 20.552 590.868 3.48% 
Tonga 7.758 107.956 7.19% 
Tuvalu 1.426 6.770 21.06% 
Vanuatu 1,267.000 13,758.000 9.21% 
Average: Simple   7.28% 
 Weighted   2.18% 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2002, p. 49. 
 
inefficient in goods.  Only Fiji and Samoa, have developed significant manufactures in 
textiles and automobile parts, due to the stimulus of trade preferences offered under 
SPARTECA.  In other FICs, manufacturing is less than 5 per cent of GDP, which 
immediately shows that the scope for trade in goods is extremely narrow across the FICs, 
with most potential residing solely in Fiji, which reinforces its place as a regional 
paymaster or a pole of concentration of the benefits of integration.  Further compounding 
the problem of trade in goods is that even if sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards can be 
raised and the frequency and cost of transport improved, the FICs produce similar 
products in the key sectors noted, representing a disincentive for regional trade.  Trade in 
services may be an avenue to pursue, especially to rationalise cooperation in the tourist 
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industry.  However, as noted, in order for collective gains to be made, PIC will have to be 
convinced of the logic and see past the prestige which accrues from national ownership of 
services and facilities.27
 
Furthermore, tariff revenue forms a substantial proportion of the tax base in FIC 
economies (Table 6.7), which an FTA will inevitably erode, depending on the amount of 
total trade that will be affected and its distribution across tariff classes.  With respect to 
WTO compatibility, the options for FICs, in relation to the options outlined above, will be 
constrained because although a FIC-only FTA matches the criteria of a South-South RTA, 
which can be notified under the Enabling Clause, once developed partners are included, 
as discussed, the agreement must be compatible with GATT Article XXIV, for trade in 
goods, and GATS Article V, should trade in services also be included.28
 
Table 6.7: Import  Duties as Percentage of Revenue for 
PACP States – Selected Years 
 Import Duties as Percentage of 
 Total Tax 
Revenue 
Government 
Revenue 
Minus Grants 
Total 
Government 
Revenue 
Kiribati (2000) 61.0 17.9 14.2 
Vanuatu (2001) 40.0 36.4 33.5 
Tuvalu (2001) 48.11 11.5 7.7 
Niue(2000) 23.2 - - 
Tonga *64.8 - - 
Cook Islands (2000/01) 20.4 22.9 24.5 
Republic of Marshall Islands (2001) 26.0 17.9 6.4 
Fiji (2001) 22.6 16.1 16.1 
Samoa (2000/01) 17.71 15.5  
Palau (2001) 25.1 15.8 10.1 
Federated States of Micronesia (2000) 24.4 11.4 4.2 
Papua New Guinea (2001) 3.2 3.0 2.6 
*unofficial estimate 
Scollay, 2002, p. 53. 
 
In summary, the extremely small size and limited scope of the FIC market immediately 
poses two potential immediate problems for integration.  The first is that the potential for 
gains from economies of scale are extremely small.  The second is the lack of resources to 
facilitate the implementation and administration of an RTA.  Nevertheless, intra and inter-
                                                          
27 Helen Hughes, (2003), Aid Has Failed the Pacific, Issue Analysis, No. 33, 7 May 2003, Centre for 
Independent Studies, Sydney. 
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regional economic integration is on the agenda for FICs.  The more rigorous requirements 
of GATT Article XXIV must be met, because of the extra-regional network of 
relationships that FICs are party to, and because of the openness of their economies to the 
processes of regionalisation.  Thus, FICs should seek to reform the Article to include SDT 
through the Doha round, as WTO negotiations continue.  In this case, EU technical 
assistance and support would be an invaluable investment for the success of EPAs 
generally. 
 
2. Rent 
Besides, basic trade in goods, another feature of the economic profile of the Pacific is the 
role of economic rents.  Rents, in economic terms, are defined to be a payment to any 
factor of production above its opportunity cost.29  Firstly, recalling the propositions about 
island economies, many PICs have actually benefited from dependency through the 
provision of rents that otherwise would render competitive industry and investment 
impractical, in the form of aid transfers from regional and global powers.  Metropolitan 
governments ploughed significant resources into PICs to build up infrastructure.  
However, with decolonisation and independence, the impetus for statist development 
declined.30
 
Consequently, Pacific industries and firms became protected by import substitutions, but 
high wages, distance and input costs meant that tariffs were introduced to allow PIC 
products to remain competitive.  As a result, it is difficult to attract foreign direct 
investment into economies which lack a competitive edge.  High tariffs cost more to the 
PICs balance of payments than they save.31  The current picture of tariff rates in the 
Pacific shows that Tonga, Tuvalu, Niue Kiribati and Vanuatu have the highest effective 
tariffs (Table 6.8).  Most others are moderate to low, but these are boosted by “sin taxes” 
on alcohol and tobacco.  Failure to collect all tariffs may reduce effectiveness of high 
rates, as in Tonga.  Still, there is great variation in tariff rates among FICs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Scollay, Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific Islands' 
Proposed Free Trade Agreement, op cit., pp. 10-11. 
29 Grynberg and Onguglo, A Development Agenda for the Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
EU and the Pacific ACP (PACP) A Concept Paper, op cit., p. 155. 
30 Geoffrey Bertram, (1999), 'Economy', in Moshe Rapaport (ed.), The Pacific Islands, Environment and 
Society, The Bess Press, Honolulu, pp. 338-39. 
31 Hughes, Aid Has Failed the Pacific, op cit., pp. 14-15. 
 166
Table 6.8:Average Effective Tariff Rates in PACP States 
(%) Selected Years 
Kiribati (1999) ***20.46% 
Vanuatu (2000) 18.15% 
Tuvalu (2001) 16.61% 
Niue (1998) 14.45% 
Tonga (1999) **13.9% 
Cook Islands (2001) 10.38% 
Republic of Marshall Islands *9.00% 
Fiji (2001) 8.88% 
Samoa (2001) 8.65% 
Palau (2000) 6.91% 
Federated States of Micronesia (2000) 6.06% 
Papua New Guinea (2001) 1.96% 
* estimate 
** unofficial estimate 
*** provisional estimate using exchange rate A$1.00 = US$0.55 
Source: Scollay, 2002, p. 26. 
 
Nevertheless, the public sector has generally not contracted due to rent transfers, and 
represents a significant employer.  Consequently, when the public sector is booming, 
there is less incentive to expand local productive activities in agriculture or in the private 
manufacturing sector.  This is because the public sector is the main conduit and 
beneficiary of rent, namely foreign aid.  The dominance of this sector of the economy 
reinforces high exchange rates created by ‘unrequited’ rent transfers, which do not require 
a reciprocal payment, in PIC’s balance of payments.  Thus the public sector stands to 
benefit, since it is concerned primarily with non-tradable activities.32  Rent income is 
therefore an active factor in the erosion of trade in goods, as rent transfers have become 
an essential part of the economy.  Hence a controversy has been raised as to whether it is 
better to simply manage the rent boom, by attempting to enhance PIC claims for 
assistance, or to cut foreign aid in favour of better macroeconomic management. 
 
Australian academic Helen Hughes (2003) argues that assistance should be lessened since 
aid has failed the Pacific, because islanders only consume aid and do not make progress 
to become independent of it.  Hughes cites the Bauer hypothesis, which regards the 
“fungibility” of aid, or in other words the substitutability of foreign aid for capital, as its 
most counterproductive aspect.  Fungibility enables governments to spend aid monies on 
their own objectives, swelling political and bureaucratic establishments.  Entrepreneurs 
                                                          
32 Patrick Laplange, (1997), 'Dutch Disease in the South Pacific: Evidence from the 1980s and Beyond', 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 84-96. 
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are deflected from making money through private investment into earning public service 
salaries.  When there is only aid or resource rents to distribute, consumption levels from 
those benefiting from rents become high, but not the rest of society.33  In summary, aid 
distorts the economy and benefits the elites, which is demonstrably true of PICs, 
according to Hughes.  However, given the enormity of grappling with the globalisation 
agenda, and the extent of dependence of official remittances and aid to Pacific economies, 
it is unlikely that aid could be dispensed with.  Moreover, the requirements of 
participation in the WTO and the negotiations with the EU require external assistance to 
facilitate regional integration initiatives.  Furthermore, the PCP through the RSPs and 
individual Country Papers target specific projects, and fund regional integration processes 
to address the indiscriminate dispersal of assistance, which was noted as one of the 
weaknesses of Lomé. 
 
More significantly, then, perhaps it must be acknowledged, as Bertram (1999) has done, 
that mainstream theory on modernisation is less applicable to the Pacific.  Classical 
economics argues that economic development is unsustainable without a “big push” to 
promote investment, output and commodity exports.  If small economies are 
conceptualised in these terms, then they simply do not possess large enough markets to 
gain the benefits of scale economies, which if they pursue diversification may only result 
in specialisation in one or two industries, with consequent high exposure to instability and 
lack of inter-sectoral spillover.  The size and persistence of financial flows, remittances or 
otherwise, and the ability of islanders to utilise these resources to some extent to sustain 
levels of expenditure and standards of living that run ahead of local productive activity, as 
measured by GDP, suggested by the MIRAB model, illustrates that there are possibly 
significant limitations of conventional neoclassical analyses which focus on the 
stimulation of the tradable goods sector, export promotion and private investment targeted 
to these ends.  Although it is conceded Melanesian economies possess traditional export 
led sectors, to ignore other economic factor flows, is to downplay one of the significant 
“economic locomotives” of Polynesia and Micronesia.34
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Hughes, Aid Has Failed the Pacific, op cit., p. 27. 
34 Bertram, 'Economy', pp. 344-45. 
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3. Quasi-rents: Are Trade Preferences Beneficial? 
Pacific preferential trade schemes, which may be classified as de jure rents, may be 
considered another distorting engine of development, but without them export 
diversification would not have been possible.35  Lomé influenced where national budget 
were spent on development, as well as which products were produced.  Fiji was the major 
regional beneficiary under both Lomé and SPARTECA.  Since 1975, the Sugar Protocol 
granted Fiji a quota of 165,000 – 205,000 tonnes of sugar into the EU market, equating to 
about 30-40 per cent of Fiji’s crop, and 80 per cent of its EU export earnings.  All 
produce is sold at the EU intervention price, about two to three times that of the world 
price.  Fiji and Papua New Guinea have also benefited from derogations for textiles and 
canned tuna.  Palm oil, coffee and copra are other agricultural products able to gain 
preferential entry.  While it is true that erosion or reordering of preferences mean that 
PACP exports will be at a competitive disadvantage, and there will be a decline in GDP 
as a result, on closer inspection though, it is not completely convincing that FICs would 
be better off under a preferential trade agreement.36
 
The SPARTECA Treaty, with the exemption of sugar, has given the Pacific duty free 
access to Australia and New Zealand’s markets since 1981.  One of SPARTECA’s key 
objectives were to promote greater penetration of Australian and New Zealand markets, 
as well as to expand and diversify their exports to accelerate development.  Analysis by 
Grynberg (1996) of whether SPARTECA has met such objectives has revealed that 
although the Treaty has been responsible for some trade expansion, most notably with the 
rise of the Fijian garment trade, generally the sustainable expansion was due more to 
regulatory change within Fiji, New Zealand and Australia.  If it were the result of the 
Treaty, then the impact would have been more uniform across PICs party to SPARTECA, 
especially those New Zealand has close relations with.  What occurred was that 
renewable exports from PICs to Australia and New Zealand declined.  However, it is 
apparent that when Fiji and New Zealand undertook structural reform in 1987 it 
corresponded to between 50 to 100 per cent increases in exports to North America, New 
                                                          
35 Roman Grynberg, (2001), 'A Theory of Trade and Development of Small Vulnerable States', The Journal 
of Pacific Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 166-67. 
36 Roman Grynberg, (1996), The Pacific ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention, Working Papers 
on EU Development Policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, accessed at 
http://www.euforic.org/fes/1gb_gry.htm,  30 June 2003, pp. 9-10; Commission of the European 
Communities, (2002), The Pacific and the European Union, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, p. 23. 
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Zealand and Australia.37  Therefore, it must be concluded that SPARTECA and 
macroeconomic reform were both necessary to produce a surge in apparel exports in Fiji.  
Overall, SPARTECA, despite its generous access provisions failed to register any real 
benefits beyond those to the Fiji garment industry. 
 
In summary, the strength of trade preferences in the Pacific are that they have provided 
stable, predictable and long-term sources of quasi-rents that have successfully encouraged 
investment in manufacturing and agriculture.  Even so, it is generally the larger MDCs 
that have taken advantage of preferences.  However, they cannot act as a long term 
substitute for competitiveness.  Nonetheless, Pacific leaders have tended to act as though 
preferences will be a permanent part of the landscape, and have not acted to shift to less 
preference-dependent growth, despite the reduction in the advantage of preferences as 
global liberalisation has proceeded.  Therefore, the appropriate way to approach proposals 
for a Pacific FTA is to realise how the adoption of more liberal trade regimes might be 
able to capture the economic benefits that can be expected to flow from the reduction of 
trade barriers,38 and not to mourn the passing of preferences, as they have had a distorting 
effect on PIC economies. 
 
In fairness though, the conditions and trends of PIC economies illustrates that the 
opportunities created by a liberalised global market are most able to be taken advantage 
of by societies that are adept at moving resources and changing economic activities with 
changing market opportunities.39  A pool of freely traded labour, specialised land, labour 
and capital; the physical infrastructure to permit efficient movement of factors; efficient 
information and communications technology to disseminate market information rapidly at 
low cost; and a stable political and social infrastructure are all essential prerequisites that 
PICs must possess to have parity with Northern partners, if integration into the global 
economy through a South-South-North agreement is to be effective.  In substitution for 
this, the role of extra-regional linkages as described by the MIRAB model cannot be 
discounted either (cf. Appendix Six).  What form might a Pacific EPA take to limit the 
impact of liberalisation, where welfare returns are likely to be limited, and to enhance the 
                                                          
37 Roman Grynberg, Australian National University. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies. and 
Australian National University. National Centre for Development Studies., (1996), The Uruguay Round and 
the Pacific island countries, National Centre for Development Studies, [Canberra, A.C.T.], pp. 61-63. 
38 Scollay, Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific Islands' 
Proposed Free Trade Agreement, op cit., p. 14. 
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possibilities for development, yet meet the wider requirements of WTO compatibility?  
This depends on how the sub-regional integration process deals with these various 
constraints. 
 
4. Issues in Economic Debates over RTAs – Application to the Pacific 
Although trade integration was discussed at the outset of the creation of the Forum in 
1971, it was not until 1998 that the FEMM launched research into options for free trade 
among the FICs, based on the mandate granted to it from the original FEMM meeting in 
Cairns in 1997.  The essential question is whether the limited scope for economic 
integration can create welfare benefits for the FICs.  Returning to Vinerian Customs 
Union theory, the most crucial issue is whether a FIC FTA will be more trade creating 
than trade diverting.  In part, the relative size of trade creation and trade diversion relates 
to the design of the agreement and the economic characteristics of the members and the 
structure of their international trade.  Laird (1999) reports that the prospects for 
maximising trade creation are better the larger the share of members in their partners’ pre-
existing trade; the more diversified the members’ economies are; the closer domestic 
prices in the group match world prices and the greater the initial non-uniformity of 
partners’ tariff structures.  As noted earlier elasticity, or the responsiveness to price 
changes of import demand and export supply in the partner countries, and the 
substitutability between partner countries, taking into account consumer preferences, 
product characteristics and factor costs will also influence the size of trade creation or 
diversion.40  Scollay (2001) concludes that with exception of the last factor, none of these 
characteristics are found in FICs.  The small scope of the regional market makes trade 
creation difficult, and high tariffs found among the FICs might mean increased trade 
causes uncompetitive trade diversion.  Trade diversion effects can be eliminated if the 
external barriers are reduced at the same time as internal barriers are.  In this case, it 
makes sense to liberalise.  However, the importance of tariff revenue effectively acts as a 
break on this proposal. 
 
This means that FICs must also conduct intensive structural reform to their tax systems, to 
find alternative forms of revenue.  A value-added tax, a tax levied on the difference 
                                                                                                                                                                             
39 Grynberg, 'A Theory of Trade and Development of Small Vulnerable States', op cit., p. 157. 
40 Scollay, Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the 
European Union, op cit., p. 21. 
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between a commodity’s price before taxes and its cost of production, or a consumption 
tax are the most likely options.  These present an inverse relation between the welfare 
gains that can be expected and the size of the cost.  VATs would in the long term remove 
the distortions caused by tariffs, but are not as convincing in FICs where exports are 
negligible.  A negative list approach, where trade is liberalised in all products except for a 
short list of exclusions would also limit administrative and negotiation costs.41
 
Hence, while there may be minor economic benefits associated with increased 
competition, the value of an FTA is reducible to the size of trade creation against 
dependence on tariff revenue.  In this sense, the economic effects of an FTA are likely to 
be very small.42  However, the possibilities for harmonisation and trade facilitation 
involved with a FIC FTA augur potentially well, since the FTA can act as a “stepping 
stone” to prepare for wider liberalisation, with Australia and New Zealand.  This is more 
logical, given the larger share of trade with these two countries, and their inclusion would 
limit the degree of trade diversion.  The stepping stone approach in this way lessens the 
impact of unilateral reduction of tariff barriers which would otherwise have to occur.  The 
rationale of FIC trade agreements is therefore highly consistent with the European 
Commission’s South-South-North model of integration, but as such immediately raises 
the spectre of legal challenges and negotiation complications. 
 
5. Application to Pacific Trade Agreements 
(i) PICTA and PACER 
The two Pacific trade agreements, endorsed by the Forum leaders at the Nauru in 2001, 
and ratified in late 2002 and early 2003 (Appendix Eight), provide a structure designed to 
address the issues and concerns identified.  The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (PACER) is an accord, rather than an FTA, which is intended to establish a 
framework for future integration between Australia, New Zealand and the FICs.  As such, 
PACER does not need to be notified to the WTO under Article XXIV, so that it can 
provide for the gradual and evolutionary development of trade and economic cooperation.  
PACER allows the FICs to integrate first, but also so that New Zealand and Australia will 
also be able to maintain access to FIC markets.  It includes a provision to commence 
                                                          
41 Robert Scollay, (2001), New Developments in Trade and Economic Cooperation Among Pacific Islands 
Forum Members, 18 July, The Foundation for Development Cooperation, Brisbane, accessed at 
http://www.fdc.org.au/files/scollayrevsd.pdf, 23 February 2004, p. 3. 
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negotiations for a Forum-wide FTA no later than eight years after the FIC-only FTA 
enters into force, as well as the possibility of a single market.  PACER ensures that 
Australia and New Zealand must continue to provide individual FICs with existing levels 
of market access under SPARTECA, until such time new arrangements are concluded 
providing equal or better access.43  The key benefits to FICs will be in trade facilitation, 
financial and technical assistance. 
 
The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) follows the original draft 1999 
negotiating text of the FEMM very closely.  It stipulates that tariffs will be progressively 
and automatically reduced on trade in goods, not services, according to graduated 
schedules, and a common external tariff will apply.  MDC FICs must have zero tariffs by 
2010, while the SIS, the American Compact states and LDCs must comply by 2012.  
Non-tariff barriers and specific tariffs may be converted to ad valorem tariffs and reduced 
according to the relevant schedule to limit administration costs.  Likewise, PICTA 
endorses a negative list, which lessens the pressure of liberalisation on industries which 
might suffer with the removal of protection.  The products that are covered by the 
negative list, which include basic everyday necessities such as household items, sugar 
products and some textiles, must have tariffs phased out by 2016.44  PICTA does not 
inhibit schemes like the MSG, but its negotiation signals less possibility for trade blocs to 
form on ethnocentric lines, to foster regional political solidarity.  PICTA also allows for 
infant industries to be protected, but only for certain products under strict timeframes. 
 
Therefore, the PICTA serves as a confidence-building step in the management of FTAs.  
However, since PICTA covers a wide range of products, the impact of liberalisation will 
likely result in some trade diversion.45  To FIC leaders immediate losses were deemed 
tolerable to keep the costs of implementation and administration of the agreement under 
control.  Trade diversion and adjustment costs caused by taxation reform will also 
negatively impact Pacific communities, where the consumer has to bear the burden.  From 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42 ibid., p. 2. 
43 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, (2001), "PACER & PICTA Frequently Asked Questions", Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, available at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/docs.htm accessed 4 August 
2003. 
44 Scollay, New Developments in Trade and Economic Cooperation Among Pacific Islands Forum 
Members, pp. 8-9; Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, (2001), Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement, 18 
August 2001, Pacific Islands Forum, Nauru, Annex III, pp. 38f. 
45 Sam Laird, (1999), 'Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?' World Economy, Vol. 22, pp. 
1179-1200; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, "PACER & PICTA Frequently Asked Questions", op cit. 
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the lessons of theory and previous experience of regional cooperation, the majority of the 
benefits are likely to accrue to Fiji, as the lead regional economy.46. 
 
 
(ii) ‘Intricacy’: Challenges from PICTA and PACER to the Pacific post-Cotonou 
Agreement Process 
The sequence of liberalisation is the single most important complexity of the development 
component of the FIC FTA initiatives (Appendix Five).  One item of concern is that to 
satisfy requirements for “substantially all trade,” bilateral flows with Australia and New 
Zealand must be counted because intra-FIC trade is so minimal.  A more significant 
concern are the implications of PACER for EU-PACP negotiations.  Article 6, paragraph 
3 of PACER specifically states that should the FICs commence formal negotiations with 
one or more developed non-Forum country, they are likewise obligated “to undertake 
consultations as soon as practicable” to negotiate free trade agreements with Australia and 
New Zealand (Figure 6.5).  Likewise, the Compact states (the FSM, RMI and Palau) 
would be obliged to offer equivalent market access to the US as to the EU.  The key 
implication for FICs is that once EPA negotiations begin, a broader regional liberalisation 
process will be triggered, perhaps far too prematurely for the “stepping stone” strategy to 
have had time to take effect, especially since the overlapping RTAs have different 
timetables of liberalisation (Appendix Five). This means that a Pacific EPA should not 
prematurely trigger a sooner than preferred “second step,” on the path to integration, too 
great for the benefits of MFN liberalisation to accrue, and requiring an unaffordable 
redistributive programme.  The key consideration for the PACP/FICs in negotiating the 
form of a Pacific EPA then is that they retain control of the pace of liberalisation,47 so 
that liberalisation is appropriate to the economic context.  Allowance must be made for a 
significant degree of flexibility and the topography of the Pacific regional economic 
landscape. 
 
 
                                                          
46 Moran, Pacific Islands Free Trade Agreements: Briefing Paper for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders 
Meeting, op cit., pp. 5-6. 
47 Scollay, Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific Islands' 
Proposed Free Trade Agreement, op cit., pp. 26-28. 
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Figure 6.5: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Article 6 
Provisions Relevant to EU-PACP EPA Negotiations 
 
Consultations between Forum Island Countries and Australia and New Zealand, relating to the 
negotiation of free trade agreements 
 
Paragraph 3: 
“… if any Forum Island Country which is party to this Agreement: 
commences formal negotiations for free trade agreements which would include one or more 
developed non-Forum country, then that Forum Island Country shall offer to undertake 
consultations as soon as practicable with Australia and New Zealand, whether individually or 
jointly with a view to the commencement of negotiation of free trade arrangements; or 
concludes free trade arrangements which would not include any developed non-Forum country, 
then that Forum Island Country shall offer to undertake consultations with Australia and New 
Zealand as soon as practicable after such arrangements are concluded…” 
 
Paragraph 4: 
“…if all the parties to the PICTA jointly commence negotiations for free trade arrangements 
which would include one or more non-forum country, they shall offer to undertake consultations, 
as soon as practicable, with Australia and New Zealand, whether individually or jointly, with a 
view to the commencement of negotiation of free trade arrangements. 
Source: Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2001, pp. 5-6. 
 
 
V. AN EPA OR AN “ALTERNATIVE TRADE AGREEMENT” FOR THE 
REGION? 
1. The EU-PACP Trading Relationship 
One caveat is necessary before sketching what the trajectory of the EU-PACP partnership 
will be for the future in light of the nature of Pacific economic integration.  With six new 
members joining the PACP in 2000, only eight Pacific states have a relatively long trade 
relationship with the EU.  Of these, eight, only three, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga 
have a trade relationship extending beyond the twentieth century.  PACP exports 
dominated bilateral trade with Europe, due the stimulus of STABEX and Lomé, while 
PACP imports remained diverse, due to the greater distance between Europe and the 
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Pacific.48  However, the small volume of imports from the EU and the volatile annual 
shifts in the composition of imports to Tonga, for example, are indicative of an immature 
trading relationship between Europe and the FICs, which is not a solid foundation upon 
which to build a North-South reciprocal free trade agreement.49  FTAs are usually the 
result of a mature trading relationship between countries.50  The positive side of the 
immature EU-PACP trade relationship is that direct trade effects of an EPA will be low 
and adjustment costs minimal, given low penetration by EU exporters.  It is debateable 
then whether the EU and the PACP will be able to liberalise enough trade to satisfy the 
substantially all trade conditions, and, in the absence of a consistent range of EU exports, 
to establish a stable schedule of concessions that would meet the RTA’s legal obligations 
to the WTO. 
 
There is also the issue of the French Pacific Territories (New Caledonia, French Polynesia 
and Wallis and Futuna).  Article 28 of the Cotonou Agreement reaffirmed that Cotonou 
trade agreements may be extended to OCTs.51  FICs would have to be granted access to 
OCT markets.  Moreover, for consistency, the Forum to allow these non-Forum territories 
to assume a role in Forum politics beyond observer status, currently only granted to New 
Caledonia, to participate in regional liberalisation efforts before the North-South element 
of the partnership commences.  Initial steps have been made by the Forum to involve the 
French Territories more closely with the Forum architecture, with a view to their future 
democratisation and independence.52  However, any rationalisation of Pacific regional 
free trade initiatives may also have implications to allow a greater degree of autonomy or 
even quicken the pace of the independence for the Pacific OCTs. 
 
2. Optimal Configuration for a Pacific EPA: A Multi-Agreement Approach 
The economic profile of the Pacific and the technical feasibility of a South-South-North 
model of integration therefore raise the final question of configuration: how far can an 
                                                          
48 Roman Grynberg, (2000), Asymmetric Reciprocity in the Post-Lomé Framework, Implications for Trade 
Relations in the Pacific, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed at:  http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/biblio_pacific.php, 14 July 2003, pp. 6-7. 
49 Grynberg and Onguglo, A Development Agenda for the Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
EU and the Pacific ACP (PACP) A Concept Paper, op cit., p. 3. 
50 These observations are based on the tables which illustrate the EU-Pacific trade profile that may be found 
in Appendix Nine. 
51 Scollay, Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the 
European Union, op cit., pp. 18-19. 
52 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, (2003), Forum Communiqué, Thirty-Fourth Pacific Islands Forum, 
Auckland, New Zealand, PIF(03)11, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Auckland, p. 11. 
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EPA incorporate what the EU has so far defined as the Pacific, or is the sub-region or a 
sub-group of PACP states perhaps a better vehicle for integration?  As discussed in earlier 
chapters this is not an unusual phenomenon in the Pacific and may better serve 
considerations of reciprocity and flexibility.  In some ways this parallels possibilities 
which may have been explored at the ACP level.  Acting collectively as the PACP gives 
the group strength in numbers when dealing with the EU or to advance an exclusive focus 
for issues relevant to them.  Another option could have been to form groupings around 
common issues, such as “Sugar Producers’ EPA” or a “Small Island States’ EPA.”  But 
whether there would be sufficient interests to sustain the partnership as well as the legal 
status of the Sugar Protocol lessen the attractiveness of this architecture.53  More 
attractive are possibilities for a “Two Tier” approach, where matters of common 
application, such as modalities for EU-ACP cooperation, safeguards and rules of origin 
matters, are applied to the whole, and arrangements for trade left to region-to-region 
negotiations.54  These represent some permutations which may be applied to the Pacific 
EPA. 
 
For the PACP/FICs, the prime trade concern is the opportunity cost of not joining the 
EPA.  The EPA ensures continued market access to the EU.  The point of divergence 
among FICs is whether access to EU markets is worth more than the structural costs and 
the impact of increased competition from Australian, New Zealand and US goods in the 
Pacific market.55  For Fiji and PNG, the costs are greater; for the LDCs market access is a 
non-issue due to the EBA.  Hence, as divergent economic profiles alter the cost-benefit 
calculus for PACP states it might make sense to limit the impact of liberalisation by 
concluding an EPA with a sub-regional group such as the MSG which may form a 
customs union sooner, which would more easily facilitate North-South reciprocal tariff 
                                                          
53 A crucial component a Pacific EPA is the place of the Sugar Protocol.  Although Fiji has begun to reform 
its sugar industry in response, a strategic issue is whether or not sugar should be included in the EPA.  
Commodity Protocols are still legally distinct from Cotonou trade provisions.  Hence, if sugar is not 
included, then this might impinge on satisfaction of SAT, by excluding a sensitive industry.  However, if 
sugar is included, then it would lead to unrestricted market access for competitive Pacific sugar, balancing 
out falling prices.  A greater legal challenge would be to include quotas in the EPA framework, if 
substantially all trade could still be met.  Scollay, Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union, op cit., pp. 41-45. 
54 ibid., pp. 61-64. 
55 Cf. Grynberg, Asymmetric Reciprocity in the Post-Lomé Framework, Implications for Trade Relations in 
the Pacific, p. 10; Scollay, Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
with the European Union, op cit., p. 64; Vincent Roza and Stefan Szepesi, (2003), EPA Impact Studies 
Perspectives for the Pacific, InBrief, No. 2A, European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at http://www.ecdpm.org, 12 December 2003, p. 2. 
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reduction.  Its members would also incorporate the mature Europe-Pacific trade partners 
in the region.  The EU-PACP LDC partnership could more easily be dealt with through 
the EBA.  However, such an approach while addressing flexibility and reciprocity 
concerns would create a policy patchwork in the Pacific, and complicate the web of 
regional agreements further.  Since sub-regional economic integration has also been 
advanced by the PICTA/PACER process, splitting the group is less advantageous, and the 
more benefits would accrue to small vulnerable island states through the provisions for 
trade facilitation. 
 
Hence, during the Commission review of alternative trade arrangements in 2004, the 
PACP states could argue a Pacific EPA should take on a slightly altered form, based on 
the Forum initiatives, but with greater programming for sectoral assistance, to sweeten the 
conclusion of an EPA.  As presented by Grynberg and Onguglo (2002), the FTA could 
compromise one subsidiary agreement of a master umbrella agreement, which would 
establish broad principles and parameters for MFN market access for the EU to Pacific 
markets, and development.  Other possible subsidiary agreements would exist in sectors 
in which PACP states enjoy comparative advantage, including a Fisheries Development 
Framework, linking technical assistance to rights to fish in Pacific waters; an Investment 
Promotion and Protection Scheme, to subsidise the risk of investment; and of course a 
trade in services element, a Regional Integration Agreement in Services, which would 
give the EU strong access to the Pacific tourism industry for example, in return for 
support to improve infrastructure and human capital.  However, such an initiative would 
require funding outside of EDF 9 to be implemented.56
 
Nevertheless, the strength of an á la carte plan (Figure 6.6) is that it maintains the relative 
cohesion of the PACP group and a commitment to a WTO compliant RTA, through 
conclusion of the umbrella agreement, but the subsidiary agreements allow the Pacific 
states to enter individually into deeper integration when their economies are prepared.  
Utilisation of a subsidiary agreement approach to the Pacific EPA would also represent a 
way to solve the problem of sequencing, with respect to PACER and the US Compact.  In 
this way, more lucrative opportunities for FICs in trade in services could be addressed, 
and the politically contentious and ambiguous issues relating to trade in goods could be 
                                                          
56 Scollay, Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the 
European Union, op cit., pp. 65-68. 
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left to the very end of EU-PACP negotiations.  In this way PACER would not be 
triggered prematurely, but both the majority of WTO issues and the configuration of the 
EPA will be determined before that time, resulting in greater harmony between North-
South and South-South integration. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: An á la carte or Multi-Agreement Approach to a Pacific EPA 
“Umbrella” EPA 
Master region-wide agreement on modalities and 
WTO issues 
FTA Agreement 
 
Fisheries 
Development  
Agreement 
 
Regional Integration 
Agreement on 
Services 
 
“Subsidiary Agreements” 
Full partnership achieved as FICs 
become ready 
Investment 
Promotion and 
Guarantee 
Agreement 
– risk insurance facility 
  
Source: After Grynberg and Onguglo, 2002. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The FIC FTA is not an isolated foray into regional preferential trade on the part of the 
FICs.  As noted, the FICs already possess significant unrestricted access to Australian, 
New Zealand and European markets through SPARTECA, Lomé and Cotonou, and the 
EBA initiative for Pacific LDCs.  Economic analysis indicates that an FTA can bring 
some positive benefits to the PACP states, but the problem of sequencing may impose 
greater burdens on their fragile economies.  In this sense, a regional model of integration 
based on the Forum initiatives is most sensible for achieving potential economies of scale, 
rather than generating fragmentation by integrating specific sectors or adopting a multi-
speed approach to EU-PACP negotiations with sub regional elements of the PACP group. 
 
Nevertheless, various inconsistencies need to be resolved to address the arbitrary 
definition of who is included or excluded in the economic region, so that natural trading 
partners such as Australia and New Zealand, and the French OCTs in Melanesia can 
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contribute towards the Pacific FTA.  The model of economic development proposed in 
the Cotonou Agreement therefore is not entirely inappropriate, but it is clear that the 
trading relationship is currently immature, and consequently the focus of a Pacific EPA 
should be broadened to include trade in services and build trade facilitation.  It is hardly 
worth having a Pacific FTA if islanders do not possess the capacity to ship their goods.57  
In this way, aid and offshore remittances should be recognised as a welfare-maximising 
strategy to export labour and geostrategic services using emigration.58  The role of aid is 
more contentious, but undoubtedly aid plus trade is necessary to sustain FIC economies.  
However, as free trade is only a matter of time, the PACP states need to be granted much 
longer timeframes and flexible options in order to be able to negotiate a region-to-region 
agreement to lessen the impact.  Reform of Article XXIV to allow flexibility to be 
incorporated into the EPA framework is a logical strategy for both the EU and the PACP 
to pursue in this respect through the Doha reform agenda.  However, in its possible 
absence, the EU will have to be proactive towards FICs and offer concessions to the 
PACP as suggested under the Multi-Agreement approach. 
 
In conclusion, alternative economic integration arrangements are most likely necessary to 
avoid a serious sub-optimal policy outcome for the EPA programme in the Pacific, 
because of the competing demands of reciprocity, flexibility and the vulnerable state of 
the Pacific economic context, so that the political economy of costs and benefits in 
economic cooperation do not polarise existing Pacific regional integration processes.  As 
a result, the array of alternative arrangements which are necessary to facilitate the 
construction of a Pacific FTA and negotiation of an EPA indicate that the Pacific is not a 
                                                          
57 Note the comments of the President of Kiribati at the Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders’ Retreat, 
Auckland, 5-6 April 2004, who argues that for small island states it is not trade barriers, but transport costs 
which are the biggest problem trade facilitation issue: 
“We talk about trade in the region. We’re talking about transport.  Because for us it is not trade barriers 
that matter.  It’s the cost of transportation.  The freight costs.” 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, (2004), 'Pacific Leaders Meet in Auckland to Discuss Pacific 
Plan', ABC Go Asia Pacific, Australia, 6 April 2004, accessed at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/asiapacific/news, 6 April 2004 
Grynberg also notes on this point the non-linear characteristics of isolation and diseconomies for PICs, 
citing the example of the exporting cut flowers from Fiji to Honolulu and Tokyo.  The distance between 
Tokyo and Suva is two times the distance between Suva and Honolulu, yet the air freight cost in 1994 was 
four times as high to ship to Tokyo.  This was because there was only one carrier on the route with 
sufficient space to accommodate the cargo, most of which was dedicated to chilled fish (Grynberg, 1996, 
5).  Therefore rates can only fall with competition, and this may require intervention and financial support, 
as is provided under PICTA’s infant industry provisions (Article 14) as well as the plans included to 
facilitate better cargo transport under the Pacific Island Air Services Agreement (PIASA) Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, (2003), Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement, Background Issues Paper, July 2003, 
Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, Suva, p. 2. 
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natural economic integration area for trade in goods.  Yet there is still potential for 
integration if economic sectors beyond trade in goods are considered. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
58 Poirine, B., (1998), 'Should We Hate or Love MIRAB?' Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 95-97. 
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Conclusions 
 
A Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement –  
“Off the Shelf, or Tailor Made?” 
Is the Pacific a region? 
 
 
“The Pacific Islands have no basis for a relationship with the EU until the wheel of history moves 
again…and it has good reason to want what few resources they possess.  Until such time we 
remain, yours sincerely, an afterthought.” 
(Grynberg, 1996, p. 28) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pacific analyst and economist, Roman Grynberg wrote the words above at a time the 
Lomé reforms were questioning the logic of the EU-ACP partnership.  In a similar 
fashion, the negotiation of a Pacific EPA has been demonstrated to raise doubts about the 
rationale of regional integration as a template for development.  The Pacific ACP was an 
afterthought in the ACP architecture.  The PACP states benefited from the Lomé 
Conventions, and were required to do little in return for the Community.  Now, with the 
subdivision of the ACP into regional groups, as well as differentiation, and the need to 
adopt reciprocal trade with the EU, the ‘afterthought’ has been forced to adapt as best it 
can to the new parameters of the EU-ACP partnership.  While the application of a 
regional template might be advantageous to the EU for reasons of efficiency, it has 
created an arbitrarily defined region.  It has been shown that the Pacific in general 
possesses weak potential to engage in the level of integrative activity that is envisaged by 
the Cotonou Agreement.  It can be said to constitute a region, but linkages tend to be 
stronger at the sub regional level, across and within the cultural sub regions of Micronesia 
and Polynesia, and Melanesia.  Conceptualisations of the Pacific as a tightly woven 
region are modern day constructions, behind which the will to cooperate is still being 
fleshed out.  Thus, it is unlikely that the EPA template can be taken “off the shelf,” to be 
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used as a vehicle of development.  Instead, the EU will likely have to consider options to 
“tailor” an EPA to the Pacific ACP states’ requirements as a collective. 
 
 
II. RATIONALE OF REGIONAL RELATIONS WITH 
THE PACIFIC REVISITED 
1. An Immature Partnership 
The grounds for such an assertion are compelling.  Firstly, are the weaknesses of the 
rationale for a South-South-North trade agreement between the EU and the Pacific.  
Although it is argued that stimulating regional trade integration constitutes a stepping 
stone to participation in reciprocal free trade with the EU, and other partners, the Pacific 
is an underdeveloped trade partner in this respect.  Pacific regional trade is low, and most 
of the PACP states have an immature trade relationship with the EU.  Those that do 
possess strong trade ties with Europe are dependent on a small range of subsidised or 
preferentially treated products.  This is hardly a good foundation upon which to construct 
a liberalised trade regime.  Although the FICs have committed to a schedule of 
liberalisation in trade in goods, under the PICTA, its potential for trade diversion is high, 
and welfare generating prospects slim, as the islands lack comparative advantage to reap 
the benefits of scale economies. 
 
2. Associationism 
If the grounds for constructing an FTA between the Pacific and the EU are scant, there 
must be a more compelling reason for why the two parties are intensifying their 
relationship.  Returning to an earlier concept, the first reason lies in the logic of 
associationism.  While the partnership is economically rational for the ACP states because 
of the development assistance and market access provided by it, especially for the PACP 
states, which are much more dependent on rent from aid flows for economic growth, there 
are other reasons for why it has persisted.  As has been illustrated, the partnership has an 
intrinsic value for the EU and the ACP states.1  The EU, for its part, fulfils a moral and 
legal obligation to improve the welfare of its developing world partners, while the ACP 
derives integrity, representation within the EU, and its existence from the partnership.  As 
                                                          
1 Enzo R. Grilli, , (1993), The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge University 
Press, London; Majorie Lister, (1997), The European Union and the South, Routledge, London & New 
York. 
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such, the Pacific can specifically benefit from the role that the EU can fulfil in boosting 
the capacity for Pacific states to conduct regional integration.  The partnership also gives 
the PACP states the added security of a negotiated agreement with a comprehensive 
development dimension.  Furthermore, as noted, the EPA framework has been 
demonstrated to be a fairer vehicle for North-South trade relations, for all PACP and ACP 
states, than other alternatives, such as the EU’s GSP or the EBA initiative.2  Lastly, the 
Cotonou Agreement offers the possibility to more effectively tackle regulatory change in 
the WTO, to the advantage of developing countries, with the EU as a partner, for example 
in the reform of GATT Article XXIV to include SDT.3  Although the trade dimension is 
questionable for a set of small vulnerable island states, these elements of the Cotonou 
Agreement are not worth sacrificing.  Thus, the partnership is greater than the value of its 
features. 
 
Thus, the arguments for a Pacific EPA might be considered nothing more than a “legal fig 
leaf,” to pacify opponents of EU-ACP trade in the WTO, if the leitmotif of partnership is 
not fully considered.  It is also a reminder that one of the non-negotiable elements of the 
EPA process is to achieve WTO compatibility, so that the partnership may be preserved 
without ambiguity, in the form of an RTA.  A Pacific EPA therefore will legitimise the 
broader development objectives of the partnership for the PACP.  Nevertheless, the logic 
for an FTA between the EU and the Pacific is not convincing, given the existing levels of 
trade and the potential for future trade.  In other words, a Pacific EPA may still be 
considered an absurdity outside of the Cotonou framework.4  Hence, the EPA template is 
necessary to introduce reciprocity into the partnership.  Of certainty, then, are that such 
global imperatives clash with the integrative potential of the Pacific region. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Sanoussi Bilal, (2002), Implications of the Doha Development Agenda on the EPA Negotiations, 
COMESA Secretariat, Lusaka, Zambia, accessed at http://www.eu-acp-trade.org, 18 March 2004; Bonapas 
Onguglo, and Taisuke Ito, (2003), How to Make EPAs WTO Compatible? Reforming the Rules on 
Regional Trade Agreements, (ECDPM Discussion Paper 40), 17 September, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at: http://www.ecdpm.org/, 29 October 
2003. 
3 Pascal Lamy, (2002), 'Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU’s Approach Towards the Problem of 
Multilateralism vs Regionalism in Trade Policy', The World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 10, pp. 1399-1413, pp. 
1406-08. 
4 Roman Grynberg, (2000), Asymmetric Reciprocity in the Post-Lomé Framework, Implications for Trade 
Relations in the Pacific, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed at:  http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/biblio_pacific.php, 14 July 2003, p. 7 & p. 11. 
 184
III. EVALUATION: THE EXTENT OF REGIONALISM IN THE PACIFIC 
1. Political-Institutional Integration 
As has been shown by the political economy of regional cooperation in the developing 
world, regional integration is an activity that demands a high degree of collective political 
will from developing countries, which is harder to sustain as the risks are greater.  In the 
Pacific, political cooperation has been driven by exogenous influences, whether in 
response to decolonisation, or the new development orthodoxy, which seeks to integrate 
the Pacific into the global trading system.  As young nations, with limited resources, the 
PICs have usually seen value in regionalism when it can serve clear-cut national interests, 
which has meant that integration has been limited to specific functional areas, for 
example, in fisheries, the environment and shipping.  As current Forum Secretary-
General, Greg Urwin, has reflected, regional organisations were created to assist in the 
delivery of technical state-sponsored development programmes, which added value 
national efforts, but reflected the state-centric nature of the regional approach to 
development.5
 
In other cases, the distribution of costs and benefits has benefited large states, like Fiji, to 
the detriment of the small vulnerable islands states.  Consequently, sub-regionalism has 
been strong, as PICs have formed groups, such as the MSG and SIS, where they share 
interests and status.  In general, regionalism has so far been best characterised as 
“collective diplomacy,” because the question of intensive integration has been avoided in 
order to reach accord on issues of mutual benefit.6  Assistance from regional powers has 
also buoyed Pacific regionalism.  Nevertheless, the adoption of the recommendations of 
the 2003-2004 Forum Review shows that Pacific leaders are beginning to realise that the 
root problems of development and the challenges of globalisation may be better addressed 
at the regional level, through pooling resources.  However, it is still very much an idea.7  
                                                          
5 Greg Urwin, and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, (2004), Economic Development of Pacific Island 
Economies and Regional Cooperation, Presentation by Mr. Greg Urwin, Secretary General Forum 
Secretariat, at the USP Seminar, Tuesday 18 May 2004, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, accessed 
at: http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2004/May/May_05.htm, 20 May 2004. 
6 Greg Fry, (1994), 'International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to 
Collective Diplomacy', in Andrew W. Axline (ed.), The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation, Pinter, 
London. 
7 Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, (2004), Pacific Cooperation, Voices of the Pacific, The 
Eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 2004, New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs & Trade, Wellington, accessed at: 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/pdf/PIF%20Report.pdf, 8 April 2004, p. 10; 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, (2004), 'Pacific Leaders Meet in Auckland to Discuss Pacific Plan', 
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Consequently, the political-institutional capacity for the Pacific to act as a region shows 
potential to handle more intensive integration, but for now lacks the will to go much 
beyond the limited form of functional integration employed. 
 
2. Economic Integration 
Efforts such as the negotiation and ratification of PICTA strengthen the case for greater 
regional cooperation, though.  Again, the PICTA is the first step in a broader plan to 
eventually establish reciprocal trade with New Zealand, Australia, and the EU.  As most 
FICs are LDCs or vulnerable island states, they will still require SDT, and some level of 
trade preferences over an extensive time period, while they adjust to free trade, including 
structural adjustment, as alternative forms of income are found to address loss of customs 
revenue, and the socio-economic impact of liberalisation.  A diverse range of high tariffs 
complicate the prospects for adoption of a common external tariff.  Again, it is difficult to 
argue convincingly that because the FICs have agreed to construct an FTA that it is an 
optimum expression of an RTA.  Significantly, the slower pace of liberalisation may also 
throw the EPA negotiating timetable awry.  What is more, the PACP and PICTA exclude 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia.  But FICs must now also consider an outlier, like 
East Timor; should it be part of the Pacific EPA as a PACP state, or negotiate a bilateral 
deal with the EU?  The PACER includes Australia and New Zealand, as the key trade 
partners to the region, but of course the EPA negotiations exclude both these regional 
participants.  Therefore the most serious problem associated with reciprocal free trade for 
the PACP/FICs is with the sequencing of agreements with multiple partners, caused by 
overlapping membership of RTAs. 
 
3. Common Identity 
If economic integration is problematic on a number of levels, the dynamics of Pacific 
identity are far more complicated than the European Commission has thus far 
acknowledged.  Island societies have developed along different trajectories caused by 
autonomous development, and because of the different resources available to them.  The 
way the Pacific was ‘peopled’ by successive migrations evidenced that islanders do have 
a sense and ability to conduct cross regional exchange, but it more importantly influenced 
the rise of distinctive ethnic-cultural sub regions.  These threads of pre-historical identity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ABC Go Asia Pacific, Australia, 6 April 2004, p. accessed at: http://www.abc.net.au/asiapacific/news, 6 
April 2004. 
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were taken and formalised in the minds of islanders by the early European explorers, who 
developed the sub-regional culture areas of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia.  In 
general, the values and leadership structures are quite different, ranging from shared 
political power in Melanesia, to chiefly societies in Polynesia.  Therefore, even though it 
is tempting to label all Pacific islanders as a regional people, it is in fact difficult to argue 
that islanders have a natural common identity, as division was ironically enforced by 
Western naming and colonisation of the Pacific.  The Pacific Way, coined by Ratu Mara, 
representing an island consensual approach to politics, is the most cogent attempt at a 
common identity, but, again, it is a political construction, as illustrated by the Forum 
Review’s suggestion that the Pacific Way incorporate principles of good government.  
Besides the Pacific Way, perhaps only the vague shared interest in the ocean, is the most 
appropriate lowest common denominator of Pacific identity. 
 
4. Capacity 
If islanders did earlier possess the ability to conduct cross-regional exchange, the capacity 
to remain in touch is severely limited in the contemporary Pacific.  However, the most 
effective means to stay connected with each other and the outside world are through ICTs 
and transportation, but they are also the most costly.  Regional cooperation therefore 
offers the best strategy to share the infrastructural costs, coordinate the efficient use of 
resources and to conduct negotiations in order to provide better transportation; 
communications and enhanced trade opportunities with the rest of the world.  The 
effective measurement of enhancement of capacity is best achieved by the steps taken to 
achieve these goals in such sectoral areas in the Pacific. 
 
 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR A PACIFIC EPA 
Hence, the Pacific may be considered a very disparate region to integrate.  With all of the 
above limitations and the technical obstacles involved in implementing the PCP in the 
Pacific, it seems in many ways the application of an EPA does not make sense.  As 
described, the EU definition of the Pacific assumes a high degree of integrative potential, 
based on the Forum architecture and a strong will to cooperate.  However, as the terms of 
the debate about integration in the Pacific are not about post-national destinations, but 
about development, the PACP states for a variety of reason are less able to adopt an EU-
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inspired model of regional cooperation that enshrines economic integration a keystone of 
the process. 
 
This argument is strengthened when it is likely that an alternative framework for EU-
PACP relations will need to be adopted to take account of the limited extent of 
integration, as provided for under Article 36.7 of Cotonou, to be able conclude a Pacific 
regional trade agreement.  The elements of this are highlighted below.8
 
• In general, a two to three tiered approach to negotiations is a strong option.  
It will allow negotiations to continue on form and scope, but by leaving 
negotiation of the trade elements of the partnership until last will avoid 
activating Article 6 of PACER unnecessarily soon. 
 
• In relation to managing the scope and pace of liberalisation for island 
economies with limited elasticity, a reassessment of the target of 
reciprocation, below the 90 per cent standard is necessary given the 
importance of preferential trade to PACP states.  Although this might mean a 
soft-FTA is created, where a significant proportion of trade is not liberalised, it 
may be a compromise the EU will have to make in order to continue the 
partnership. 
 
• The agenda of Pacific EPA negotiations should be broadened to include a 
development agenda for economic activities where PICs have comparative 
advantage, as noted, in fisheries, investment and tourism or trade in services.  
Extensive regional trade facilitation programmes, investment assistance 
programmes and sanitary and phytosanitary compliance programmes, already 
begun, will bolster integration efforts in these areas. 
 
                                                          
8 Cf. European Centre for Development Policy Management, (2001), Cotonou Info Kit, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at: http://www.ecdpm.org, 24 February 
2003, No. 15; Robert Scollay, (2002), Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union, A Report for ACP Secretariat and the Pacific ACP States, 28 
2002, ACP-EU Trade Relations, available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/documents/Scollay%202002%20-
%20Pacific%20EPA%20Impact%20study.pdf, accessed August 2003; Vincent Roza and Stefan Szepesi, 
(2003), EPA Impact Studies Perspectives for the Pacific, InBrief, No. 2A, European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, accessed at http://www.ecdpm.org, 12 December 2003. 
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• Areas of integration beyond trade in goods may therefore represent the 
optimum level for initial region-to-region cooperation.  Integration could begin 
here, and then move to trade in goods. 
 
Hence, the slow, phased pace of political and economic integration in the Pacific suggests 
a clear “piecewise approach” to regional cooperation, to integrate in sectors as they and 
the PACP states become ready for reciprocal liberalisation with the EU. 
 
 
V. PROSPECTS FOR AN EU TEMPLATE OF 
REGIONALISM IN THE PACIFIC 
In conclusion, the view from Brussels is very different.  Perhaps in growing recognition 
of the nature of Pacific regionalism, Development Director-General Richelle’s statement 
at the 2003 post-Forum dialogue illustrated that the EU is willing to adopt a 
“consultative” approach to EU-PACP trade negotiations, and promises not to enter into 
them until the PACP is ready.9  Indeed it may be further proof that the PACP is an odd 
component in the region-to-region architecture constructed by the Cotonou Agreement.  
Certainly, the EPA template creates a number of new demands for the PACP states, in 
terms of dealing with a more complicated agenda, reciprocal trade, implications of the EU 
relationship on their relations with Australia and New Zealand, as well as the imperative 
for regional integration.10  It is clear then the negotiation of a Pacific EPA will create yet 
another artificial, externally defined ‘Pacific region,’ in reflection of the neoliberal 
political imperatives generated in Brussels, Geneva and Washington, since the integration 
process has yet to be legitimated at the elite or the grassroots levels of Pacific societies.  
EU assumptions about the degree of commonality in the Pacific ignore the high levels of 
informality and diverse interests, which characterise regionalism in the Pacific.  The case 
also demonstrates that regional solutions to the problems of underdevelopment are 
inherently political in character, in the developing world, which justifies the use of a 
political economy framework to capture the potential for a region such as the Pacific to 
work towards regional integration.  Hence, EPAs are not just about trade and WTO 
                                                          
9 Koos Richelle, (2003), Statement by Mr Koos Richelle Director-General for Development, European 
Commission, Fifteenth Post-Forum Dialogue Partners Meeting, Commission of European Communities, 
Auckland, New Zealand, p. 7. 
10 Scollay, Draft Impact Assessment of Possible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the 
European Union, op cit., pp. 81-82. 
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compatibility, they carry on the legacy of associationism.  Consequently, even though this 
mixed agenda creates a capabilities-expectation gap between development policy 
objectives and the implementation of the PCP in the Pacific, the partnership between the 
EU and the Pacific will endure.  More generally, the EPA process highlights that what 
constitutes the Pacific region is defined by those who have an interest in it. 
 
Therefore, an EPA “off the shelf” is not the optimal vehicle of development for the 
PACP, as the model does not match the integrative potential of the region across a 
number of dimensions, if deep integration is pursued all at once.  Presently there is an 
indeterminate end to the situation, as an alternative trade agreement is likely to be adopted 
between the Pacific and the EU.  However, it does not appear sub regional or bilateral 
trade agreements will be pursued, because of the salience of the development partnership 
to both sides.  An accommodation will be reached rather than allow the PACP group to 
fragment, or the partnership to dissolve.  If a compromise is found, the trade arrangements 
may be harder to defend in the WTO, depending on the outcome of the Doha round and 
whether SDT can be incorporated into Article XXIV.  In conclusion, there is evidence of 
an increased commitment to regional integration in the Pacific, of which PICTA and the 
“Pacific Plan” are positive examples.  However, the potential for intensive regional 
integration is less well developed in the Pacific, as the logic of integration is not union, as 
in Europe, but interdependence. 
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Appendix One 
 
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC REGION 
 
 
Source: Keesing, 1989. 
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Appendix Two 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Member States and Administrative Regions 
as at 1 May 2004. 
 
 
Source: Europa website: http://europa.eu.int/abc/maps/index_en.htm 
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Appendix Three 
 
The Six Regions of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States for 
Negotiation of 
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union 
 
 
Source: Allen, 2002, p. 1. 
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Appendix Four: 
 
KEY INDICATORS FOR 
PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES 
 
 Population 
(2000) 
Land Area 
(km2) 
Population 
Density 
(2000) 
EEZ 
(km2) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(2000) 
UNHDI 
Rank 
(2001) 
Cook Islands 21,000 240 88 1,830 71 0.822 
Federated States 
of Micronesia 
118,000 702 6 2,131 68 0.569 
Fiji 812,000 18,272 44 1,260 69 0.667 
French Polynesia 235,000 3,265 72 - 73 - 
Kiribati 91,000 690 132 3,600 62 0.515 
Nauru 12,000 21 571 320 59 0.663 
New Caledonia 213,000 19,103 11 - 73 - 
Niue 2,000 259 8 390 - 0.774 
North Marianas 70,000 477 68 - - - 
Palau 20,000 458 23 601 70 0.861 
Papua New 
Guinea 
5,200,000 463,000 11 3,120 59 0.314 
Repbulic of 
Marshall Islands 
50,000 181 36 2,131 65 0.563 
Samoa 170,000 2,935 58 120 69 0.590 
Solomon Islands 447,000 28,530 16 1,630 - 0.371 
Tokelau 1,000 10 100 - - - 
Tonga 100,000 699 143 700 71 0.647 
Tuvalu 11,000 26 423 757 64 0.583 
Vanuatu 197,000 11,880 17 680 - 0.425 
Wallis & Futuna 20,000 274 14 - - - 
Sources: Commission of the European Communities, 2002, p. 8; Hughes, 2003, p. 4 & p. 6; 
United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2003 
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Appendix Five: 
 
TIMETABLE OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
EU-ACP WIDE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AND 
PACIFIC ISLAND CONTRIES TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
Date EU-ACP Negotiations Pacific Trade Negotiations EU-ACP Trade Regime 
Spring 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2001 
The EU requests and 
receives, in 2001, 
derogation from other 
WTO members enabling it 
to maintain Lomé trade 
preferences until 2008. 
1998: FEMM 
commissioned research into 
options for free trade 
among FICs. 
 
 
1999: Draft negotiating text 
completed for a FIC only 
FTA. 
 
 
 
FEMM Ministers accept 
most of draft proposal at 
annual FEMM Ministerial.  
PACER agreement adopted 
to include Australian and 
New Zealand trade interests 
within Pacific trade 
architecture. 
 
 
 
PICTA and PACER 
agreements completed at 
Nauru PIF Meeting. 
 
 
2001: “Everything But 
Arms Initiative” allows 
duty-free and quota-free 
access for all products, 
except for weapons, from 
all LDCs to the EU market.  
Affects ACP LDCs. 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance with the 79 
ACP countries, except 
South Africa, of non-
reciprocal tariff preferences 
in force at present, i.e. the 
Lomé regime for all ACP 
countries. 
 
 
 
Among FICs, SPARTECA 
preferences continue with 
Australia and New Zealand 
until PACER mechanisms 
triggered, 2011. 
 
 
Progressive liberalisation of 
commodities covered by 
Commodity Protocols: 
sugar, rice, bananas. 
September 
2002 
 
End of preparatory phase of 
negotiations. 
 
 
October 2002: PACER 
agreement ratified. 
September 
2002 – 
September 
2003 
All ACP – EU phase of 
negotiations.  Agreement of 
negotiation mandates and 
guidelines for the conduct 
of region-to-region 
negotiates completed. 
 
April 2003: 
PICTA ratified, FIC to 
make regular reductions in 
trade and tariff barriers. 
September 
2003 – 31 
December 
2007 
The EU negotiates EPAs 
with ACP countries, in the 
form of regional groupings.  
As yet no country by 
country alternative trade 
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arrangements were under 
negotiation. 
2004 The EU and ACP countries 
study all possible 
alternatives for non-LDC 
countries which decide that 
they are not able to sign 
FTAs. 
 
The EU revises its GSP.  
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
The EU and the ACP 
countries analyse 
prospective agreements “to 
ensure that the timetable 
envisaged permits the 
adequate preparation of 
negotiations.” 
 
 
 
Beginning of liberalisation 
for excepted products on 
PICTA “negative list”. 
 
 
 
1 January 2008 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 
 
2016 
 
 
Enforcement of new EPAs Forum review of PICTA. 
 
Full liberalisation for trade 
in goods among MDC 
FICs, except for LDC 
island states and Compact 
states. 
 
Negotiations for an FTA 
between Australia, New 
Zealand and FICs 
scheduled to begin, under 
PACER. 
 
 
Vulnerable island states to 
complete liberalisation. 
 
 
 
Tariffs for negative list 
products reach zero. 
End of the global ‘all-ACP’ 
Lomé regime.  ACP 
signatories of EPAs 
progressively open their 
markets to EU products. 
LDCs which have chosen 
not to conclude EPAs retain 
their non-reciprocal tariff 
preferences. 
Non-LDCs which have 
chosen not to conclude 
EPA’s benefit from a new 
regime (yet to be defined). 
From 2018-
2020 
 Article XXIV compliant 
FIC FTA under PICTA 
enforced; negotiation and 
implementation of PACER 
provisions continue. 
Enforcement of FTAs 
between the EU and ACP 
signatories of EPAs. 
Sources: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2001, Cotonou InfoKit No. 14 & No. 15; 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2001; Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2001. 
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Appendix Six 
 
INTER AND INTRA-REGIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF PACIFIC ISLAND 
TERRITORIES 
 
Country World 
Bank 
ACP-
Cotonou 
LDC SIDS 
(UNDP) 
WTO Common-
wealth 
Sub regional 
Agreements/
Territory of 
American Samoa — — — — — — United 
States 
Cook Islands  ?    ? NZFA 
SIS 
PIF 
Easter Island — — — — — — Chile 
Non-SPC 
Fiji ? ?  ? ? ? MSG 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
SPC 
French Polynesia — — — — — — OCT 
(? PIF – 
applicant) 
Guam — — — — — — United 
States 
Hawaii — — — — — — United 
States 
Kiribati ? ? ? ?  ? SIS 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
— — — — — — United 
States 
Marshall Islands ? ?     Compact 
SIS 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
Micronesia 
(FSM) 
? ?  ?   Compact 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
Nauru  ?  ?  ? SIS 
PIF 
New Caledonia — — — — — — OCT 
(? PIF) 
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Niue  ?  ?  ? SIS 
PIF 
NZFA 
Palau ? ?  ?   Compact 
PIF 
Papua New 
Guinea 
? ?   ? ? MSG 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
Pitcairn Island — — — — — — OCT 
Samoa ? ? ? ? ? ? PIF 
SPARTECA 
Solomon Islands ? ? ? ? ? ? MSG 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
Tokelau — — — — — — NZSAT 
Tonga ? ?  ? ? ? PIF 
SPARTECA 
Tuvalu  ? ? ?  ? SIS 
PIF 
Vanuatu ? ? ? ? ? ? MSG 
PIF 
SPARTECA 
Wallis & Futuna — — — — — — OCT 
Totals 24 10 14 5 12 3 (5) 11  
Based on Schiff, 2002, p. 25-26. 
Key 
? Member/Associate 
? Observer 
Compact US Compact of Association Island state 
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 
NZFA Island in autonomous Free Association with New Zealand 
NZSAT New Zealand Self-Administering Territory 
Non-SPC Non-member of the South Pacific Community (NB. Unless specified, all other 
 territories are SPC members) 
— Not applicable 
OCT Overseas Country and Territory 
PIF Pacific Islands Forum 
SIS Small Islands State Summit 
SPARTECA South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
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Appendix Seven 
 
CULTURAL SUB REGIONS OF THE PACIFIC 
ILLUSTRATING MICRONESIA, MELANESIA AND POLYNESIA 
(Including approximate date of settlement) 
 
Source: Lal and Fortune, 2001, p. 56. 
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Appendix Eight 
 
RATIFICATION STATUS FOR COUNTRIES COVERED BY 
PICTA AND PACER 
 
 PICTA 
(entered into force, 13 April 2003) 
PACER 
(entered into force, 3 October 2002) 
Country Date Signed Date Ratified Date Signed Date Ratified 
Cook Islands 18 August 2001 28 August 2001 18 August 2001 28 August 2001 
Fiji 18 August 2001 16 October 2001 18 August 2001 15 October 2001 
FSM     
Kiribati 18 August 2001 4 June 2003 18 August 2001 4 June 2003 
Nauru 18 August 2001 14 March 2003 18 August 2001 14 March 2003 
Niue 18 August 2001 26 February 
2003 
18 August 2001 26 February 
2003 
Palau   18 August 2001  
PNG 5 March 2002 10 August 2003 5 March 2002 10 August 2003 
RMI   18 August 2001  
Samoa 18 August 2001 10 October 2001 18 August 2001 10 October 2001 
Solomon Islands 6 August 2002 5 June 2003 6 August 2002 5 June 2003 
Tonga 18 August 2001 27 December 
2001 
18 August 2001 27 December 
2001 
Tuvalu 18 August 2001  18 August 2001  
Vanuatu 18 August 2001  18 August 2001  
Australia na na 18 August 2001 3 July 2002 
New Zealand na na 18 August 2001 21 November 
2001 
Source: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2003, p. 12; Inman and ANZ Banking Group, 2003, p. 
4. 
 
 
 235
Appendix Nine 
 
TABLES ILLUSTRATING THE PROFILE OF THE 
EU-PACIFIC TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
Import and Export Patterns and Products 
 
A. Comparison of Imports and Export Patterns in Selected ACP Regions 
ACP regions Imports Exports 
 EU ROW Intra-region EU ROW 
CARICOM 18% 80% 2% 24% 74% 
CEMAC 71% 25% 3% 30% 69% 
EAC 42% 52% 7% 35% 67% 
PACP 5% 93% 3% 19% 77% 
Sources: Szepesi, 2003, p. 24; McQueen, 1999; Netherlands Economic Institute (NEI), 1998. 
 
B. Share of Exports to and Imports from the EU for PACP/FICs 
as a percentage of Total Exports/Imports 
 Exports Imports 
Cook Islands (2001) 0.33 0.92 
Federated States of Micronesia 
(2000) 
Na >0.01 
Fiji (2001) 1.82 18.31 
Kiribati (1999) 0.28 5.91 
Nauru Na Na 
Niue (1998) 0.2 Na 
Palau (2000) 0.62 Na 
Papua New Guinea (2001) 1.99 10.2 
Repbulic of Marshall Islands (2000) >0.1 Na 
Samoa (2001) 4.2 4.10 
Tonga (2000) 0.70 1.45 
Tuvalu (1999) 1.51 na 
Vanuatu (2001) 5.32 8.71 
Source: Roza and Szepesi, 2003, p. 2. 
 
C. Exports to EU of Eight Original PACP States 
(Percentage shares by country, 2000) 
Fiji 29.05% 
Kiribati 0.07% 
Vanuatu 1.50% 
Tuvalu 0.00% 
Tonga 0.02% 
Solomon Islands  2.81% 
Samoa 0.68% 
Papua New Guinea 65.86% 
Source: Scollay, 2002, p. 29. 
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D. Imports from EU of Eight Original PACP States 
(Percentage shares by country, 2000) 
Fiji 36.26% 
Kiribati 0.15% 
Vanuatu 10.43% 
Tuvalu 0.20% 
Tonga 0.51% 
Solomon Islands 3.58% 
Samoa 3.89% 
Papua New Guinea 44.97% 
Data from six new PACP states were unavailable.  They however have negligible trade relations 
with the EU, as three are US Compact states (RMI, FSM and Palau) and the Cook Islands, Niue 
and Nauru do not have a history of cooperation with European Community. 
Source: Scollay, 2002, p. 25. 
 
 
E. Principal Exports to the European Union of Six PACP States 
(Percentage of total exports to EU – 2000) 
Fiji Papua New Guinea Samoa 
Sugar 92.3% Palm Oil 31.0% Copra 80.6% 
Plant Products 1.8% Coffee 26.7% Kava 6.7% 
Garments 0.8% Copper Ores and 
Concentrates 
14.6% Garments 5.6% 
Fish, frozen or fresh 0.7% Coconut Oil 11.6% Beer 0.6% 
Canned Fish 0.7% Copra 6.9%   
  Canned Fish 1.5%   
Solomon Islands Tonga Vanuatu 
Canned Fish 62.3% Vanilla 24.7% Copra 61.2% 
Coconut Oil 25.5% Marine Products 11.5% Coconut Oil 9.2% 
Copra 3.0% Coffee 1.8% Kava 7.6% 
Cocoa 1.7% Fruit Juices 1.0% Cocoa 7.0% 
Timber 1.5%   Marine Products 1.4% 
Source: Scollay, 2002, p. 29. 
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F. A Representative Sample of Main Imports from the EU to 
Three Original PACP States – 2000 
(Percentage of total imports of each PACP state) 
Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands 
Electrical machinery 
and Apparatus 
21.5% Bulldozers or 
Heavy Machinery 
13.2% Parts, Accessories 
for Machines and 
Appliances 
12.0% 
Machinery for 
Working Rubber and 
Plastic 
15.4% Metal Structures 7.8% Electrical 
machinery and 
Apparatus 
10.0% 
Machine Parts 5.4% Prepared or 
Preserved Meat 
7.0% Special Purpose 
Supplies and 
Services 
7.9% 
Soya Bean Oil and 
its Fractions 
3.4% Electrical 
Equipment for Line 
Telephony 
4.1% Hand Tools and 
Components for 
Hand Tools 
5.6% 
Automatic Data 
Processing 
Machinery and Units 
3.1% Instruments and 
Appliances 
3.5% Medicaments 5.0% 
Machine and 
Mechanical 
Appliances 
3.1% Optical Fibres 2.4% Sugar 2.7% 
Medicaments 2.6% Transmission 
Shafts 
2.0% Pickling 
Preparations for 
Metal Surfaces, 
Fluxes 
2.6% 
  Dishwashing 
Machines 
1.8%   
Source: Scollay, 2002, p. 24. 
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